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ABSTRACT
It is popularly assumed that the public is highly punitive toward criminal offenders and
that its reasoning about criminal offences is emotionally and morally based. This
assumption has been challenged by social scientists who cite influences of news media
and methodological flaws in empirical studies as contributing causes. Public sentiment is
. I

a basis for law and the increasing responsiveness of legislators to what is perceived to be
public opinion on crime means that accurate information on enduring principles in the
public's intuitive reasoning about criminal justice is vital. An initial exploratory study
(N = 34) presented members of the pubiic with descriptions of emotionally and morally

provocative offences. Morally indignant reactions and the assignment of punishments that
were disproportionate to the objective harm caused by the offences indicated aspects of
offences and associated reasoning principles that were worthy of further, experimental
investigation. Important principles appeared to be breach of trust by an offender in a
position of trust and the vulnerability of victims. A second study (N = 348) examined the
influence of these two variables in a 3 x 3 (offender position of trust x victim
vulnerability) between-subjects experiment. Findings confirmed that victim vulnerability
exacerbates the public's condemnation of offences in a more prosaic offence. However,
the results also showed that an offender who occupied a highly trusted position in society
was not more highly condemned than offenders in less trusted positions. In addition to the
finding that the highly trusted offender was perceived to be significantly less in need of a
punishment aimed at individual deterrence, this finding led to a hypothesis that his high
status may have protected him from public sanction. It was also concluded that the type of
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trust whose violation the participants of the initial study strongly condemned may have
been the trust that is inherent in relationships, rather than in social positions. Survey
research (N1 = 192, N2 = 237) provided an empirical basis for unconfounded
representations of status and trust in further investigations. Doctors, lawyers and police
officers were selected as exemplars of various levels of trust and status. A subsequent
experimental study (N = 122) manipulated offenders' trust and status, and the existence of
' '

a professional relationship between the offender and victim in a 3 x 2 between-subjects
design. Results indicated that the existence of a professional trust relationship interacted
with the status and position of trust of an offender in their effect on public condemnation.
The high status of an offender became a liability in terms of condemnation when that
offender also had a professional relationship with his victim, but only when the offender
occupied a trusted position in society. The same study indicated that, in an offence where
no professional relationship with the victim existed, high status offered a significant
degree of protection from a punishment aimed at general deterrence. It was concluded
that, although concerns for victim vulnerability are ubiquitous in the public's reasoning
about criminal justice, trust is a principle that is applied complexly and which interacts
with offender status and offender-victim relationship. The public's responses to criminal
offenc�s are both more complex and more rational than is widely believed. The variability
found in the data collected for this series of studies indicated that criminal justice
researchers must be cautious in assuming consensus in public evaluations of offences and
its reasoning about deserved punishment.
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BACKGROUND
The public is widely believed to have punitive attitudes towards criminal
offenders. Additionally, there exists a widespread assumption that the public responds
emotively rather than rationally to some offences, and that its decisions about deserved
punishment are characterised by intuitive, moral judgments rather than factual assessment
of risk and harm. For example, Tyler and Boeckmann (1997) found that, not only was the
public supportive of punitive legislation, its punitiveness arose from moral and social
concerns rather than assessments of the potential harm of crimes or concerns about the
performance of the courts.
Evidence for emotive, moralistic public justice reasoning is found in news media
reporting of crime and its portrayals of public responses as well as in empirical scientific
literature. A recent community newspaper survey of more than 15,000 Western
Australian residents reported that 91% believed that criminal sentences were too lenient,
85% favoured corporal punishment for offenders, and 70% favoured the death penalty for
people who sold drugs ("What Our Readers Feel," 2000). However, the news media have
been said to play a role in perpetuating or even promoting such a view of crime and its
impact for self-interested purposes (for example, Howitt, 1998). The recent community
news survey was methodologically suspect in that participants were self-selected and the
questions were emotive, complex and leading. For example, the question "Do you feel the
widespread use of illicit drugs has had a deteriorating effect on your quality of life?"
elicited an unsurprising 78% of affirmative responses.
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In general, the public acquires its knowledge of crime from the news media. As
Finkel (1995) stated:
It is quite clear that most people are not sitting at home reading official
statistics on crime. The public is far more likely to be influenced by what it
reads in the newspapers and what it sees on television news. (p. 14)

News media contribute to moral panic and punitive attitudes by presenting
superficial, stereotypical accounts of crimes that are perceived to threaten traditional
moral values (Wilczynski & Sinclair, 1999); through a bias towards reporting extreme
and atypical offences (O'Connell, 1999); by highlighting extra-legal facts (Surette, 1990);
and through emphasis on stories designed to elicit sympathy for vulnerable victims and
moral outrage against terrible offenders (Carriere & Ericson, 1989; O'Connell, 1999).
Roberts and Edwards (1989) found that reading media reports of serious offences led to
more punitive attitudes towards unrelated offences. Doob and Roberts (1984) found that
members of the public who read the same kind of information about a crime that is
available to a sentencing judge were more satisfied with the sentencing decision than
those who read a short account of the same offence in a newspaper report. The Director of
Public Prosecutions in Western Australia favours internet publication of all judicial
sentencing remarks ("Net 'Will Explain' Sentences," 2000) in order to address what he
perceives as selective and superficial media reporting of crime and consequent distortion
of the public's understanding.
Even media presentations of more considered analyses of the public's views on
justice are often based on the popular assumption that the public is punitive and that its
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justice reasoning is based on emotional and moral issues. It was recently reported that a
respected Western Australian lecturer in history warned that reflection of majority
opinion in law, particularly in relation to emotive issues, has been shown to need
tempering by attention to human rights (Leadbetter, 2000).
The widespread use of survey techniques in criminal justice research and the use
of polls as a basis for policy development has attracted criticism for simplistic and
potentially erroneous characterisation of public opinion (Durham, 1993; Finkel, 1995).
The focus for Durham's (1993) analysis of potential compromises to the validity of
survey results was the methods used to ascertain public judgments of appropriate
sentences for crimes. Her concern was for the potential use of such data as an empirical
basis for legislative change and as a theoretical basis for understanding the nature of the
relationship between public preferences and law. Durham argued that, although there is
increasing pressure to include the results of surveys and polls in public policy (see also
Diamond, 1989; Finkel, Maloney, Valbuena, & Groscup, 1996; Stalans, 1993; Walker &
Hough, 1985, on the employment of public opinion polls to support harsher laws), there is
substantial evidence for her view that:
there are several important reasons to be concerned about whether the
responses elicited in surveys of public views of appropriate punishment really
indicate the existence of discrete opinions on appropriate punishment. (p. 8)

Durham (1993) included specificity and unfamiliarity of stimulus material, time
constraints on respondents, respondent comprehension, and the elicitation of general
ideological orientations, rather than particular opinions, in her criticisms of survey
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research on public opinions of criminal justice issues. Her analysis included evidence for
the production of false assumptions of consensus or variability in public opinion, as well
as false indications of punitiveness by survey research. Finkel ( 1995) identified similar
concerns for "poor polling questions, inadequate response choices, bad timing of the poll,
insufficiently detailed questions, transitory reactions that pass for sentiment, or an
inability to tap complex and contradictory sentiment" (p. 14).
The assumption that the public is punitive and non-rational has been challenged
by many social science researchers (for example, Cullen, Cullen, & Wozniak, 1988;
Diamond, 1990; Roberts, 1992). Researchers such as Walker, Collins and Wilson ( 1987)
and Warr ( 1995) have found evidence for diversity in public opinion and an unexpected
sophistication in public attitudes towards crime and punishment. More recently, Doob
(2000) reported that a sample of the Canadian public found alternatives to a justice
system that emphasised simple punishment were acceptable as long as the offender was
held accountable. Doob interpreted these findings in the light of a shift of emphasis on
excessive leniency or toughness in the criminal justice system to one that considers what
is intelligent and fair. Indermaur ( 1987) also found public acceptance and support for
non-punitive sentences and Finkel et al. ( 1996) reported that the public favours
proportional, individualised sentences based on perceived culpability over mandatory,
invariate sentencing frameworks.
Other research has revealed that sources of evidence that suggest public
punitiveness include methodological inadequacies and stereotypical biases in public
decision making that result in unrepresentative judgments. For example, in the absence of
specific information about offences, members of the public use stereotypical, violent

Public Reasoning About Justice
21
crimes as the basis of their judgments (Hough & Roberts, 1999; Indermaur, 1987; Roberts
& Doob, 1989; Stalans, 1993; Thomson & Ragona, 1987; Walker & Hough, 1988).

Interpersonal sources of information about crime have been found to reduce biased recall
of atypical, violent crimes (Stalans, 1993). Presenting the public with a realistic
description of an offence and precisely defined punishment selection tasks has been found
to elicit responses that are less punitive than those evoked by requests for general
opinions (Applegate, Cullen, & Turner, 1996; Jacoby & Cullen, 1998; Zamble & Kalm,
1990). Presenting members of the public with an example of typical criminal case has
been shown to reduce perceptions of judicial leniency (Stalans & Diamond, 1990).
Additionally, the assessment of punitiveness using simple measures, such as
support for generally increasing sentences, obscures the complexity with which members
of the public view criminal justice issues (Flanagan & Caulfield, 1984; Innes, 1993;
Sprott, 1999). Harlow, Darley and Robinson (1995) recommended that participants in
studies of public judgments on appropriate criminal penalties be allowed a large response
range without predetermined scale marks to avoid constraining and artificially reducing
variability in responses. Finally, the simple but non-usual inclusion of a 'don't know'
option for survey responses has been shown to result in sizeable shifts towards public
expressions of 'no opinion' (Jones, 1994).
In recent years in Western Australia, a growing public role in criminal justice
processes has been illustrated by increased, often controversial, political responsiveness
to what is believed to be public opinion. Recent events have shown that perceptions of
public outrage about specific offences have the power to effect strong and rapid changes
to the processes of government and law. Perceptions that the public is outraged, afraid,
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and consequently punitive have led to the enactment of laws that many regard as
Draconian. Examples are the "oppressive, ill-conceived, sloppily drafted and
penologically irrelevant" (Harding, 1995, p. ix) and now repealed Crime (Serious and
Repeat Offenders) Sentencing Act 1992 (1992) and mandatory sentencing of juvenile
offenders. More recently, new home invasion legislation (Criminal Code Amendment
[Home Invasion] Act 2000) has been enacted as a direct response to a perception of
public outrage over the conviction of a homeowner who seriously assaulted a burglar.
Even in the absence of such rapid legislative change, public opinion on justice
eventually finds its way into law (Green, 1996; Lloyd-Bostock, 1991, Tomaino, 1997).
Green (1996) has stated that "public opinion should be the ultimate basis of the law"
(p. 116). Robinson and Darley (1998) have asserted that there is a utilitarian justification
for reflecting community sentiment in legal codes. "Where the criminal law commands
the respect of the community it governs, the law's moral credibility itself provides a
reason for law abidingness" (pp. 443 - 444)1 .
According to Robinson and Darley ( 1995), speculation by the criminal law
community on the public's sense of justice commonly forms a basis for the proposition,
adoption, and interpretation of criminal law. Finkel ( 1995) called this sense of what
ordinary people think is just and fair "commonsense justice" (p. 2). Walker ( 1985) stated
that;

1

There exists an alternative view that public sentiment and the morality of a society should
have a limited place in the law. Although that position is not ignored, a discussion of this
philosophy of law debate lies outside the boundaries of the rationale for this present program of
research. Instead, see Hart (1963) and Devlin (1965) for the original arguments and George
(1990) and Rittinger (1990) for examples of discussions of what is known as the Hart-Devlin
debate.
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In theory sentencing decisions are influenced only by officially approved
considerations, whether embodied in statute, practice direction, case-law or
circular. In real life most sentencers admit to having some regard to what they
believe to be public opinion. (p. 64)

Pillsbury ( 1995) asserted that the public has a passionate philosophy on criminal
justice, and he warned that justice experts who disregard this philosophy risk being
ignored in public debate. Additionally, Lovegrove ( 1998) claimed that judicial sentencing
cannot currently be regarded as well informed policy, in part because it is inadequately
characterised by informed public involvement. One of the five recommendations made in
Lovegrove's proposal to transform judicial policy was the enhancement of community
consultation and education processes.
As public sentiment is used as a basis for law, it is important to know more about
the ways in which the public decides on the seriousness of offences and the severity and
purpose of deserved punishments. There has been very little work done on analysing
ordinary thinking about criminal justice, even though "the idea of ordinary, everyday
extra-legal thinking, or common sense, as distinct from legal norms, concepts, and
definitions, crops up in some form in a great many discussions of law and legal
processes" (Lloyd-Bostock, 199 1, p. 32). The need for accurate information cannot be
over-stated. Ouimet and Coyle ( 199 1) found that perceptions of a high level of fear of
crime in the public had an impact on the judgments of a sample of court practitioners
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(judges, prosecutors, defence counsel, probation officers) even though fear of crime had
no impact on judgments of deserved punishment made by their sample of the general
public. Finkel and colleagues (1996) have reported that "the Court's readings of
community sentiment have been faulty, contradictory, and contentious" (p. 475).
Incorporation of false perceptions of the public view into law has practical implications
for justice and for the legal system. For example, commonsense reasoning about criminal
justice is relied on in some guidelines for the use of discretionary judgments (Lloyd
Bostock, 1991). Additionally, jurors become judges of law and well as judges of fact
(Finkel, 1995) when disparities between black-letter law and commonsense justice lead
them to nullify the law by delivering verdicts based on community sentiment.
Robinson and Darley (1995) asserted that the research methods of social science
provide a much sounder basis than mere speculation for formulation and interpretation of
laws. However, the predominantly correlational nature of criminal justice survey research
presents problems for the internal validity of many studies (Kapardis & Farrington, 1981).
Rather than enacting legislation as a hasty response to survey snapshots and assumptions
of prevailing public sentiment, it may be more useful to have regard to enduring,
normative decision principles that underpin public evaluations of crime seriousness and
appropriate punishment. The use of rigorous experimental methods has the potential to
produce valid, generalisable information that can provide a stable foundation of
understanding and prediction of the public' s wishes when reviewing the administration of
criminal justice.
Accordingly, the purpose of this present program of research was to explore and
determine some of the principles that underpin public judgments of crime seriousness and
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deserved punishment. The use of the term 'principles' in this dissertation means
consistent, underlying bases of social evaluations and judgments. The rationale for the
research was that the methods used would better address aims of explanation and
prediction than simple descriptions of public opinion about particular offences. The focus
was on emotional, morally based principles that underlie public opinions on criminal
justice rather than pragmatic judgments of potential danger and harm from crime.
Although it was expected that this focus would also highlight some extra-legal and extra
evidentiary concerns of the public, disparities between the views of the public and the law
were an implication rather than an aim of this research.

Perspective, Methodology and Structure
The focus and methods of this research were social psychological. However, in an
illustration of the way in which research on areas of substantive interest to social
psychologists often requires an interdisciplinary perspective, the dissertation also drew
heavily on the sociological and criminological literature. Analyses from areas of the
philosophical literature, particularly those relating to morality and ethics, were
incorporated where relevant.
It has been said that social psychology is a hybrid discipline that owes much to
perspectives of sociology (McKnight & Sutton, 1994). This thesis adopts a sociological,
group level of explanation utilising experimental methods. Thus it averts what social
psychology textbooks call the crisis of social psychology (for example, McKnight &
Sutton, 1994; Vaughan & Hogg, 1998; or any social psychology textbook): essentially,
the conflict between validity and applicability. It employs the European social
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psychological approach that favours broad conceptual and theoretical development,
retaining the precise experimental methodology of the North American social
psychological tradition but avoiding the associated criticisms of reductionism and the
unwanted complication of individual levels of meaning (McKnight & Sutton, 1994).
The more recent criticism of social psychology, that its almost exclusive focus on
developed Western societies amounts to 'cultural imperialism' (Moghaddam, 1987) is
addressed by stating from the outset that this finite contribution to the body of social
psychological knowledge is restricted to investigations of such a society.
The methods used in this program of research took into account previous
criticisms of survey research on criminal justice issues made by Durham (1993) and
Finkel ( 1995). Stimulus materials were offence vignettes that presented more detailed
information than labels for offences and offence aspects, but that were comprehensible
and uncomplex. Response formats requested specific evaluations and accounts of
underlying reasoning rather than indications of general beliefs. The use of visual analogue
scales for recording quantitative responses also provided for a wider range of responses
than is usual. Although no time constraints were placed on any of the respondents, the
final study included instructions designed to elicit a consistently more considered level of
response in order to facilitate systematic comparison of groups of participants.
There is mixed support for the use of vignette methodology. In its favour, it has
the advantage of enabling systematic manipulation of variables in brief concrete stimuli
that enhance uniform interpretation (Alexander & Becker, 1978). Vignettes can also be
used to present stimuli that would otherwise be dangerous, impractical, unethical or
infrequent (Lanza, 1988). Criticisms of the vignette method include the specificity and
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artificiality of stimulus scenarios (Flaskerud, 1979). Additionally, Parkinson and
Manstead ( 1993) asserted that the cognitive process of reading and interpreting a written
vignette is far removed from everyday social reality and evaluation and that vignettes are
vignettes are not particularly useful for eliciting affective reactions. Nevertheless, vignette
stimuli were chosen to present offence information to participants of studies included in
the present research because specific evaluations of detailed information about offences
have been shown to reduce false impressions of punitiveness gained from simple requests
for general opinions (Applegate et al., 1996; Jacoby & Cullen, 1998; Zamble & Kalm,
1990). Additionally, the methodology reflects the process by which members of the
public usually become aware of criminal offences and make judgments about them. In
regard to Parkinson and Manstead's (1993) concern about eliciting affective responses
with an essentially cognitive stimulus, the presentation of criminal offence scenarios that
were 'socially real' , for example, video footage, would have run the risk of eliciting
responses that placed too much emphasis on affect.
The structure of this dissertation is essentially that of a series of research reports.
Chapter One describes an initial exploratory study into underlying influences on the
public's responses to provocative offences. Chapter Two reports an experimental
investigation of the impact of two of those influences on reasoning about the seriousness
of a more ordinary offence and its appropriate punishment. The third chapter describes
two surveys that were conducted to clarify the inter-relationship of two variables in need
of further experimental examination. A second experimental study is reported in Chapter
Four and the overall findings of the thesis and its investigation are discussed in the
concluding chapter of the dissertation.
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The First Study
It could be expected that particular types of offences result in public responses
that are more emotionally and morally based, and in more punitive evaluations of
deserved punishment, than others. The first step taken in this program of research was an
exploration of reactions to provocative offences in an attempt to illuminate some of the
underlying principles of such responses. The aim was to obtain indications of links
between offence characteristics and judgments of crime seriousness and deserved
punishment that were disproportionately severe in relation to the objective harm of the
offence in order to inform subsequent experimental studies on the role of these reasoning
principles in decisions about more prosaic offences. This study is reported in Chapter
One.
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CHAPTER !
Public Reactions to Provocative Offences

In the case of offences that are emotionally or morally provocative, it is possible
that strong public responses override consideration of objective principles of justice.
Offences that violate sexual norms, for example, may arouse moral indignation in the
public that results in more severe and punitive sentencing judgments than the legal
culpability of the offender and the harm done to the victim would otherwise suggest. In
order to investigate the intuitive justice reasoning of the public, it is important to
determine some of the aspects of offences that lead the public to use some 'degree of
evoked moral outrage' as an underlying principle for decisions about crime seriousness
and deserved penalties.
Literature that specifically cites moral indignation or outrage as a public reaction
to offences is sparse. Two previous survey studies have investigated moral indignation as
a factor in public-assigned sentences. Scott and Al-Thakeb (1977) stated that the goal of
moral indignation studies is to determine the role of public attitudes in the public
definition of particular behaviours as criminal. Broadhurst and Indermaur ( 1982)
replicated Scott and Al-Thakeb' s study by asking their sample of 278 members of the
Western Australian public to suggest appropriate penalties for 27 violent and non-violent
offences. Their main purpose was to examine the relationships between the severity of
suggested penalties and the accuracy of participants' knowledge about imprisonment; the

Public Reasoning About Justice
30
severity of penalties the public assumed were currently in place for each offence; the level
of general punitiveness of public attitudes; and demographic variables.
Broadhurst and Indermaur (1982) viewed the penalties suggested by members of
the public as a measure of moral indignation and as synonymous with perceived crime
seriousness. They operationalised the measure as the average number of days'
imprisonment allocated for an offence. They hypothesised that moral indi gnation would
be inverseI y correlated with the accuracy of participants' knowledge about imprisonment
and the severity of the penalties they assumed were currently in place. Additionally, they
predicted that punitive attitudes would be positively correlated with moral indignation
and that there would be si gnificant relationships between moral indignation and
demographic characteristics such as age, sex, and education level.
Results showed that moral indignation was unrelated to knowledge of
imprisonment and assumed current penalties. The authors reported, "considerable
variance in response even with crimes defined as violent or very serious" (Broadhurst &
Indermaur, 1982, p. 219). A high, positive correlation was found between general
punitive attitudes and moral indignation - an unsurprising result, given the
operationalisation of the second variable. Relationships of sex and education level to
moral indignation were also reported.
The studies conducted by Scott and Al-Thakeb (1977) and by Broadhurst and
Indermaur (1982) were concerned with actual public opinions of offence seriousness and
appropriate penalties, rather than examination of the principles underlying those opinions.
A more complex conceptualisation of moral indignation was required for the purposes of
the present study. A working definition proposed that moral indignation involves a strong
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emotional response and a sense of violation of important social values or norms. It
incorporated a sense of negative affective reaction and a judgment that an act is wrong,
regardless of its consequences.
Scheff ( 1996) has stated that an indication of moral indignation is 'helpless anger'
at an event that is such a gross violation of normal standards that it defies description.
Although Scheff was talking about the reaction of individuals to crime victimisation, his
operationalisation of the concept of moral indignation concurs with the working
definition of strong aversive feelings and a sense of norm violation.
Moral outrage at morally wrongful acts has been included as a legitimate basis of
punishment by legal sociology and legal philosophy. The classic Durkheimian view of
punishment proposes that its purpose is to enhance social solidarity and moral order
(Garland, 1990). Harold Garfinkel's (1956/ 1982) interpretation of court proceedings as
degradation ceremonies included the characterisation of moral indignation as a "social
affect" (p. 457) that strengthens social bonds. Garfinkel stated that
the paradigm of moral indignation is public denunciation . . . . Moral
indignation serves to effect the ritual destruction of the person denounced.
Unlike shame, which does not bind persons together, moral indignation may
reinforce group solidarity. (p. 457, original italics)

Therefore, moral indignation serves as the mechanism for Durkheim' s view of
punishment as reinforcement of social cohesion.
Conrad Brunk ( 1996) discussed moral outrage in theories of punishment in a
series of lectures on the philosophy of law. He stated that the moral outrage view is a
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version of utilitarianism that justifies punishment for the purpose of maintaining public
order. The goal of the punishment is to provide an outlet for the public sense of moral
outrage. Brunk stated that the motivation for this view is pure revenge, rather than
retribution, because it is not aimed at delivering just deserts. He proposed that, without
this cathartic release of outrage, the public will vent it in more socially destructive ways
such as disrespect for the law. The psychological analogue of Brunk's position
incorporates the psychodynamically based frustration-aggression hypothesis (Dollard,
Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sear, 1939) in that "the expression of moral indignation toward
crime is an outlet for feelings of frustration and aggression" (lndermaur, 1987, p. 165, and
see also D'Anjou, Cozijn, Toom, & Verkoegn, 1978).
Miller and Vidmar ( 1981) developed a social psychological theoretical model of
the social meaning of punishment reactions. They suggested that retributive punishment
for rule-breaking that is perceived as an affront to social and moral values can serve the
purposes of rule vindication, reinforcement of social consensus about rules, and the
release of psychological tension.
The moral outrage view is not a major part of sentencing guidelines as they stand.
Sentencing decisions are based on the magnitude of harm done by an offence and the
degree to which the offender is culpable (for example, Ashworth, 1987). Although far
. from uniform, most models of sentencing aim to provide a punishment that is
proportional to the gravity of an offence and which takes into account the criminal history
of the offender (see Lovegrove, 1987, for a review).
Although intent and harm caused by an offence are the key determinants of
judicial decision making about offence seriousness and consequent deserved punishment
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(Ash worth, 1987), the public's view of the seriousness of particular offences may be
based on the degree to which the offence is wrongful rather than harmful. Hamilton and
Sanders (1983) found cross-cultural evidence for their proposal that a universal property
of judgments of wrongdoing is consideration of what a wrongdoer ought to have done (in
terms of role-related social obligations) as well as what he or she actually did do. Warr
(1989) identified normative evaluations of the wrongfulness of offences, and factual
assessments of the extent of offence harm to a victim as separate contributions to public
perceptions of crime seriousness. He described perceptions of the wrongfulness of an
offence as "the moral gravity of committing the act, that is, the moral culpability or
blameworthiness that would accrue to the individual committing the act" (1989, p. 796).
Wrongfulness has also been associated with judgments of 'badness' of an offender and
his or her actions (O'Connell & Whelan, 1996).
From his survey of a representative sample of 336 residents of Dallas, Texas,
Warr ( 1989) found that judgments of seriousness were based on wrongfulness in response
to crimes that were more wrongful than harmful. When crimes were more harmful than
wrong, judgments were based on the degree of harm. However, Warr also found that a
substantial mipority of participants disregarded the moral gravity of offences and based
their decisions about seriousness on harmfulness alone.
Moral indignation or outrage at the wrongfulness of an offence has the potential to
influence public perceptions of seriousness and to produce associated judgments of
deserved punishment that are disproportionately severe to the factual harmfulness of an
offence. The separation of the importance of actions and their consequences underlies a
fundamental debate of ethics and moral philosophy. The utilitarian view that the test of
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right and wrong resides in consequences is opposed by the views of Kant and others that
an act can be morally wrong even if its consequences are beneficial (Warr, 1989).
The emotional and moral judgments that were the focus of the present study are
more likely to be associated with judgments of the wrongfulness of an offence than
pragmatic assessments of its harmfulness. There has been little recent empirical
investigation into the influence of emotional or moral responses on public sentencing
judgments or the aspects of offences that evoke such responses.
The first study in this program of research explored the reactions of members of
the public to descriptions of offences that were designed to be emotionally and morally
provocative. Responses to these offence scenarios , influential aspects of the offences, as
well as the degree to which these aspects exacerbated evaluations of harmfulness,
wrongfulness, and decisions about deserved punishment were expected to illuminate
some of the underlying principles that may cause the public to make decisions that are
generally perceived as excessively punitive.
The present study was not an investigation of the role of morality and
emotionality in law, but of its presence in the public's reasoning about justice with the
implication that a consequence could be disparities between judicial reasoning and
decision making and public sentiment. Although not the focus of this research, results
may inform what is often held to be a problematic aspect of the interface of public
opinion and justice.
The aim of this initial exploratory study was to obtain indications of links between
offence characteristics and disproportionately severe judgments of crime seriousness and
deserved punishment in order to inform subsequent experimental studies on the role of
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these reasoning principles in decisions about more prosaic offences. The present, non
experimental study presented seven offence scenarios to members of the public and
requested mainly qualitative responses in a within-subjects design.

Method
Participants
A non-probability sample of 34 adults was interviewed. People with a variety of
ages and education levels were selected in an effort to adequately represent the general
public. There were 20 females and 14 males. Two participants were younger than 22
years of age, four were aged between 22 and 25 years, four were 26 to 35 years, 12 were
36 to 45 years, nine were 46 to 55, and three were 56 to 65. Twenty-six participants were
Australian-born and, of the eight who had been born outside Australia, four had been in
the country for less than 10 years. Twenty-eight participants had had no contact with the
criminal justice system. Of the remaining six, three had served jury duty, four had been
victims of minor property crime and one was a law student. No information was collected
on education level.
It was made clear that participation in the study was voluntary and that all
responses were confidential and anonymous. Participants were told that some of the
material they would be required to read described sexual offences and warned that they
should not participate in the study if they thought that such material would upset or
offend them. It was accepted that this ethical safeguard may have introduced a selection
bias into the study, especially in view of its aims. However, no person who was
approached refused to participate.
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Materials
Scenarios
Five short offence scenarios that were expected to elicit various types of
emotional responses and moral judgments were formulated. Scenarios one to five
described offences of supply of drugs, a police officer's fabrication of evidence, carnal
knowledge of an animal, unlawful use of a motor vehicle, and causing pollution,
respectively. Two longer offence scenarios (scenarios six and seven) described a sexual
offence against a minor. The latter two scenarios were identical except for the age of the
offender. All seven offence scenarios are included in Appendix A.
Previous research has found that found that using realistic vignette scenarios as
stimuli for public judgments of sentencing increased the validity of data in that, by giving
respondents more information than typical survey questions, a false appearance of
punitiveness was eliminated (Applegate et al., 1996; Jacoby & Cullen, 1998; Thomson &
Ragona, 1987; Zamble & Kalm, 1990). It is reasonable to assume that, in contemporary
Western society, some offences are more evocative of emotional or moral responses than
others. Offences that evoke disgust, repugnance, fear, anger or that represent violations of
norms that threaten social order fit this category. The offence scenarios that were
developed for the present study were all designed to be evocative of strong negative
emotions toward the offenders and/or morally based judgments about the offences. With
the exception of scenario one, the offences were more wrongful than harmful (see the
earlier discussion of Warr, 1989 and Table 1).
Scenario one described the supply of heroin to high school students in exchange
for their recruiting fellow students as new users. It was expected that this description
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would evoke feelings of anger at the harm caused by this illegal drug and outrage that an
adult would corrupt youth. The second scenario described the offence of a police officer
who had planted evidence to obtain a conviction against a known heroin dealer. It was
anticipated that respondents would have mixed feelings of concern about a police officer
breaking the law, sympathy for the difficulties faced by police, and, as a result of the first
scenario, some degree of acceptance of the officer's methods.
It was expected that the offence described in the third scenario, carnal knowledge
of an animal, would prompt disgust and repugnance in most respondents even though any
degree of harm to the animal is debatable. Scenario four, the theft of a car by an
Aboriginal youth, was expected to access community outrage at what is currently
perceived to be a widespread offence. The fact that the description made it clear that the
car was returned undamaged was expected to illuminate concerns that were moral and
emotional rather than responses that were congruent with the considerations of harm. For
similar reasons, the pollution caused by the corporation described in scenario five was
described as causing minimal, temporary damage.
A sexual offence against a minor was included as an example of a crime that was
particularly likely to elicit condemnation of the offender in a way that was
disproportionate to the factual circumstances of the offence. Hart ( 1989) stated that, "in
relation to the special topic of sexual morality . . . it seems prima facie plausible that there
are actions immoral by accepted standards and yet not harmful to others" (p. 5). In an
attempt to explore underlying factors in respondent punitiveness that were
disproportionate to the legal seriousness of the offence, scenarios six and seven described
a sexual offence that resulted in minimal harm. It was made clear that the 15-year-old
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female victim initiated the sexual contact and that she has since stated that the offence
had had no adverse effects. The scenarios described offences that were identical except
for the age of the offender. It was expected that moral indignation would be compounded
by the discrepancy in the ages of the offender and the victim described in scenario seven.
The characteristics of the seven scenarios that were expected to evoke moral
indignation, and indications of the relative harmfulness and wrongfulness of the offences
are summarised in Table 1.
Table 1
Harmfulness, Wrongfulness and Moral Indignation Characteristics of Seven Scenarios
Offence
possession of heroin with
intent to sell or supply

fabricating evidence

Moral Indig_nation Characteristics
addiction and recruitment of young
victims; material gain from moral
wrong_
offender a police officer; may be
countered by drug dealer victim

carnal knowledge of an
animal

deviant sexual offence; disgust,
repugnance

unlawful use of a motor
vehicle

offender an Aboriginal youth; anger
at perception of widespread car theft
by this group topical
environmental protection topical

water pollution

sexual penetration of a child sexual offence; youth of victim
over 13 and under 16
(offender 18)
sexual penetration of a child sexual offence; youth of victim and
over 13 and under 16
offender much older
(offender 60)

Conseguences
potential
physical and
social harm
none, victim
guilty; social
harm
none, no
physical harm,
no witnesses
exceE!..£.olice
none, car
returned
undamag_ed
little damage
done;
temporary harm
victim
consented,
initiated sex,
and says "no
harm"
victim
consented,
initiated sex,
and says "no
harm"
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Questionnaire
Participants were asked to record their emotional responses to the scenarios; to
evaluate the seriousness of the offence; and to describe the type and purpose of any
punishment deserved by the offender. They were also asked to comment on a working
definition of moral indignation and to identify offences that had elicited this response.
The questionnaire is included in Appendix B.
The main part of the questionnaire comprised an introductory letter; the five short
offence descriptions and the two longer scenarios; and a set of five questions that
followed each scenario. The five questions asked participants to record their feelings
about the offence; a rating of the seriousness of the offence (on a 135mm visual analogue
scale with the anchors not at all serious [low] to extremely serious [high]); their reasons
for the seriousness rating; a judgment about what should happen to the offender; and their
reasons for making that decision. With regard to the last item, it was intended that the
commonly accepted sentence purpose categories of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation
and rehabilitation (Hoekema, 1995; Walker, 1991) would be inferred from responses. A
similar technique was utilised by Indermaur (1990).
The questionnaire ended with a working definition of moral indignation/outrage
and requests for demographic information. Participants were asked whether the definition
was meaningful to them and whether they related it to any of the offence descriptions
they had just read. They then recorded information about their sex, age group, cultural
background, and previous involvement with the criminal justice system.
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Procedure
The scenarios had been formulated with the expectation that they would arouse
moral indignation. However, this concept was not introduced to participants from the
outset. In order to prevent participants from becoming aware of the definition of moral
indignation too early, they were instructed to progress through the questionnaire
sequentially.
Debriefing of participants included an assurance that all the offence scenarios
were fictitious. They were offered telephone debriefing and counselling by the researcher
and provided with a contact number for the Sexual Assault Referral Centre.
The only questionnaire item that required scoring was the rating of perceived
seriousness of the offences. The score was the length of the line representing the 135mm
visual analogue scale at the point where participants had marked their rating.

Analysis
This study was an exploratory one and the results presented are impressionistic
and global rather than quantitative or definitive.
The one quantitative measure included in the questionnaire was the perception of
the seriousness of each offence. There was a high degree of consensus (SD = 17 .25) in the
rating of supplying heroin as the most serious offence (M = 119.94) on a 135mm visual
analogue scale. Ratings of seriousness are shown in Table 2.
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Table 2
Mean Seriousness Ratings of Offence Scenarios (possible range O [ not at all serious] to
135 [extremely serious])

M

SD

1 supplying heroin

1 1 9. 94

17.25

2 fabricating evidence

100.00

35.12

3 carnal knowledge of an animal

56.18

44.01

4 theft of a motor vehicle

68.82

37.77

5 causing pollution

95.18

34.29

6 sexual penetration of a minor (offenderl 8)

22.44

27.95

7 sexual penetration of a minor (offender 60)

51.59

39.85

Offence Scenario

Note: N = 34

The most frequent emotional response to the offence of dealing heroin was anger.
The most frequent reasons for regarding this as a serious offence were 'corruption of
youth', 'youth of victims' and 'harm done by drugs'. Most participants regarded
imprisonment as the appropriate punishment for this offender for the most common
purpose of retribution, followed in frequency by incapacitation.
Participants also regarded the offence of a police officer who fabricated evidence
as very serious. However, there was less consensus than for the supply of heroin offence
because some participants sympathised with the officer's actions. Feelings about the
offence were mainly anger, disappointment in the officer's actions, and frustration at the
necessity for the offence. Most participants regarded the offence as morally wrong and a
betrayal of the trust that society has in police officers to act with integrity and to uphold
the law. However, some participants regarded the officer's actions as representative of a
lesser wrong than that perpetrated by the person against whom the evidence was
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manufactured. The most commonly mentioned punishment option was dismissal from the
police service because the officer had proven himself untrustworthy (indicative of
incapacitation). Of the remainder of participants, most wanted disciplinary action such as
demotion or transfer taken against the officer, or a stem warning issued. Comments
indicated that the aims of these punishments were either retributive or in the interests of
general deterrence. This was usually described in terms of the need to make an example
of him.
The most frequent emotional responses to the offence of carnal knowledge of an
animal were revulsion and disgust. However, some participants said that they felt sad or
sorry for the offender and nearly a third were amused or indifferent to the offence. The
offence was not regarded as particularly serious, although responses to this offence
resulted in the largest amount of variability in seriousness ratings. Participants who did
not regard the offence as serious commented that although the behaviour was unnatural, it
was a private problem that did not result in harm to human beings (or, in some instances,
the animal). Most participants regarded therapy or counselling as the most appropriate
consequence for the offender with the aim of helping, rather than punishing, him and
enabling him to acquire insight into the unacceptability of his behaviour.
The description of unlawful use of a motor vehicle evoked feelings that ranged
from anger to indifference. The mean rating of moderate seriousness was produced from
highly variable responses that were characterised by bipolar considerations of
wrongfulness or harmfulness (Warr, 1989). Recommendations for punishment were also
influenced by this bipolarity. However, the most common choice was that the offender
should serve a Community Service Order so that there might be a consequence for his
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actions (to show him that they were wrong) but in acknowledgement of the mitigating
circumstances of his youth and the absence of damage to the vehicle.
The offence of causing pollution was regarded as serious and participants were
angry at the harm done to the environment in the interests of what they perceived as the
corporate offender's greed. This reaction may have been a reflection of the emotional,
topical nature of concern for the environment as it was made clear in the offence
description that the environmental damage was temporary and minimal. Most participants
wanted the corporation to be made to restore the environment and to pay a heavy fine by
way of restitution.
The sexual penetration of a minor by an 18-year-old offender was regarded as not
at all serious. This was significantly different (t(33) = -5.26, p < .001) from the moderate
seriousness with which participants regarded the same offence committed by a 60 year
old man. Participants were largely unconcerned by the offence by the younger man but
many described themselves as disturbed by the older offender's actions. Comments in
relation to the seriousness of the 60-year-old' s offence included that, at his age, he should
have had more control, he should have acted more responsibly, and some participants
expressed concern that he may have taken advantage of the youth of the female victim.
No consequences were deemed necessary for the younger offender, but a wide range of
punishments was recommended for the older offender. Most included either a warning
about severe consequences for any future, similar offences, and assessment and
counselling about the inappropriateness of his actions. However, a third of participants
maintained the reasoning they had used for the younger offender's punishment, that is,
that because no harm had been done, no punishment was necessary.
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Thirty-two of the 34 participants found the working definition of moral
indignation/outrage meaningful. A representative summary of reasons for relating this
feeling to particular offences, and the number of participants who felt indignant or
outraged in response to each offence, are summarised in Table 3.
Although this was a small, exploratory study using a non-random sample, some
important themes about the role of emotional and morally based responses (categorised as
moral indignation/outrage) in the public's reasoning about justice emerged. Responses to
scenarios one, two, five and seven indicated that violations of public trust and (other)
abuses of power and responsibility may be important factors in the public's justice
reasoning, even in cases where the culpability of the offender is ambiguous or where
there has been minimal harm done to the victim. Responses to scenarios one and seven
also indicated that angry and punitive responses might be exacerbated when victims are
perceived as vulnerable because of their youth.
Although the present study provided the anticipated evidence that the public does
respond emotionally and morally and with consequent punitiveness to certain offences,
there was also evidence for tolerance of norm violations and for the use of more
objective, conventional justice reasoning than widespread assumptions of public
punitiveness would indicate. In contrast to offences that aroused angry responses, the
offence description that elicited the expected reactions of repugnance and disgust (carnal
knowledge of an animal) was not identified as a source of moral indignation and it was
not related to perceptions of high seriousness or to severe punishment.
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Table 3
Representative Reasons for Relating Moral Indignation or Outrage to Particular Offence
Scenarios
Offence Scenario

N

1. supplying heroin

16

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

2. fabricating evidence

12

•
•
•
•
•
•

3

•
•
•

causing pollution

6

•

6. sexual penetration
of a minor (offender
18)
7. sexual penetration
of a minor (offender
60)

0

•

9

•

3. carnal knowledge of
an animal
4. theft of a motor
vehicle

s.

5

•
•
•
•

Note: N = 34

Reasons for Moral Indignation
or Outrage

"corruption of young people"
"youth of victims"
"influencing the young"
"abuse of powerful position and role as moral role
leader by an adult"
"positions of power, age and authority should not be
abused"
"I am very much against drugs of any sort"
"because of degree of impact and [it] affects many
people"
"police must always be above the law"
"[I] feel that if police are corrupt then there is very
little hope for our society"
"[dealer must be charged but] police must be above
reproach!"
"if you can't trust the police, who can you trust?"
"police have a moral obligation to protect society and
ensure the law is enforced in a fair and just manner"
"[the] dishonesty and the effect on the police force,
generally, angers me"
"certainly violates my moral code"
"it' s a bit gross"
"treat others as you would have them treat you. Some
sections of society need to learn they must respect
other people's rights and property."
"because of degree of impact and [it] affects many
people"

"outraged that a person in a position of trust has
abused this power"
"positions of power, age and authority should not be
abused"
"age difference between man and girl"
"abuse of powerful position and role as moral role
leader by an adult"
age of victim, less power
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The principal goals of punishment for the offence of carnal knowledge of an
animal were treatment and rehabilitation. Reasoning about punishment was congruent
with judicial reasoning in sentencing a recent, similar offence ("Man Admits Sex," 2000).
Although Chief Judge Kevin Hammond was reported as describing the offence of carnal
knowledge of an animal as offensive and clearly deviant, he claimed that it was a matter
for treatment, not imprisonment. The punishments recommended by the participants of
the present study and the recommended judicial punishment for this recent similar offence
were much less severe than the seven years imprisonment prescribed by Section 18 1 of
the Western Australian Criminal Code (1913). In a comprehensive analysis of the topic of
disgust, Miller (1997) explained the ways in which the nature of disgust has changed over
time. It appears that reactions of disgust toward particular events have also changed over
time.
The only other sexual offence that formed part of the study, the sexual penetration
of a female minor by an adult male, aroused strong condemnation by some participants
when there was a disparity in the ages of offender and victim. Comments indicated that a
suspicion of abuse of power, rather than simple violation of sexual norms, was the main
underlying principle of responses to scenario seven. However, Section 32 1(7)(a) of the
Western Australian Criminal Code ( 1913) prescribes a penalty of 14 years imprisonment
for the offence of sexual penetration of a female child over the age of 13 but under 16
years old by an adult male (the penalty is seven years if the offender is under the age of
18 years). Participants' recommended penalties for this offence were less than those
prescribed by law whether the offender was described as 18 or 60 years old. Further
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evidence that the prescribed punishment for this offence does not reflect contemporary
opinion is provided by the recent offence of drunken but consensual sex between a 19year-old man and a 14-year-old female. In imposing a $600 fine on the offender, Judge
Antoinette Kennedy was reported as stating that "young girls need to be protected from
themselves" and that she would have recommended imprisonment if the man had been a
few years older ("Man Fined," 1999, p. 27). Finally, it is interesting to note within the
context of changing views of laws that the original rationale for the offence of sexual
intercourse with an underage female (known in the United States as statutory rape) was
protection of a girl's value in terms of the property rights of her father (Diamond, 1996).

Conclusions
Qualitative analysis of the results of the present study indicated strong
condemnation of offences that violated the social norms that a) people in certain roles
should be able to be trusted to act morally, and, b) that it is morally unacceptable to harm
those who are vulnerable. Perceived violations of these norms resulted in strong, angry
reactions to offences, and evaluations of harmfulness, wrongfulness, and deserved
penalties that were disproportionately higher than those warranted by objective criteria of
culpability and harm to the victim. Consequently, the principal indications of the present
study, violation of a position of trust and offending against vulnerable victims, were
regarded as two important, extra-legal factors in the public's reasoning about crime
seriousness and punishment. These variables were selected for experimental manipulation
in the study reported in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
The Influence of Offender Position of Trust and Victim Vulnerability on
the Public's Reasoning About Justice

Responses to the initial exploratory study in this program of research indicated
that the holding of positions of trust by offenders and the vulnerability of victims were
factors in the public's reasoning about justice. Specifically, the study indicated that
violation of these principles leads to harsher condemnation and more severe judgments
about punishment, in ways that are sometimes unrelated to the degree of actual harm
produced by the offence.
Participants in the exploratory study described in the previous chapter reacted
strongly to a police officer's violation of his role as an employee of an institution in
which public trust is of paramount importance. The police officer's offence was
perceived as a breach of public trust in the moral obligation of police to uphold the law.
Other strongly condemned examples of the violation of an expectation that people in
particular positions will act responsibly were a heroin supplier's perceived immoral,
predatory behaviour by an adult towards vulnerable youth and a 60 year old man's
perceived abuse of power and advantage over a young female. The breach of the moral
obligation of people in certain roles to behave in a responsible, trustworthy manner, and
of the expectation that they can be trusted to do so, was strongly associated with
condemnation and punitiveness aimed at retribution and general deterrence. It may be that
the public is likely to be more condemnatory of an offender who violates such social and
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moral obligations in the course of committing an offence than of an offender in a less
trusted position, or one whose victim is more resilient.

Trust
The two prominent features of the voluminous literature on trust are agreement on
its importance to human interaction and lack of consensus on its substantive meaning
(Blomqvist, 1997; Hosmer, 1995 ; Hwang & Burgers, 1997; Kahn, Jr & Turiel, 1988;
Kasperson, Golding, & Tuler, 1992; Kramer, 1999). Although considerable effort has
been made to define the concept of trust, the results have been described as "a confusing
potpourri of definitions applied to a host of units and levels of analysis" (Shapiro, 1987,
p. 624). Additionally, some discussions of trust have assumed that its meaning is so well
known as to leave it undefined or to be inferred from its context (Barber, 1983).
Empirical studies have often relied on subjective understanding rather than on construct
operationalisation, for example, "trust is what the actors in our study think it is"
(Braithwaite & Makkai, 1994, p.3).
It was beyond the scope or purpose of this dissertation to attempt to arrive at a
conclusive, general-purpose conceptualisation of trust. The meaning of trust as it
specifically related to the present thesis was explored with reference to the literature that
had previously made such attempts. In an effort to maintain the applied, empirical focus
of this social psychological dissertation, the following review relied on relevant recent
reviews and scholarly discussions of the trust literature rather than on extensive
discussion of the intricate philosophical and sociological analyses of trust provided by
authors such as Barber (1983), Blau (1964), Lewis and Weigert (1985), and Luhmann
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( 1980). The interested reader is referred to these works for a more profound and esoteric
theoretical treatment of the topic.
Psychology's interest in the concept of trust has come from psychodynamic
developmental, personality, interpersonal and, more recently, organisational perspectives.
Psychologists have long had an applied interest in the development of the ability to trust
(Bowlby, 1982; Erikson, 1963; Kahn, Jr & Turiel, 1988). Of greater, recent emphasis has
been psychology's interest in individual determinants and antecedents of trustful and
distrustful personalities (Blomqvist, 1997; Kasperson et al., 1992). Rotter ( 1971)
discussed the relationship between generalised, dispositional trust and broader social
issues but later psychological investigations have mainly focused on interpersonal trust
between individuals in close or intimate relationships (for example, Holmes & Murray,
1996; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). The dramatic increase in the study of the
benefits of trust to organisations in the last decade (Kramer, 1999; Wicks, Berman, &
Jones, 1999) has included scholarly discussions of the nature of societal trust as well as its
role in organisational culture. Attempts have also been made to model trust as the
probability of cooperative behaviour in organisations (Hwang & Burgers, 1997).
The concepts of developmental, dispositional, interpersonal or organisational trust
were not relevant to this program of research. Neither was distrust of interest here. The
focus was systemic trust in the social domain rather than individual trust in the
interpersonal domain or in an organisational context. A useful definition of this social
trust is: the "expectation that other persons and institutions in a social relationship can be
relied upon to act in ways that are competent, predictable, and caring" (Kasperson et al.,
1992, p. 169).
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A focus on trust as a social expectation and the effects of violations of that trust
required an interdisciplinary approach. Philosophy has long debated whether trust is an
external moral force with which members of societies conform or a rational choice that
facilitates social interaction (Hardin, 1993; Hollis, 1998). Psychologists have described
social trust as a moral value that is a regulatory mechanism of social behaviour
(Eisenberg, Reykowski, & Staub, 1989; Willig, 1997). Adam Seligman (1997) has
provided a sociological explanation of trust in the context of the intersection of political
and economic structures. According to Seligman, citizen trust is the belief that fellow
citizens will cooperate in shared political values and systems. Economic trust is a
society's confidence in the reliability of competent enactment of roles and systems of
exchange. Whether its source is morality or rationality, the departure point for the
discussion of trust here is that it is fundamental to a well-ordered society and that
violations of trust elicit a psychological sense of threat to the social order.
Philosophers, sociologists, psychologists, economists and management theorists
generally agree that trust is necessary for cohesive social function. A typical assertion is
that "it [trust] is seen as essential for stable relationships, vital for the maintenance of
cooperation, fundamental for any exchange and necessary for even the most routine of
everyday interactions" (Misztal, 1996, p. 12). Another is that "trust consists in a highly
complex and largely unarticulated network of expectations among members of a
community. It is the background for every sort of social interaction" (Hoekema, 1 995, p.
344). Effectively, trust reduces the complexity of social interactions (Luhmann, 1 980);
the alternative is doubt and chaos.
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'Pure' Trust
The distinction has been made between trust that is regulated by contracts and
rules and a more pure form of trust. Misztal ( 1996) referred to this distinction as trust as
passion rather than trust as policy. Darley (1998) has called it non-calculational, as
opposed to calculational trust and proposed an emotional basis for it in that unregulated,
non-calculational trust, by definition, gives opportunities for betrayal. Seligman ( 1997)
referred to pure trust as 'pristine', a more real form of trust than trust in regulated social
exchange.
Pure social trust is more than confidence in the sanctioning power of contracts
and regulations, or mere trust in others because it is in their interest to be trustworthy or to
their detriment to be untrustworthy. It is fundamental to social situations "that can no
longer be adequately encompassed within the matrix of normatively defined role
expectations" (Seligman, 1997, p. 63) in that it goes beyond reliance on conformity
(Darley, 1998). Those who argue for the importance of pure trust represent the moral and
emotional side of moral philosophy's debate on the rationality of social trust. Pure, non
calculable trust has a more emotional basis and more moral force than trust as a rational
decision to enhance cooperation, for example, "trust as a social lubricant which makes
possible production and exchange" (Misztal, 1996, p. 82). Darley ( 1998) argued that
proponents of the existence of non-calculational trust rely on a distaste for assertions that
the mechanism of honourable behaviour is self-interest.
The distinction between pure and regulated trust has been alluded to in discussions
of current emphases on attempting to control breaches of social trust by increasing the
regulation of social life. The modem response to perceived erosion of social trust and, by
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implication, resultant social psychological harm, is to attempt to control trust violations
by increasing regulation of social interactions. However, it has been argued that formal
regulation of trust can destroy trust in its pristine form (Darley, 1998; Fukuyama, 1995;
Govier, 1997; Seligman, 1997). Regulation presupposes breach of trust and may breed
distrust (Braithwaite & Makkai, 1994). Even in highly regulated domains such as
economics, there is support for the proposition that "trust is more likely to develop
between partners when exchange occurs without explicit negotiations or binding
agreements" (Molm, Takahashi, & Peterson, 2000).
In the recent opinion of one social commentator:
The sense of mutual obligation is fundamental to a civilised society . . . . it
relies on a degree of trust we acquire only through the experience of living in
a functioning community . . . . To attempt to create a sense of mutual
obligation by regulation is like trying to paint a masterpiece by numbers.
(Mackay, 2000, p. 18)

Trust Relationships
Freiberg ( 1995) drew a distinction between the types of social relationships that
require trust. He proposed that relationships of symmetrical trust involve the cognitive
and affective expectation in more or less equal social interactions that one can be
confident that the social order is secure and predictable. Asymmetrical trust relationships
9ccur between parties of unequal power or status. When one person holds a position of
advantage by virtue of their knowledge, expertise, or power, he or she is trusted to
exercise this advantage in a competent manner and to put the interest of the weaker party
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above their own. Although behaviour in professional asymmetrical relationships is often
regulated by codes of conduct and formal sanctions, not all behaviour can be so governed.
Additionally, some unequal relationships have no such protection, for example the
relationship between parents and children. Freiberg's conceptualisation of two types of
trust relationships included the fact that trust may be symmetrical, asymmetrical, or both.
The focus of the present context of this program of research was symmetrical trust
relationships.
Responses to Breach of Trust
Trust, by definition, involves elements of risk and vulnerability (Kasperson et al.,
1992; Koller, 1988). It lies somewhere between the confidence that comes from complete
predictability and unquestioning faith in the unknowable (Blomqvist, 1997; Freiberg,
1995; Seligman, 1998), between total understanding and total ignorance (Luhmann,
1980). To trust, one must risk betrayal.
It has already been implied that social trust is necessary to prevent a social sense
of doubt and threat to social cohesion (for example, Luhmann, 1980). However, the
emotional basis of pure social trust means that breaches are more than non-cooperation,
they amount to social betrayal. Freiberg ( 1995) stated that we expect and trust people to
behave in a predictable manner and, "if unpredictable, unexpected or untrustworthy
responses . . . persist, we may become anxious, indignant, outraged or even ashamed"
(p. 103). A specific response arising from violation of the risk and vulnerability inherent
in pure social trust is its experience as a moral violation that results in a sense of being
diminished and a consequent desire for revenge (Darley, 1998).
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Trust and Criminal Offences
Although it is widely agreed that trust is fundamental to social relationships, the
role of trust in criminal law is latent rather than explicit (Freiberg, 1995)2. Essentially,
breach of trust is an aggravating factor in sentencing and it is deeply embedded in law,
but "trust itself is not manifest in the substantive criminal law, in the administration of
criminal justice nor in providing explanations for criminal behaviour" (Freiberg, 1995, p.
88).
As symmetrical social trust is necessary for everyday social contracts and
exchanges to be conducted with confidence that others will behave as they ought, all
crime can be viewed as a violation of that trust. In an analysis of the role of violation of
trust in punishment, Hoekema (1995) stated that "what defines criminality, I suggest what makes an act an appropriate ground for punishment - is the betrayal of trust . . . . a
criminal act consists in violation of the minimum trust that we must, of practical
necessity, extend to strangers" (p. 345, original italics). The legal-philosophical concept
of 'public harm', the abstract harm produced by criminal acts, has been directly related to
the erosion of the kind of trust upon which social relations and individual welfare depend
(Feinberg, 1986; Kleinig, 1978; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997).
In addition to the normative expectation that all persons will act as they ought, the
trust-as-confidence that is symmetrical trust (Cherney, 1997) is higher in some
individuals, and in some relationships, than in others. The offences of the heroin dealer,
the police officer, and the 60 year old sex offender that were portrayed in the initial

2

As Freiberg (1995) states, trust is more evident in civil law where it has an explicit role in
fiduciary relationships. Its place in criminal law is limited to offences that occur within employer
employee or duty of care relationships (Hills, Della Torre, & Thomson, 1998).
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exploratory study were all breaches of social trust. They did more than violate the
expectations of their respective roles, they challenged the everyday trust that people will
act as they ought. However, the crime of the police officer, a representative of an
institution that society depends upon for social order, was especially heinous.
Govier (1997) has identified professionals as a group that is expected to be highly
trustworthy. She stated that, because of their esoteric specialist knowledge and the
important function they perform in a society, professionals such as medical doctors must
be trusted to be, not only competent practitioners, but also conscientious human beings of
high moral integrity. They have a high level of responsibility to serve the interests of the
general public as well as the interests of clients. A crime committed by persons who are
normally regarded as exceptionally trustworthy could be expected to represent a greater
breach of social, symmetrical trust and to elicit a commensurate degree of outrage from
the public.

Vulnerability

In a comprehensive examination of the topic of vulnerability, Goodin ( 1985)
stated that to be vulnerable is to be susceptible to material or emotional harm to one's
welfare or interests. It is accepted that some people are more vulnerable than others, that
individuals vary in the degree to which they are fragile or resilient in the face of physical
and psychological harms. Typologies of victim characteristics that are based on criteria of
the impact of an offence on the victim have long emphasised vulnerability as an important
aspect of the justice process (Landau & Freeman-Longo, 1990; von Hentig, 1967). The
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notion of the 'ideal' victim in terms of deservedness of public sympathy is one who, at a
minimum, is innocent of provocation of the offence and, at a maximum, is perceived as
vulnerable in some way (Shapland, Willmore, & Duff, 1985).
Ashworth (1993) examined the issue of victim vulnerability and resilience in
relation to sentencing. He questioned the justice of adjusting sentences based on varying
and unforeseen levels of harm to victims (see also Black, 1 994; Hills & Thomson, 1999;
Hinton, 1996). For example, serious effects of sexual assault on victims are regarded as
aggravating circumstances in evaluations of offence seriousness. Ashworth questioned
whether it was right that an offender's sentence should differ according to whether a
victim was abnormally seriously affected by the assault, or had responded to treatment
and appeared to have recovered. Indeed, one of the arguments against the use of victim
impact statements is their potential to introduce subjectivity and inconsistency into
sentencing, in part because of the differential resilience of victims (Erez & Roeger, 1 995;
Hinton, 1996). Regardless of any debate on the legal importance of victim vulnerability, it
appears to play a role in the public's intuitive reasoning about crime seriousness and
punishment.
A particular instance of vulnerability is inherent in lack of worldliness or life
experience. Excessive naivety that is the product of youth or intellectual impairment has
the potential to render people vulnerable to corruption and exploitation . The study
described in Chapter One indicated a connection between youthfulness of victims and
their perceived vulnerability. This perception was associated with greater condemnation
of offences and more retributive punishment decisions. People who have an intellectual
disability are an even more readily identifiable category of vulnerable persons. The
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poorly developed social and interpersonal competencies of people with intellectual
disabilities have been identified as characteristics that render this group especially
vulnerable (Nettelbeck, Wilson, Potter, & Perry, 2000).

Trust and Vulnerability

The potential for interaction of the trusted nature of the position of a person who
offends against the law and the vulnerability of a person who is a victim of that offence is
obvious. One of the inherent qualities of trust is that it involves risk and to be vulnerable
is, by definition, to be particularly at risk. Accordingly, it could be expected that, as well
as violations of the trust inherent in particular social positions, the juxtaposition of an
offender who occupies a trusted position and a victim who has characteristics of
vulnerability would strongly influence reasoning about justice and deserved
consequences, even when no specific relationship of obligation exists. Examples are the
social juxtapositions of medical doctors and exceptionally vulnerable persons, and adults
and children. Even when the vulnerable person is not a patient of the doctor and the child
is not the offspring of the adult, those juxtapositions could be expected to embody a high
level of everyday, social trust and offences could be expected to be condemned
according!y.

The Present Study

The present study investigated the effects of victim vulnerability and offender
position of trust on the public's reasoning about justice.
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Offender position of trust was operationalised as the degree to which a person in a
particular social role is generally expected to act responsibly and morally for the public
good. The manipulation occurred at three levels: a medical doctor was included as the
embodiment of the high degree of social trust in the medical profession (Govier, 1997;
Kasperson et al., 1992; Mechanic, 1996); an adult described as a businessman represented
an everyday, average level of trust; and an offender described as a 14 year old youth was
expected to be regarded as less trustworthy because of his lack of maturity.
Victim vulnerability was operationalised as the potential for harm or exploitation.
Three types of vulnerability were tested. In consideration of the indications of the initial
study, one victim was described as a 14 year old youth (he would also be considerably
younger than the offender presented in two levels of the trust manipulation); an adult
victim with no characteristics of vulnerability was presented at the second level and the
other victim was described as a man with a mild intellectual disability. This last level of
the manipulation embodied the most readily identifiable type of vulnerability.
The type of offence chosen to be the vehicle for the victim and offender
manipulations was assault occasioning relatively minor, and possibly unanticipated,
bodily harm. It was chosen as a type of offence that was less emotive than those
associated with sex, drugs or excessive violence so that there was less chance of the
nature of the offence interacting with the manipulated variables.
Punishment for the purpose of retribution is a condemnatory response to an
offender's personal responsibility for violation of a moral code (Hoekema, 1995). In the
case of the present study, it was predicted that, the greater the vulnerability of the victim,
the more severe would be the condemnation of the offence and the more retributive the
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punishment of the offender. Similarly, it was expected that, the higher the level of social
trust embodied in the offender's position, the more severely condemned would be the
offence and the more retributive would be the punishment. It was also expected that
members of the public would base their punishment decisions on a need to denounce a
highly trusted offender, to make an example of him through a penalty aimed at general
deterrence. Because of greater salience of trust in particular offender-victim
combinations, for example, a medical doctor and a disabled victim, the possibility of an
interaction of the two independent variables was also entertained.

Method
Design
The levels of the two independent variables, offender position of trust and
vulnerability of victim, were fully crossed to produce nine experimental conditions in a 3
x 3 factorial, between-subjects design. Stimulus materials were nine offence scenarios
that represented the nine experimental conditions.
The eight dependent measures were: degree of negative emotional response to the
stimulus scenario; the perceived moral wrongfulness of the offence; the perceived
harmfulness of the offence; the severity of the deserved punishment; and the importance
of each of four widely accepted goals of punishment (individual deterrence,
rehabilitation, general deterrence, and retribution) to the punishment decision.

Participants
Third and fourth year psychology students acted as research assistants and
administered the research questionnaire to 348 members of the general public. This
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sample was selected from people who were known to the research assistants, and people
who were known to people who were known to them, using a 'snowballing' technique
(Eland-Goossensen, Van De Goor, Vollemans, Hendriks, & Garretsen, 1997). The
research assistants were given detailed instructions that were designed to maximise the
representativeness of the sample (see Appendix C).
Participants were 161 males and 183 females3 aged between 16 and 80 years
(M age = 36.79, SD = 13.27), 205 were married or living in a marriage-like relationship
and 132 were not. Most participants (70%) had low-to-average socioeconomic status.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of nine experimental conditions and
were assured of confidentiality and anonymity before voluntarily participating in the
research.

Materials
Questionnaire Pre-testing
The questionnaire, titled Public Opinion Survey, was pre-tested on a small sample
of the general public (N = 44). Feedback resulted in more credible and detailed stimulus
scenarios, abbreviation of the questionnaire and a simpler research design than an initial
plan for between- and within-subjects tests.
The within-subjects pre-testing enabled feedback on the manipulation of offender
and victim characteristics. Participants' comment� confirmed that the manipulation of
offender position of trust was successful. In general, they expressed the belief that a
medical doctor was expected to be more trustworthy than the adult or the youth that were

3

In all instances of numbers of participants in demographic categories not summing to 348,
the cause is missing data.

L
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portrayed as the other two offenders. Additionally, the young victim and the victim who
was described as having an intellectual disability were generally perceived as more
vulnerable than the victim who was described as an adult businessman.

Stimulus Scenarios
The nine experimental conditions were portrayed by nine different descriptions of
an assault by a fictional offender named Greg Hill. The assault resulted in physical harm
to the victim. The scenarios were represented as brief summaries of evidence and they are
reproduced in Appendix D. The example of scenario one, in which the offender was
described as a medical doctor and the victim as a youth, appears below.

Greg Hill is a medical doctor who lives and practices in a middle-class suburb
of Perth. He has been charged with the assault of a 14-year-old youth after he
pushed the youth off his bicycle. Hill had been walking down a city street
when the youth emerged from an alley on his bicycle and almost collided with
him. When Hill spotted the youth at the traffic lights a few minutes later, he
told him off and pushed him. This caused the youth to fall from his bicycle,
sustaining grazes, bruising and a broken wrist. The youth was not one of Dr
Hill' s patients.

It was made clear that the victim of the offender who was described as a medical
doctor was not one of his patients because a doctor-patient relationship between the
o_ffender and victim would have added another, confounding, kind of trust.
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The Research Instrument
Each research questionnaire comprised an instruction page, one of the nine
stimulus scenarios and six questions (see Appendix E). The instruction page explained
that the purpose of the research was to invite members of the public to give their personal
opinions on justice issues. This page also explained the requirements for completing and
returning the questionnaire.
The first of the six questions required a rating of the extent of participants'
negative emotional response to the offence described in the stimulus scenario. The next
two questions utilised Warr's (1989) two-dimensional interpretation of crime seriousness.
Question two sought an evaluation of the moral wrongfulness of the offence, and question
three asked how harmful the offence was. Each of these first three questions required a
cross to be made on a 135mm visual analogue scale. The scale anchors were no negative
emotional response to extremely negative emotional response for question one, and not at
all morally wrong/ha.rniful to extremely morally wrong/harmful for questions two and

three.
Question four requested that participants rate the severity of the punishment
deserved by the offender and to provide comments on the aspects of the offence that
influenced their decision. The anchors of the 135mm visual analogue scale for this
question were no punishment to the maximum punishment for this offence.
The fifth question comprised four 135mm visual analogue scales to record the
importance of each of four widely accepted goals of punishment (individual deterrence,
rehabilitation, general deterrence, and retribution/just deserts, Hoekema, 1995; Walker,
1991) to participants' judgments of the appropriate penalty. The goals of punishment
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were implicit, rather than explicit, in the questions. For example, the importance of
retribution/just deserts to each punishment decision was measured by asking about the
importance of the need to ensure he gets what he deserves to that decision.
Lastly, question six asked participants about their age, sex, marital status and
income, and participants were invited to record any comments they wished to make.

Procedure
Research assistants were instructed to select equal numbers of males and females
who were over 18 years of age and who came from a range of ages and socioeconomic
groups (research assistant instructions appear in Appendix C).
Participants read the instruction sheet in the presence of the research assistant.
They then read the stimulus scenario they had been assigned and answered the six
questions. The completed questionnaire was sealed in an envelope and delivered or
mailed to the researcher.

Data Scoring
Each questionnaire delivered eight individual scores out of 135, calculated by
measuring the length of each 135mm visual analogue scale at the point where participants
had marked their rating.
The eight questionnaire items had high internal consistency reliability
(Cronbach's a = .87) and principal components analysis produced a simple solution of
one component with an eigenvalue of 4.21. This component accounted for 52.66% of the
. total variance in the set of variables and all eight dependent variables loaded highly
(between .65 and .82) on it. Therefore, it would have been possible for every item to be
included in an analysis of variance on a measure called, for example, justice evaluation.
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However, there was a strong conceptual rationale for separating analyses of items one to
four from the four scores produced by item five. Questions one to four measured the
strength of participants' negative response to, and evaluation of, the offence, whereas the
four aspects of question five elicited information about the importance of punishment
goals that are potentially mutually exclusive. Scores on items one to four yielded a
Cronbach's alpha value of .82 and principal components analysis revealed one component
with an eigenvalue of 2.63. This component was named condemnation. It accounted for
65.64% of the total variance in the four items' scores and all four items loaded highly
(between .76 and .83) on it.
Consequently, five dependent variables were prepared for analysis: condemnation,
and the importance of individual deterrence, rehabilitation, general deterrence, and
retribution to the decision about the deserved penalty.
Demographic values for age and sex were recorded in their raw state but
information about marital status and income was used to estimate socioeconomic status.
For example, participants who recorded an annual family income of $50,000 to $75,000
were regarded as being from an average socioeconomic group if they were married and
from a high socioeconomic group if they were unmarried.
Qualitative data was produced by the question, "What aspects of the crime
influenced your opinion on the severity of punishment deserved by Greg Hill?" that
formed part of item four and the comments that participants made at the end of the
questionnaire. These were recorded verbatim and grouped according to experimental
condition for later thematic analysis. The data w�re used as a source of elucidation of
quantitative findings.

Public Reasoning About Justice
66

r
t

[

Results

Data Screening
Missing data formed a random pattern except in the case of the item that asked
about family income (23 missing values). This aberration was not unexpected as some
participants commented that this question was too personal and they refused to answer it.
In accordance with a data screening procedure for collinearity and redundancy
recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell ( 1989), inter-item correlations were also checked
and these did not exceed r = .62 (for the harmfulness and severity of punishment items) in
the overall data set.
As the data were grouped by the research design, subsequent screening of the data
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was performed separately for each experimental group. Within-cell inter-item correlations
did not exceed r = .82. This occurred in the adult businessman offender/adult victim
group between measures of the importance of general deterrence and rehabilitation to
participants' punishment decisions.
Screening for outlying univariate scores using the z-score method indicated that
four scores (all on the importance of individual deterrence variable) were extreme.
However, stem-and-leaf plots in conjunction with SPSS tables of extreme values
indicated 29 outliers that involved more than one variable. These scores were accepted as
a valuable part of the opinions of the research population and, rather than delete either the
variables or the cases involved, extreme scores were retained and modified using a
method suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (1989). Outlying cases were assigned a raw
score that was one unit smaller (or larger) than the next most extreme score in that
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distribution. As a consequence, no data were lost but the influence of the outliers'
deviance on score distributions and their analysis was diminished.
Mahalanobis distance values were calculated for each participant to check for
multivariate outliers. Using the conservative a = .00 1 recommended by Tabachnick and
Fidell ( 1989), comparison with the appropriate chi-square value, x2 crit (5) = 20.52,
showed no multivariate outliers in the data.
Initial screening of the data showed many within-cell violations of normality and
modification of the univariate outliers made little difference. There were still 31
normality violations in the 45 cell-measure groupings after univariate outliers were
modified. Many data distributions were platykurtic and some were also asymmetrical.
However, if variables were not normally distributed in the population, results of analyses
on transformed distributions of scores on these variables would not be generalisable to
that population. In order to preserve the generalisability of the research results, non
normal distributions were not transformed.
It was decided to conduct analysis of variance on the condemnation variable, as
this analysis is robust to violations of normality when sample sizes are large and equal. It
is not clear whether this robustness also applies to multivariate analyses of variance
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989) but, as there was no suitable method of non-parametric
statistical analysis for the data produced by item five, it was decided to perform
MANOVA. Large sample sizes and the absence of extreme scores in the data were
expected to reduce the impact of non-normal distributions on multivariate analysis of
variance of the importance individual deterrence, rehabilitation, general deterrence and
retribution.
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Tests for linearity of pairs of dependent variables were not performed because of
the number of tests that would have been necessary and the resulting complexity of
interpretability.
Descriptive Statistics
In addition to problems with the flatness and asymmetry of the distributions of the
research data, the range of scores on most dependent variables in most of the nine
research cells was extremely broad. Standard deviations demonstrated a wide range of
responses to the stimulus scenarios for every dependent variable, indicating considerable
variability in participants' views. Attempts to account for this variability and, hence,
modify the extent and the heterogeneity of the statistical variance in the data, included
grouping participants by age group, sex, age group and sex, and by socioeconomic status.
None of these attempts made an appreciable difference to the variability of the data.
Means and standard deviations for each of the five dependent variables in each
experimental condition are reported in Table 4.
Analysis
Condemnation
Although scores on condemnation were highly variable, the homogeneity of the
variance across experimental groups was sufficient to permit and to confidently interpret
ANOVA.

A 3 x 3 (offender position of trust x vulnerability of victim) ANOVA on
condemnation showed a significant, small main effect for victim vulnerability,
F(2, 329) = 3.637, p = .027, ri2 = .022. There was no significant effect of offender

position of trust on condemnation. Additionally, no interaction effect of victim
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vulnerability and offender position of trust was found. The ANOVA table appears as
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Table 5.

Table 4

Means and Standard Deviations of Condemnation, Individual Deterrence, Rehabilitation,
General Deterrence and Retribution Scores for Three Offender Positions of Trust and
Three Levels of Victim Vulnerability (range O - 135)

Victim hi DV
condemnation
Victim
l'.0Uth
adult
disabled adult

Total
ind. deterrence
Victim
�

I
rs

l'.0Uth

adult
disabled adult

Total
rehabilitation
Victim
l'.0Uth
adult
disabled adult

Total
gen. deterrence
Victim
l'.0Uth
adult
disabled adult

Total
retribution
Victim
l'.0Uth
-adult
disabled adult

M

doctor
SD

80.30
7 1 .84
83.89
78.69

M

24.75
3 1 .54
24.93
27.41

doctor
SD

doctor
SD

41
37
36
114

80.90
7 1 .42
84. 1 8
78.70

N

M

M

N

38.09 41
4 1 .75 39
42.39 38
41.17 118

58.24
5 1 .59
7 1 .05
60.17

doctor
SD

N

40.06 41
39.47 38
42.35 38
40.54 117

59.76
48.61
55.55
54.77

M

M

3 1 .47 42
39.38 39
27.7 1 38
34.37 119

9 1 .98
75.97
99.84
89.24

M

N

doctor

66.27
63.03
68. 1 3
65.80

SD

N

39.44 4 1
4 1 .20 39
38.30 38
39.05 118

98.05
98.24
1 00.28
98.88

M
60.79
59. 14
57.53
59.15

M
50. 1 3
57.54
5 1 .49
53.00

M
60. 1 3
62.86
79.51
67.65

adult
SD

N

29.36 37
29. 10 39
29.35 37
29.52 113

adult
SD

N

3 1 .82 38
3 1 .93 37
30.53 39
31.16 114

adult
SD

N

39.37 38
38.07 37
45. 1 1 38
40.64 113

adult
SD

N

39. 19 38
40.43 37
40.09 39
39.68 114

adult
SD

N

37.78 38
39.22 37
43. 1 2 39
40.72 114

Total
Note: ind. deterrence = individual deterrence
gen. deterrence = general deterrence

Offender
iouth
SD

M

78.62
79.28
85.57
81.09

M

30.78 38
3 1 .09 37
26.67 36
29.51 1 11

iouth

99.38
103.97
1 1 1 .65
104.89

M
75.05
82.44
92.89
83.45

M
62.97
60.95
7 1 .92
65.22

M
75.90
63. 1 0
8 1 .95
73.58

N

SD

36.25
29.67
25. 1 2
30.92

iouth
SD

SD

SD

79.94
74.13
84.54
79.48

SD

28.08
30.51
26.83
28.76

Total
SD

N
116
113
109
338

N

M

39
39
37
115

96.34 33.10 119
92.63 35.80 115
103.82 28.21 114
97.57 32.77 348

N

M

N

40.26 39
44.87 39
44.87 38
43.26 116

iouth

Total

N

4 1 .89 38
43.82 39
33.08 38
40.23 115

iouth

M

N

38.92 39
43.34 39
42. 1 9 3 8
41.90 116

Total

64.53
64.48
73.82
67.58

M

40.12
43.07
42.74
42.09

Total

57.72
55.73
59.58
57.68

M

SD

SD

39.87
41.66
43.01
41.43

Total

67.47
63.00
76.56
69.00

SD

38.94
40.63
41.35
40.58

N
117
115
114
346

N
118
114
115
347

N
118
115
115
348
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Table 5
ANOVA Summary Table of the Effects of Vulnerability of Victim and Offender Position of
Trust on Condemnation
Source
Offender
Victim
Victim x Offender
Within
Total
* p < .05

d[_
2
2
4
329
337

ss

430.93
5992.72
1205.19
271035.60
277471.44

MS
215.47
2996.36
301.30
823.82
823.36

0.262
3.637 *
0.366

Post hoc pairwise comparisons of the effects of victim vulnerability using Tukey's
Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) test showed that condemnation of an offence
against the most vulnerable victim, the man who was described as having a mild
intellectual disability (M = 84.54, SD = 26.83), was significantly stronger (p = .019) than
condemnation of an offence against an able-bodied adult victim (M = 74.14, SD = 30.51).
Although not significantly different from scores in the other two conditions, the mean
condemnation score (M = 79.94, SD = 28.08) for the offence against a victim who was
described as a youth fell between those for victims who were expected to be regarded as
highly vulnerable or non-vulnerable.
Qualitative data were analysed by recording the frequency of occurrences of
themes that emerged from response content analysis (Glesne & Peshkin, 1992). The data
supported the assumption that the condemnation of an offence against a person with an
intellectual disability was related to the perceived vulnerability of the victim. Table 6
shows that aspects of the offence that influenced punishment decisions were relatively
evenly spread across experimental conditions. The exception was the stronger influence
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of victim attributes on decisions about punishment for an offence against a victim who
was described as having a mild intellectual disability.
Table 6
Frequencies of Aspects of the Offence Scenario That Influenced Participants ' Opinions
on Severity of Punishment
Cell

(offender/
victim)

dr/youth
dr/adult
dr/pwid b
adult/youth
adult/adult
adult/pwid
youth/youth
youth/adult
youth/pwid

-Notes:

Total c
a

b

c

Offence As�ects That Influenced Punishment Severit! a
1

offender
attributes

2

intent

15
12
14
11
6
15
14
11
13

2
6
3
4
4
3
6
4
4

111

36

3

victim
attributes

4

harm

13
3
1
6

7
4
4
7
6
5
7
3
5

44

48

6
1
11
3

5

6

7

blame/
deserts

wrong

1
1
4
1
2
1
1

3

21
15
4
13
16
11
12
17
10

12

119

11

seriousness

1
1
1
2
4

1 position, age or status of offender; expectations of same
2 planned nature of offence; retaliatory
3 vulnerable characteristics of victim

4 extent of harm, violence, potential harm
5 serious nature of offence
6 calculation o fjust deserts: assessment of a penalty that is proportional to the degree o f harm and
blameworthiness
7 moral wrongfulness of offence
pwid = person with intellectual disability
some participants gave more than one reason

The finding that an offence committed by a person in a highly trusted social
position (a medical doctor) was not more strongly condemned than an identical offence
committed by the two representatives who did not carry a public expectation of high
trustworthiness was also examined in the light of qualitative data. Analysis of responses
to the question: "What aspects of the crime influenced your opinion on the severity of
punishment deserved by Greg Hill?" showed that the 1 19 participants who read an assault
scenario in which the offender was described as a medical doctor recorded a total of 132
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crime aspects that influenced their punishment decision. Forty-one of those aspects had to
do with the position, age, status or expectations of the offender and 29 of the participants

ir

who recorded those 4 1 aspects made specific mention of the offender's profession. Based
on the assumption that, for those 29 participants, at least, the position of trust of the
offender was salient, their condemnation scores were compared to those of the 90

f:
1

participants who did not mention the doctor-offender's profession. The degree of
condemnation expressed by those who mentioned the doctor's profession (M = 91.71,

SD = 20.91) was higher than that expressed by the remainder of the participants who were
in conditions involving a doctor as the offender (M = 74.0 1 , SD = 28.0 1 ). Although
unequal sample sizes made inferential analysis inappropriate, mean comparisons
indicated that condemnation of the offender who was described as a doctor was also
higher for those for whom his role was salient than for participants in the conditions
involving an adult offender (M = 78.70, SD = 29.52) or an offender who was a youth
(M = 81.09, SD = 29.51).
Goals of Punishment

A 3 x 3 (offender position of trust x vulnerability of victim) MANOVA was
performed on the four dependent variables that measured the importance of individual
deterrence, rehabilitation, general deterrence and retribution to decisions about
punishment.
The Box's M test is sensitive to violations of homogeneity of dispersion matrices
at a = .001 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989). It revealed that the variance-covariance matrices
were homogenous F(80, 135516) = 1.403, p = .0 10, indicating that pooled matrices would
be an accurate measure of error.
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MANOVA (Pillai's criterion) showed a significant multivariate main effect on the

importance of goals of punishment for offender position of trust, only F(8,666) = 4.338,
2
p < .00 1, rJ = .050. There was no multivariate main effect for vulnerability of the victim

and no interaction. The full MANOVA source table appears as Table 7.

Table7
Multivariate Analysis of Variance of the Importance of Individual Deterrence,
Rehabilitation, General Deterrence and Retribution to Decisions About Punishment
Source of variance
Offender
Victim
Victim x Offender

*

Pillai's trace
.099
.038
.060

Hypothesis df
8
8
16

Error d[
666
666
1340

Multivariate F
4.338 *
1.600
1.270

p < .00 1
Univariate analyses of the offender position of trust effect showed significant

influence on individual deterrence, F(2,335) = 6.303, p < .002, 172 = .036, and
rehabilitation, F(2,335) = 13.998, p < .00 1, 172 = .077 , but not on general deterrence or
retribution. Post hoc pairwise comparisons using Tukey's HSD showed that individual
deterrence ("the need to deter him from doing it again") was a significantly less important
consideration (p < .001) in the punishment of an offender who was a medical doctor (high
trust position, M = 89.24, SD = 34.37) than in the punishment of an offender who was a
youth (low trust position, M = 104.89, SD = 30.92).
Rehabilitation ("the need to rehabilitate him") was a significantly more important
f;ictor in the punishment of an offender who was a youth (M = 83.45, SD = 40.23) than in
the punishment of either a doctor (M = 60. 17, SD = 41. 17, p < .001) or an adult
businessman (M = 59. 15, SD = 40.64, p < .001).
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Considerations of general deterrence ("the need to make an example of him") and
retribution ("the need to ensure he gets what he deserves") were not significantly
influenced by the manipulation of offender position of trust.

Discussion
Victim Vulnerability
The prediction that the more vulnerable the victim, the higher would be the level
of public condemnation for an offence was substantially supported. Condemnation was
significantly greater for an offence against the most vulnerable victim than for the least
vulnerable victim. Additionally, although an offence against a young victim was not
significantly more condemned than one against an adult, the direction of the mean
condemnation scores indicated increased condemnation as a function of vulnerability.
The youth may not have been perceived as particularly vulnerable in the context
of this offence. In fact, a belief in 'the rashness of youth', which was part of the rationale
for the inclusion of � young offender as the low trust exemplar in the manipulation of
position of trust, may have led participants to feel that the youth's actions contributed to,
if not provoked, the assault. Additionally, the indication from the initial study that the
vulnerability of youth is an important factor in the public's reasoning about justice may
have been an artifact of the types of offences that gave this indication. One offence was
an example of a topical and emotive social issue (supp]y of heroin) and the other violated
sexual norms (consensual sex between a female minor and a much older male).
Therefore, the influence of youth vulnerability on public responses to crime may interact
with the type of offence and may be gender-specific in some cases.

--

Public Reasoning About Justice
75
The prediction that offences against vulnerable victims would produce more
retributive punishments for committing them was not statistically supported. Victim
vulnerability had no significant effect on the importance of any of the goals of
punishment that were measured. However, the means for each of them showed a general
increase in the direction from low to high vulnerability of the victim (see Table 4).
Individual deterrence was the most important goal of punishment overall.

Offender Position of Trust
The prediction that the more trusted the position of the offender, the more severe
would be participants' condemnation of an offence was not supported. Mean
condemnation scores for the three types of offender were nearly identical. The
expectation that general deterrence and retribution would be more important to decisions
about the punishment of an offender who occupied a position of high social trust was also
not supported.
Although it was not predicted, in retrospect it was not surprising that
considerations of individual deterrence were significantly less important to decisions
about the punishment of the offender who could be expected to be the most trustworthy.
Neither was the finding that rehabilitation was a more important aim of the youth's
punishment incongruent, given his potential to benefit from retraining. Rehabilitation is
an important consideration of judicial deliberations (Sundt, Cullen, Applegate, & Turner,
1998) and public opinion (Doob, 2000) about the punishment of juvenile offenders. It has
been shown that the public does not support exclusively punitive responses to juvenile
offenders (Moon, Sundt, Cullen, & Wright, 2000).
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The manipulation check conducted during the questionnaire pilot showed that a
medical doctor was regarded as holding a highly trusted position and that his position was
more highly trusted than that of an adult businessman or a youth. However, analysis of
the present study revealed that, not only was offender position of trust not a significant
factor in condemnation of an offence, but more than half of the participants who read the
assault scenario in which the offender was described as a medical doctor did not consider
his occupation and position in their decisions about punishment.
Before concluding that trust was not a consideration in the public's reasoning
about justice, alternative explanations for the absence of an effect for this specific
instance of breach of trust on condemnation were explored. As well as being perceived as
highly trustworthy, the position of medical doctor has high social status (Daniel, 1983;
Mechanic, 1996; Sargent, 1994). Research on the effects of status has shown that high
social status affords protection from social sanctions for moderate social deviance
(Rosoff, 1989; Wiggins, Dill, & Schwartz, 1965). What Skolnick and Shaw (1994)
termed a status shield effect may have ameliorated the effect of the doctor-offender's
breach of trust on condemnation in the presence of what was a moderately serious
offence. In other words, the manipulation of offender position of trust in the present study
may have been confounded with offender status. A status shield effect would account for
a public perception that individual deterrence was not a necessary consideration of the
punishment of the high status offender. There has also been evidence from sentencing
research that loss of status experienced as a result of the exposure of crimes of high status
offenders may be treated as a mitigating factor in punishment (Thoinas, 1979).
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Research that has specifically examined the effect of offender status on
condemnation for offences has shown that high status reduces condemnation for an
offence unless the offence is professionally related (Skolnick & Shaw, 1994; Shaw &
Skolnick, 1996). These researchers found that professional relatedness of offences (but
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not offence magnitude, as had previously been proposed by Wiggins et al., 1965 and
Rosoff, 1989) reversed the usual negative correlation between status and condemnation
and produced a status liability effect. This conclusion is supported by a sentencing
principle that damage to high status is no longer a mitigating factor in punishment if an
offence was committed in the course of an offender's work (Thomas, 1979).
Skolnick and Shaw (1994; Shaw & Skolnick, 1996) operationalised professional
relatedness as an offence by a high status professional against a client. The fact that
scenarios used in the present study made it clear that the victim was not a patient of the
offender who was described as a doctor is congruent with speculation about the presence
of a status shield effect.
Evaluation of the results of the present study also invited speculation that the type
of trust that was manipulated may not have been an accurate reflection of the aspect of
public justice reasoning indicated by the results of the exploratory study reported in
Chapter One. The main indication that trust was a factor in the public's reasoning about
justice in that study was respondents' anger and indignation at an offence committed by a
police officer. The planting of evidence to obtain a conviction against a known heroin
dealer was seen, even by some participants who regarded it as morally justifiable, not
only as a betrayal of the officer's trusted position but also as a wilful abuse of his relative
power.
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The trust embodied in power relationships was explained in Freiberg's ( 1995)
conceptualisation of asymmetrical trust - the trust inherent in reliance on those who have
more power or knowledge than the trustor. When a person holds a position of advantage
by virtue of their age and experience, their expertise, or their position in society, they are
trusted to behave in an ethical manner towards those with less power. Freiberg has cited
relationships between professionals and their clients; parents and their children; and the
relationship of doctors, lawyers, and counsellors to those who seek their help as examples
of this kind of trust. In accordance with this view on trust, the offences of the heroin
dealer, the police officer, and the 60-year-old sex offender may all be said to have
demonstrated a breach of asymmetrical trust in addition to violations of symmetrical trust.
Future Directions
Investigation of victim vulnerability as an aspect of the public's reasoning about
justice was not pursued in this program of research. It had been established that a high
level of vulnerability increased condemnation of an offence. There was also some
indication that this condemnation may be related to punishment aims. It was concluded
that the youth of victims probably interacts with the nature of an offence in the production
of perceived vulnerability and consequent condemnation.
The role of trust in the public's reasoning about justice required clarification as
well as further investigation. The protection offered by a trusted offender's status may
have ameliorated condemnation for a breach of symmetrical trust in the case of a
moderately serious offence. It was decided that a clearer picture of the public' s
perceptions of those who embody varying levels of trust and status was required before
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conducting a further examination of the effects of status and trust on reasoning about
criminal offences.
The results of the present study prompted an alternative view that the function of
trust as an underlying principle in the public's reasoning about justice may reside in
breach of trust relationships rather than in the violation of the normative role expectations
attached to trusted positions. It was concluded that further examination of the role of
asymmetrical trust relationships in the public's reasoning about justice was necessary.
Methodological improvements were also considered necessary. The offence
scenario that was used in the present study caused some participants to form the opinion
that the victim provoked his attacker. Some respondents went so far as to state that the
victim deserved to be assaulted and ambiguity about the culpability of the offender may
have contributed to the variability in the data. It was decided to remove this ambiguity
from future scenarios.
The fact that there was so little consensus in the responses made by members of
the public may not have been due to methodological concerns alone. The magnitude of
the standard deviations in the data also prompted consideration that participants may have
varied in the degree of consideration they gave to their responses. In accordance with one
of Durham's (1993) recommendations for improving the validity of research on public
opinions about criminal justice, no constraints were placed on the response contexts of
participants in the current study. It could be expected that judgments based on heuristic
information processing (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991 for a comprehensive discussion of
heuristics and biases in social cognition) were likely to differ from those made by
participants who gave careful, objective consideration to their responses. It was the latter
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kind of response that was most likely to serve the aims of the research. Therefore, it was
decided to elicit a more consistent and thoughtful level of consideration from respondents
in subsequent studies in order to enable more systematic comparison of experimental
groups.
An alternative view of the variability in the data produced by the present study
was that people's views on the issues examined are so influenced by complex, interacting
factors, or so much a product of individual difference characteristics, that they cannot be
neatly summarised or compared. It may eventuate that lack of consensus must be
accepted as an inherent characteristic of public opinion on criminal justice issues.
Qualitative data gathered by the present study indicated that, although offender
characteristics were the most important consideration in participants' reasoning about
punishment overall, and although victim characteristics were important to reasoning
about offences in which the victim was vulnerable, objective assessments of deserved
penalties in relation to harm and culpability played a major part in participants'
evaluations. Notwithstanding the potential confounds, methodological limitations and
sources of non-consensuality discussed above, the possibility that the opinions of the
public may be more rational and less influenced by emotional and moral concerns
(especially in relation to prosaic offences) than is commonly believed must not be over
looked.
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CHAPTER 3

Status and Trust

The purpose of the studies reported in this chapter was to explore the relationships
of trust and status to enable a more meaningful investigation of the role of trust in the
public's condemnation of offences and its reasoning about punishment. The results of the
first experimental study in this program of research showed that an expected effect for an
offender's position of trust might have been modified by the influence of his status. As it
was trust, rather than status, that was indicated as an important principle in the public's
reasoning about justice in the initial exploratory study, and trust that was the intended
manipulation in the subsequent experimental study, the logical next step in this program
of research was to attempt to manipulate trust without confounding by status.
Consequently, it was decided to experimentally compare the effects of high trust
on public condemnation of offences and reasoning about punishment for offenders of
high and low social status. This chapter describes an attempt to clarify the concepts of
status and trust and their relationships in real-world exemplifications.

Status Defined
Status is primarily a sociological construct. One of the problems of discussions of
status is the imprecise boundaries placed on status, prestige and class (Scott, 1996). The
dominant view in sociology is Weber's theory that, in a tripartite social structure of class,
status, and authority (party), status is conferred on those who possess characteristics that
carry social honour or prestige and/or the economic bases of class (for example,
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Anderson, Hughes, & Sharrock, 1 987; Cuff, Sharrock, & Francis, 1 998; Giddens, 1 997;
Sargent, 1 994; or any mainstream sociology textbook). A representative sociological
definition of status is, "the social honour or prestige which a particular group is accorded
by other members of a society" (Giddens, 1 997, p. 586). Prestige is defined as "the level
of esteem in which people hold themselves and are held by others" (Cuff et al., 1 998, p.
5 1 ). The notion that the bases of status are not purely economic, and an illustration of the
fundamental difference between status and class, was provided by Giddens' ( 1 997)
example of social esteem for 'genteel poverty' and concurrent scorn for 'new money'.
Status and Trust
In one of the few concurrent treatments of trust and status in the psychological
literature, personality theorists Jones, Couch and Scott ( 1 997) describe a "fundamental
and unavoidable tension between behaviors which promote "getting along" [trust] and
those associated with "getting ahead" [status]" (p. 466). Nevertheless, in terms of the
expectations of those who have achieved or been ascribed high status or trust, the
meanings of status and trust are intuitively correlated. Psychological definitions of status
stress the role of societal obligation, for example, "condition, position, or standing
socially, professionally, or otherwise . . . . obligatory behaviour of persons in particular
positions in terms of roles, the pattern of socially accepted and expected behaviours"
(Reber, 1 985, p. 728). Govier ( 1 997) related status to trust in that, "the relatively high
status of some professions, such as medicine, dentistry, the judiciary, and science gives
many people an initial disposition to trust their members . . . . even those who are total
strangers" (p. 82). She stated that high status people present themselves as trustworthy
and, "generally give the impression of being socially responsible" (p. 83). Similarly, trust
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in a social position could be expected to contribute to perceptions of high social status.
Fumham ( 1994) has stated that expert professionals such as scientists can raise flagging
levels of public esteem by, in part, building trust. Investigations of the inter-relationships
of status and trust have not been a focus of psychology or sociology. Neither is there a
nexus between the voluminous literatures on the concept of trust and sociological
analyses of status as an element of social structure. Sociology's primary interest in status
is its role in social stratification. A status is "a position in society which confers a certain
degree of prestige on one; it is usually one of a set of hierarchical positions; and generally
implies certain expected behaviour" (Sargent, 1987, p. 24). Therefore, a person's status is
a determinant of his or her position in the social hierarchy.
The fact that retaining honour and prestige relies on a social trust that expected
behaviours will be performed is not made explicit in sociology. This omission can be
explained in the context of the different emphases of sociology and social psychology. In
an analysis of the perspectives taken by the two disciplines, Thoits (1995) stated that
detailed and explicit pursuit of explanatory mechanisms is of secondary importance to
sociology's concern with location in the social structure. Conversely, psychologists often
attempt to understand dyadic or small group processes without reference to relationships
of status or power. In a discussion of mainstream sociology' s view on interpretations of
prestige, Wegener (1992) stated that purely subjective analysis is seen to be of little
sociological relevance and, in the utilisation of cognitive and valuative analyses, "we are
left with only psychological effects" (p. 258).
One sociological perspective that conceptualises status and prestige in terms of
shared societal value systems rather than part of a framework of social stratification alone
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is the normative functionalist approach of Talcott Parsons (Scott, 1996). Parsons'
conceptualisation of the production and characterisation of status allows for a subjective,
normative consideration of status in social relationships that approaches a social
psychological analysis. The basis of references to sociology and the meaning of status
used in this dissertation relied on a functional understanding of status rather than its
explanation of structure alone.

The Present Studies
Ideally, an experimental study that further investigated the findings reported in
Chapter Two would have evaluated of the influence of trust, independent of effects of
status. To do so would have required the formulation of orthogonal offence scenarios in
which an offender had, variously, high trust and high status, high trust and low status, low
trust and high status, and low trust and low status. However, attempts to isolate trust and

''

status in factorial designs using examples of offenders proved problematical. The

I

formulation of offence scenarios that portrayed an offender who occupied a position of

t

in status proved particularly difficult. The concepts of position of trust and social status
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have considerable overlap when considering real-world exemplars. Additionally, the

t
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i

high social trust but who had low social status, and one in a position of low trust but high

results of the study reported in Chapter Two indicated a need to investigate the impact of
professional trust relationships on reasoning about criminal justice. By definition, those
on whom the public relies for expert knowledge and assistance are held in high esteem,
thus indicating a similar correlation between asymmetrical trust (Freiberg, 1995) and

l

�

status.
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In an attempt to further illuminate the relationships between the status and
trustworthiness of those who occupy various social positions and occupations, two
surveys were conducted. The aim was to provide a sound empirical basis for further
experimental research using offender characteristics that, as much as possible, separated
trust and status. In order to emphasise relationships between trust and status, the
methodology and results of the surveys are reported together.

Method

Participants
Participants in both surveys were introductory psychology students at Edith
Cowan University. There were 237 participants in the trust survey, 167 females and 59
males (no information was recorded for the sex of 11 participants). Their ages ranged
from 17 to 52 (M = 24.61, SD = 9.18). There were 192 participants in the status survey,
132 females and 51 males (no information was recorded for the sex of nine participants).
Their ages ranged from 17 to 63 (M = 24.34, SD = 9.53).
The samples, although non-randomly selected, were not as unrepresentative of the
general population as would usually be the case with student participants. Edith Cowan
University has a high proportion of mature students, low entrance scores relative to
Western Australia's three other major universities, and a student catchment area of low to
average socioeconomic status.
Although the surveys were conducted as activities in two of the students'
undergraduate tutorial classes, they were informed that participation was voluntary and
that neither the completion nor the content of the surveys was associated with assessment
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of the unit. They were assured that the information they provided was anonymous and
that individual responses would remain confidential to the researcher.
Materials
The questionnaire used in the trust survey asked participants, "Who Can We
Trust?" It requested nominations of the types of people that society holds in high and low
trust and the reasons for that trust or distrust.
The questionnaire used in the status survey asked for definition of social status
and for the generation of lists of the types of people participants regarded as belonging to
high or low social status groups. Respondents also recorded their reasons for the status of
each nomination. Definitions of social status were regarded as a prime for the concept of
status.
The questionnaire used for the trust survey appears in Appendix F. The status
survey questionnaire appears in Appendix G.
Procedure
Administration of the trust survey formed part of an introductory psychology
tutorial on social psychology. The tutorial exercise was explained as an examination of
the differences between the explanations of individual and social psychology. The student
participants were allowed ten minutes to complete the questionnaire and their responses
f-

were used as the basis for a facilitated discussion on levels of meaning in social
explanation. Tutors' instructions for the exercise appear in Appendix F.
Completion of the status survey formed part of an introduction to psychology
tutorial on applied language. Student participants discussed subjective and consensual
meaning of language before and after completing the survey questionnaire. Tutors'
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instructions to the participants appear in Appendix G. Results of the surveys were made
available to the student participants later in the semester and their use and relevance was
explained.

Results
Only the major elements of the results of the surveys are presented in order to
maintain the focus of the research. A broad picture of results that are relevant to the
dissertation is presented in the form of frequency data and bar charts. Specifically, the
perceived trustworthiness and status of medical doctors, lawyers and police officers are
highlighted because of the prominence of these groups in the results of both surveys or
because of the relevance of their status and trust characterisation to earlier studies in this
program of research. The future utility and prominence of categories identified as
possessing high or low trust and status were based on the degree to which they met the
criteria of belonging to clearly representable occupational groups, nomination in both the
trust and status surveys, nomination by at least 25% of participants, and the assignment of
trust that was relational as well as general and professional rather than interpersonal.
Other results that are of interest in themselves, but that are not relevant to the thesis are
included in Appendix H for the trust survey, and Appendix I for the status survey. In the
interests of clarity, a table showing all groups that were identified as possessing high and
low levels of trust and status is presented here first (Table 8).
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Table 8
Groups That Were Identified as High Trust, Low Trust, High Status, and Low Status in
the Trust and Status Surveys and the Proportions of Participants Who Nominated Them
High Trust

Trust Survel'. (N =237}
%
79.7
65.4
47.7
27.4
23.2
20.3
1 1 .0
8.9
7.2
3.0
2.5
2.1
1 .7
1 .7
1 .3

group
family
close friends
doctors
police
teachers
spouse/partner
self
priest/ministers
counsellors
animals/pets
pilots
dentists
judges
voluntary workers
firemen

High Status
group
doctors
politicians
lawyers
actors/models
business executives
millionaires
judges
sport-stars
professionals
aristocracy
university lecturers
teachers
priest/ministers
police

group
politicians/government
salespeople
strangers
criminals
lawyers
people just met
police
government departments
media
bosses
people who hurt in past
businesspeople
some friends
real-estate agents
banks
addicts
doctors
teachers

Status Survel'. (N = 192 )
%
59.9
44.8
37.00
3 1 .8
24.5
22.4
12.5
9.4
9.4
8.3
7.8
6.8
6.3
5.7

Low Trust
%
50.6
34.7
20.7
14.8
12.7
12.2
1 1 .4
8.9
8.0
7.2
7.2
6.3
6.3
6.3
5.1
4.6
4.2
3.4

Low Status

group
unemployed
criminals
homeless
cleaners
unskilled workers
poor
addicts
garbage collectors
blue collar workers
students
Aboriginal people
politicians
sole parents
youth
migrants
checkout workers
kitchen hands
'dole bludgers'
disabled people
salespeople

%
39.6
20.3
16.1
16.1
15.1
1 3.5
1 1 .5
9.9
9.4
8.3
7.3
6.8
6.3
5.7
5 .7
5 .7
5.2
5.2
4.7
4.2
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When asked, "Who can we trust?", immediate family, close friends, doctors and
police officers were the four most frequently mentioned groups (Figure 1).
Family and friends were trusted because of interpersonal relationship
characteristics such personal knowledge of them, love, and long association and proven
trustworthiness (see Appendix H for further details). Doctors were identified as a trusted
group by 47 .7% of participants. The most frequently mentioned reasons for that trust
were because they kept information confidential and because of the caring and healing
work they performed (Figure 2).
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Figure 1
Nominations of high trust groups.
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To a lesser extent, doctors were regarded as trustworthy because of their trusted
position in society, their knowledge, because of people's reliance on them, and because of
their high status. Therefore, the four most frequently mentioned reasons for trusting
medical doctors derived from symmetrical trust attributes of their role in society.
However, the asymmetrical trust consideration of reliance and the role of status as a
source of perceived trustworthiness were also mentioned. A small number of participants
(4.2%) did not trust doctors because of adverse past experiences.
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Figure 2
Frequencies of reasons for high trust in medical doctors
When asked to nominate categories of people who had high or low social status,
59.9% of the 192 participants nominated medical doctors as possessing high social status
(Figure 3). Politicians, lawyers and celebrities also figured prominently in high status
nominations.
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Although wealth, power and education were the major defining characteristics of
status overall, these characteristics were surpassed by caring and helping as the main
status-producing attributes of medical doctors (Figure 4).
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Figure 3
Nominations of high status groups.
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Figure 4
Frequencies of reasons for the high status of medical doctors.
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Thirty-seven per cent of respondents identified lawyers as a high status group (see
Figure 3) because of their high income, wealth, education and power (Figure 5).
However, lawyers were also identified as an example of a group that were distrusted by
12.7% of respondents (Figure 6) in the trust survey because of attributions of dishonesty
and greed (Figure 7). Low opinions of lawyers have been noted elsewhere (Black &
Rothman, 1998; Bell, Friedenthal, Tarlton, & Sullivan, 1995). The decline in public
esteem for lawyers has been related to increased ruthlessness and greediness as well as to
lowering of professional standards in a way that appears to have more to do with trust
than social status.
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Figure s
Frequencies of reasons for the high status of lawyers.
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Figure 6
Nominations of low trust groups.

10

8

"'
Q
0
"'

6

<U

0

>.
Q

<U

i:...

2

0

��

4.;.

�

o�i."t:

.()"o

"176
-:t,

t,.('

"%

"-'1,.

"'Q'

l,.o;:.d' q��(!>

%

'Q°"·q,. · c>,."% .
i'te-0

�

�

�o
"c,
"'"'1'.
"->;,
(''t,
%,,,.
"" '<l'c,�
c>o
"'.,60
�
tj,.
.:.,.Oq
...
�

Reasons for Low Trustworthiness of Lawyers

Figure 7
Frequencies of reasons for low trust in lawyers.
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Politicians figured prominently as a high status (44.8%), low trust (50.6%) group
in the results of these surveys, however, because of the difficulty of representing them in
clear relationships of professional trust, this group was not suitable for valid inclusion as
a trust and status exemplar category in subsequent studies. Salespeople (particularly car
salesmen) were widely distrusted (34.7%) but they were not prominent in low status
nominations (4.2%). Celebrities had high status (31.8%) but did not appear in the trust
survey nominations. Specific results for these groups are reported in Appendices H and I.
Twenty-seven point four per cent of participants nominated police officers as a
group they trusted (see Figure 1) because of the service and protection they provided and
because of their position in society (Figure 8). However, 11.4% of respondents distrusted
police officers (see Figure 6) because they regarded them as corrupt and as abusive of
their power (Figure 9). Only five point seven per cent of participants in the status survey
identified police as a high status group.
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Figure 8
Frequencies of reasons for high trust in police officers.
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Figure 9
Frequencies of reasons for low trust in police officers.

Status, Per Se
The main purpose of the present study was to further understanding of
relationships of status and trust in their real-world manifestations rather than an
examination of participants' conceptual understanding of those notions. The generation of
category exemplars of high and low levels of trust and status was intended to provide a
sound empirical base for future experimental manipulations. Participants of the trust
survey were not asked to define trust. The request for participants of the status survey to
·define status was integral to the data collection context as well as being included as a
prime for the identification of status categories.
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Although definitional information on status was incidental to the purpose of the
study, its examination provided worthwhile information on the production and
characterisation of status and interesting comparisons with sociologists' theoretical
understanding of status. The characteristics that defined status and the reasons for
manifestations of high status were also compared.
Content analysis of participants' definitions included recording each defining
characteristic mentioned by each participant once. The characteristics were then
organised by the themes they represented (see Appendix J). A summary of the defining
characteristics of status is presented in Figure 10. Consistent with theoretical discussions
of status, defining characteristics were mentioned in the context of high status, with their
opposites implied as definers of low status.
An Australian conceptualisation of status might be expected to be different from
that described in the predominantly North American literature. For example, Wegener
(1992) has previously noted cultural differences in the conferring of prestige. In an
analysis of the power, privilege and prestige of occupations in Australia, Daniel (1983)
noted that lines of social stratification in Australia are blurred and confused. She stated
that there is little Australian evidence for the dominant Weberian sociological concept of
a tripartite social structure of class, status and authority. Nevertheless, participants'
definitions of status showed a high degree of congruence with mainstream sociological
theory. Economic sources of status, categorised by sociologists as class in the tradition of
Marx, were prominent. Nomination of defining characteristics that relied on prestige that
· was not dependent on economic substance supported the Weberian view that status is
more than class.
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Figure 10
Characteristics that define status.
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Participants specifically identified prestige itself (for example, importance and
respect) as a definer of status, but they also nominated sources of prestige (type of
employment, knowledge) as sources of status. Presentation (for example, dressing and

i
I

speaking well) and valued personal attributes were also definers of status, supporting the
functionalist view that status involves more subjective value judgments than a mere
grading system of social rank.
The reasons for the status of groups that were identified as manifestations of high
social status are presented in Figure 11.
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Figure 11
Characteristics of high status groups.

The difference between generic definitional characteristics of status and reasons
for the status of groups that represented real-world examples of high status was 'doing
good work'. This difference was almost solely attributable4 to the identification of
medical doctors as an example of an extremely high status group. The perception that the
work of doctors involves caring and helping, reflecting prestige from socially valued
characteristics, was the main source of their high social status.
The type of prestige that was attributed to doctors as a source of their high status
has been discussed as a particular example of normative, subjective evaluations. Wegener

4

Although police officers were a group whose status was relatively low (5.7% of
participants nominated them as a high status group), that status largely derived from their work
that serves and protects.
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(1992) stated that such evaluations fit prestige theories that rely on charisma as a
foundation of prestige and contrasted these theories with more rational functional theories
that rely on valued achievement characteristics. He referred to the work of Shils who
explained charismatic prestige as an entitlement to deference because of the performance
of functions that are a "central feature of man's [sic] existence and the cosmos in which
he lives" (Shils, 1975, p. 258). Daniel ( 1 983) characterised this as '"pure prestige'
without any apparent underpinning of more concrete referents of power" (p. 23).
Participants' reasons for the low status of groups they identified in that context
were briefly examined. Underclass characteristics such as lack of material wealth, income
and education or skill were the major defining characteristics of low status groups.
However, congruent with Weberian sociological theory's characterisation of pariah
groups (Giddens, 1997), negative privilege characteristics such as belonging to a group
with a despised social image or manifesting behaviour that differs from culturally
expected norms were also perceived as conferring low social status.

Conclusions
The main purpose of the surveys described in this chapter was the identification of
groups with independent, orthogonally variant levels of trust and status. The survey data
provided strong empirical support for the portrayal of medical doctors as the
exemplification of a high trust and high status group. Even though 4.2% of participants
did·not trust doctors, their reasons involved individual adverse experiences. The
anticipated general finding that medical doctors are a high status, highly trusted social
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group also lent support to the speculation that a status shield effect (Skolnick & Shaw,
1994) may have clouded the manipulation of position of trust in the results of the
experimental study reported in Chapter Two.
Lawyers and politicians5 were examples of groups that are not trusted but that also
possessed high social status. However, the conclusions from the first experimental study
indicated a need to investigate relationships of trust between offenders and victims.
Lawyers were clearly indicated as a relatively low trust, very high status group that also
allows for the manipulation of a professional relationship with a victim. The type of
distrust that was attributed to politicians was general rather than relational. It would have
been difficult to formulate a realistic professional, non-interpersonal relationship between
a politician offender and a constituent victim that was comparable to that of a doctor and
patient. Consequently, it was decided that the status and trustworthiness of politicians
would not be pursued as an empirical base for future studies.
The previous difficulty with formulating a high trust, low status group was not
completely resolved by the survey findings. Police officers provided the best example.
They did not appear in nominations of low status groups but their status was low in
comparison to doctors or lawyers and there was, albeit equivocal, evidence that they are
highly trusted. They must be regarded as a serviceable but less than ideal example of a
high trust group with relatively low status. It was accepted that their inclusion in a
factorial manipulation of offender trust and status would result in comparisons that were
not strictly orthogonal.
5

Interestingly, the increasing responsiveness of governments to public opinion polls that
was mentioned as part of the rationale for this program of study (see Background) has been
described as an attempt by politicians to regain the trust and confidence of the public (Finkel,
1995).
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The survey data contained no prominent example of a low trust, low status
offender group that could be portrayed as having a professional relationship with a victim.
Criminals were the only group that was frequently identified as having both low trust
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( 14.8%) and low status (20.3%). Although it would have been possible to represent an
offender as an habitual criminal, it was not possible to formulate a scenario in which that
offender had a professional relationship with a victim that was congruent with the
asymmetrical trust relationship between doctor and patient, lawyer and client, or even
police officer and crime victim.
The secondary aim of the surveys reported in this chapter was to disentangle the
concepts of trust and status. Trust formed 1.4% of the total number of characteristics that
were mentioned in participants' definitions of social status. It formed 3% of the total
number of reasons for the status of high status exemplars, an increase that was
attributable to the high number of nominations of medical doctors in that category and to
status characteristics of police officers. Explicit mentions of trust formed nearly five per
cent of the reasons doctors have high social status. It appears that, although trust was not
generally regarded as an important characteristic of high status, being highly trusted
contributes to the prestige of some groups.
There were some indications that high status was a source of perceived
trustworthiness in the case of medical doctors and police officers. However, the fact that
high status does not guarantee trust was demonstrated by the case of lawyers and
· politicians who had very high social status but were widely and strongly distrusted. In the
case of these two groups, the fact that their status derived from characteristics of wealth
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and achievement rather than from the prestige or charisma conferred by service provided
to society would appear to explain the absence of a correlation between their status and a
corresponding level of trust.
The trust and status of doctors and police officers was mainly associated with the
perceived characteristics of their professional roles. In particular, the nature of the work
they performed, and the importance of that work to society, was a source of trust and an
i'

important factor in their relative levels of status. The status of lawyers was derived from
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commonly acknowledged status characteristics of wealth and education. Undesirable
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personal characteristics were offered as reasons for distrust in them. These characteristics

i

contributed to by representations of criminal defence lawyers in popular entertainment).

appear to be based on a stereotypical perception of lawyers as a social group (possibly

Identification of exemplars of low trust and low status provided no evidence for
relatedness of trust and status at the opposite pole of these dimensions (see Appendices H
and I). The main reasons for low trust were attributes of self-interest, dishonesty, a past
record of untrustworthiness, not being known to participants, greed, and deviousness.
Low status reasons of lack of wealth, income, and employment mirrored economic
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reasons for high status. Reasons also included lack of prestige and personal characteristics
of laziness and absence of ambition. The perception that people had low status because
they make no social contribution and are a burden on society reflected the prestige-as
charisma attributes of high status.
In summary, there was little evidence of a general correlation between trust and
· status. An association between high trust and high status was shown in specific
occupational and social groups whose status was derived from prestige characteristics that
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have previously been described as sources of social deference and value (Shils, 1975;
Wegener, 1992).
The survey results presented in this chapter provided a sound empirical basis for
the representation of offenders who have high trust and high status, and low trust and high
status. Less unequivocal evidence was provided for the portrayal of a high trust, low
status category and it was deemed impossible to credibly represent a member of low trust,
low status group that was also capable of a professional relationship with a victim.
The groups that best-represented offenders of varying levels of trust and status in
combination with the manipulation of a professional relationship were medical doctors,
lawyers, and police officers. It was accepted that factorial manipulation of high and low
levels of trust and status in the subsequent experimental study must be incomplete.
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CHAPTER 4
The Influence Of Offender Position of Trust/Status And Professional
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Trust Relationship On Reasoning About Justice

The exploratory study conducted at the beginning of this program of research
presented emotionally and morally provocative offence descriptions to members of the
public. Responses indicated that a perception that an offender had violated a position of
social trust was associated with judgments about the offence that were disproportionately
punitive to the harm it caused. The consequent experimental study, reported in Chapter
Two, tested the effect of an offender's position of trust on public condemnation of an
offence and decisions about the severity and purpose of deserved punishment. Results
revealed no effect for offender position of trust, prompting speculation that the offender
who represented a high degree of symmetrical, social trust (a medical doctor) was
protected from condemnation by his concurrent high social status. Subsequent survey
research confirmed that medical doctors occupy a position of high trust and high status in
contemporary Australian society. Other results from the survey research were that
lawyers occupy a position of high status and low trust and that police officers, although
generally trusted, do not have high social status.
The unexpected absence of an effect for position of trust that was reported in
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Chapter Two also led to a conclusion that trust relationships, rather than the trust that
resides in social roles, may be an important factor in the public's reasoning about criminal
justice. The purpose of the experimental study reported in this chapter was to clarify the
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influences of offenders' positions of trust and status, together with the impact of a
professional trust relationship with a victim on evaluations of an offence and judgments
about appropriate punishment.
The mechanism of the influence of both the trusted position of offenders and their
high status on social judgments is assumed to be the violation of socially expected
behaviours. An examination of trust in this context was described in Chapter Two.
Chapter Three reported the sources and characteristics of status. The following rationale
for the experimental study reported in this chapter begins with a discussion of societal
expectations associated with social status.

Status and Behavioural Expectations
As mentioned in the previous chapter, status is essentially a sociological construct.
Of necessity, an examination of the expectations associated with status must rely on that
discipline. Sociology holds that the three dimensions of societal stratification are class,
status and power (Sargent, 1994). Class as conceptualised by Weber, and derived from
Marxist theory, has an economic basis6 • However, the sources of status are not necessarily
economic and may be "a position in society that confers a certain degree of prestige"
(Sargent, 1987, p. 24). Sargent explained that such positions' are hierarchical and they
carry pressure, but not compulsion, to behave in accordance with society's expectations.
The expectations of persons of high status are not specified in general sociological
theory except through references to the responsibilities, as well as the privileges, of status.
. 6

Analysis of the original authors' conceptualisations was considered to be outside the
purview of this thesis. The place of status in the context of this research is its separation from the
concept and influences of trust.
7
The use of this word in social-structural analyses denotes relative rank. Position, a s in
'position of trust', used in the context of this dissertation means role or occupation.
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Although it is rarely made explicit, and the emphasis is structural rather than individual or
relational, the privileges of high status are assumed to be the continued possession of that
status and the associated benefits of power and freedom (Daniel, 1983). Responsibilities
are discussed in the context of expected conformity with conduct dictated by status roles.
The implied consequence of abrogation of those responsibilities is loss of status.
The specific, functionalist sociological theory proposed by Talcott Parsons
provides a more social psychological account of the behavioural expectations associated
with status. Parsons viewed society as a collection of commonly held values and beliefs
(Callinicos, 1999). He nominated expectation and role as key elements of social order
(Cuff et al., 1998). Based on his understanding of socialisation processes, Parsons
claimed that patterns of stable social interaction are built on conformity to one's status
role and compliance with approved or expected behaviours. Parson's functionalism holds
that societies attach a moral force to culturally acquired expectations of status role
behaviours, to the extent that such behaviours are demanded and that non-conformity
elicits punitive reactions. Sanctions are unconsciously applied and include controls in
interpersonal interactions, such as signs of disapproval and withdrawal of approval
(Parsons, 1951/1982). Parsons stated that these interpersonal controls are, "on a certain
level, the most fundamental mechanisms of all, and only when they break down does it
become necessary for more elaborate and specialized mechanisms to come into play" (p.
4 15). Thus, in Parson's view, behaving in a way that is expected is not only a matter of
maintaining a place in the structural hierarchy, it is necessary for the stable function and
moral cohesion of society.
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Parson's functionalist sociology has been characterised as having an idealistic
moral basis and his incorporation of a social psychological perspective has been criticised
by other sociologists as an ill-advised attempt to formulate a grand theory of social
function (Callinicos, 1999). It diverges from sociology's purpose of broad structural
analysis and impinges on the mandate of psychology to provide explanations of behaviour
(Outhwaite, 1987; Scott, 1996; Sharrock, 1987). Nevertheless, in the context of this
dissertation, it provides a useful account of the mechanisms by which an essentially
sociological construct influences behaviour.

Status and Trust
Parson's incorporation of normative values and mutual obligations into social
analysis is the nexus between the sociological explanation of status and the concept of
trust. His notion that people must act as they are expected to in order to maintain social
cohesion concurs with Freiberg's (1995) conceptualisation of symmetrical trust. In
common with social psychology and with the literature on trust that was reviewed in
Chapter Two, Parsons acknowledged the social importance of conformity to behaviours
defined by roles. The social expectation of that conformity can be characterised as the
trust that is inherent in everyday, symmetrical social relationships.
The common-sense expectation of the impact of high social status on social
judgments is that it carries, not only an expectation of conformity with role expectations,
but also a responsibility for exemplary social behaviour. Moghaddam stated that "in all
· known societies, some people have higher status, they enjoy greater influence, and are
assigned more responsibility for their actions" (Moghaddam, 1998, p. 222). However, this
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intuitive assumption is not made explicit in either sociological or psychological literature.
Functionalist sociology makes a strong case for the expectation that people will conform
to the behaviours dictated by their status roles (Cuff et al., 1998; Sargent, 1994; Scott,
1996). Presumably, these expected behaviours might be good or bad. Social psychology's
assertion that people are expected to conform with role schemas is similarly neutral,
although Miller and Vidmar ( 1981) have associated violation of social expectations with
negative social sanctions. Nevertheless, the association of honour and prestige with high
status implies that people who are assigned high status are expected to behave
honourably. An explicit, though dated, example of this assumption was found in an
examination of the interaction of status, deviance and social sanctions. Wahrman (1970)
proposed two conclusions: "the higher one's evaluation of a person, the stronger one's
expectation that the behavior of that person in all areas will also be highly evaluated" (p.
230), and: "the less expected deviant behavior is, the greater the annoyance at the
deviant" (p. 231).
Wahrman's ( 1970) explanation of responses to wrongdoing by people of high
status is congruent with the hypothesised reaction to wrongdoing by a person in a position
of high trust that was proposed in Chapter Two. The rationale was that the high level of
trust in the offender's position in society would be perceived as carrying an associated
responsibility to behave in an exemplary fashion. It was anticipated that a violation of
such an expectation would be strongly and disproportionately condemned.
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Status Protection From Condemnation
An alternative view that, rather than abrogation of status attracting censure, high
status protects from condemnation for wrongdoing, was proposed by Hollander ( 1 958). In
his view, people who possess high status are perceived by their society as group leaders
deserving of latitude to permit and encourage creativity and innovation. Hollander
proposed that, although idiosyncratic behaviour that does not comply with role
expectations involves deviance from group norms, it might still be employed for the
attainment of group goals or for the good of the society. In return, the society grants
people of high status what Hollander has termed idiosyncrasy credits: allowances of
protection from adverse consequences for moderate deviations from social norms.
Wiggins and colleagues (1965) explained the differential rewarding of high
contributors to society's goals in the context of distributive justice principles. Those who
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contribute most are rewarded the most. However, serious deviations from social norms
are condemned because they interfere with the attainment of group goals (Wiggins et al.,
1 965) and because they set a poor example (Skolnick & Shaw, 1 994). Such deviations
deplete an idiosyncrasy credit balance to the extent that the offender's status becomes a
liability and he or she faces stronger sanctions than those for similar deviations by people
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of lower status.
Feather and Atchison ( 1998) found evidence for a status protection effect that did
not rely on an assumption of the conduct privileges of status alone. They proposed that
attributions of good or bad moral character would be cued by high or low status and
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would influence sanctions for wrongdoing. Feather and Atchison concluded from their
results that perceptions of the moral character of an offender covaried with status in the
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differential protection of high and low status offenders from judgments of criminal
responsibility and harsh punishment. That is, status effects were mediated by attributions
of moral character. Feather and Atchison' s findings cannot be regarded as general,
unqualified support for a protective effect of high status or high moral character because
their manipulation of status relied on the possession of a single advantaged or
disadvantaged social attribute (attendance at a private college versus a government high
school, married versus single motherhood). However, their results are interesting in that
they link prestige characteristics with attributions of moral goodness.
The concept of a status protection effect was the basis for the speculation that the
doctor-offender described in Chapter Two was protected from condemnation for violating
the expectations inherent in a position of trust. Feather and Atchison's (1998) findings,
that perceived good moral character also shields offenders from sanctions, raise the
question of whether the position of trust, itself, offered protection from condemnation.
Perhaps confidence in the benevolence and honour of people in highly trusted positions
means that isolated, minor breaches of the expectation that they will behave in an
exemplary fashion are regarded as temporary aberrations rather than threats to social
order that are commensurate with the degree of that trust.

Status and Punishment for Wrongdoing
As recently as the nineteenth century, status was a legitimate basis for differential
punishments (Garland, 1990). However, as Garland asserted:
Such distinctions are no longer respectable in the avowedly egalitarian,
democratic legal cultures of twentieth-century Britain or the USA [or
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Australia], nor do they exist in the legislation which regulates penal practices,
though class and race distinctions continue to operate in more subtle and less
visible ways. (p. 203)

In a discussion of inequalities in the criminal justice system, Carlen ( 1989/1994)
has stated that, in reality, offenders with characteristics of high social status often escape
criminal proceedings altogether. Carlen asserted that "discriminatory decision-making
throughout the whole criminal justice system ensures that the socially advantaged are
routinely filtered out: they are given the benefit of the doubt, or are defined a good risks,
or simply have access to the best legal advice" (p. 306). In contrast, an experimental study
of sentencing by English magistrates (Kapardis & Farrington, 1981) found that sentences
were more severe for offenders of higher social status. The age and race of the offender,
the prevalence of the offence, and, interestingly, the involvement of breach of trust in the
offence (operationalised as theft by an employee or non-employee), had no significant
effects on sentence severity.
From a social psychological viewpoint, the social, occupational and educational
status of an offender has been said to affect punishment responses (Miller & Vidmar,
1981). These authors defined punishment as "a negative sanction intentionally applied to
someone who is perceived to have violated a law, a rule, a norm, or an expectation" (p.
146). Miller and Vidmar intended their definition to apply to non-legal reactions as well
as legal punishment and they stated that the role of status attributes in punishment was
· their influence on perceptions of responsibility and the potential utility of sanctions.
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Nevertheless, an offender's social status is not a legal basis for individualised
sanctions. The retributive notion of punishment assesses blame on the basis of an
offender's actions (or omissions) and state of mind, alone (Walker, 1991). Objective
characteristics of offenders that do influence sentencing are competence and cognitive
capacity (see, for example, H. L. A. Hart's [1968] discussion of criminal responsibility
and the philosophical basis for such individualisation), extreme youth or old age, and
judged capacity to benefit from various types of punishment (Walker, 1991).
Some legal philosophers have incorporated the concept of status into analyses of
punishment. In his discussion of what it is about wrongdoing that warrants a punishment
response, Kleinig (1995) stated that, by their behaviour, wrongdoers set themselves above
others and assign themselves the latitude that is associated with an elevated position in
society.
They arrogate to themselves an authority to which they have no right, an
authority to override the equal moral rights of others. They elevate their
own ends, their own preferences and desires, over those of others, and in
pursuing these they violate one of the basic canons of moral life - the
essential equality of persons . . . . What punishment does is to defeat the
presumption implicit in wrongdoing. It brings the wrongdoer low. (pp. 416
& 4 18)

If the wrongdoer is a person or a member of a group who has already been
· consensually elevated above the social position of others, Kleinig's ( 1995) thesis may not
apply. The offender who has been assigned high status or who occupies a highly trusted

Public Reasoning About Justice
1 13
position in society is not a person who has put him or herself above considerations of
equality. He or she has a socially sanctioned role that has already conferred elevation and,
consequently, punishment might not always be seen as a necessary response to
wrongdoing.

Status Shield and Status Liability
The status protection effect derived from Hollander's (1958) concept of
idiosyncrasy credit has been investigated in connection with the influence of offenders'
social status on social and legal condemnation and punishment (Rosoff, 1989; Shaw &
Skolnick, 1996; Skolnick & Shaw, 1994; Wiggins et al., 1965). Wiggins et al. examined
the effects of interference with attainment of group goals and status of the interference
agent on punishment. They manipulated three levels of a high or medium status group
member's behaviour and measured its effect on the probability of a group achieving its
goal (high points on group tasks). Status was operationalised as the group member's past
competence at group tasks and interference was the extent of deduction from the group's
point score due to one member's cheating. Punishment was measured by group members'
post hoc reports of liking and preference for the interference-agent and the withholding of
group rewards.
Wiggins and colleagues ( 1965) found a significant interaction between status and
interference in determining punishment. Results confirmed their prediction that, as long
as there was still hope of achieving the group goal, a high status interference-agent would
J;,e protected from severe punishment by the group because of his past performance and
future need of his services. High status continued to afford protection from punishment
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for medium interference. However, high interference that caused frustration of group
goals changed high status from a shield to a liability. Wiggins et al. explained this status
liability effect, in part, by reference to the principle of distributive justice that "suggests
that an individual is punished in proportion to the rewards he has received in the past" (p.
208).
There have been other examples of social psychological research that has studied
the influence of status, conformity and power in small group contexts (for example,
Hollander, 1960, 1961; Sherif & Sherif, 1964). These will not be examined here due to
their limited relevance to the present research. This review will focus on the role of
criminal offenders' social status in evaluations of formal sanctions. However, there are
also some limits that will be placed on discussion of that literature because much of it
conceptualised status in a way that differs from the present research.
Criminal justice researchers have long had an interest in the extra-legal influences
of offender status on punishment. Status has mostly been very loosely defined in
empirical investigations of that interest and findings have been inconsistent (Miller,
Chino, Hamey, Haines & Saavedra, 1986). Some studies have demonstrated a negative
relationship between status (however defined) and severity of punishment and others have
shown a positive relationship. Most studies have operationalised offender status as
socioeconomic status (SES), in a way that is much closer to the concept of class than the
conceptualisation of social status in the present research. The most commonly used
measure of SES has been education level (D' Allessio & Stolzenberg, 1 993).
In a review of investigations of the relationship between SES and punishment,
D' Allessio and Stolzenberg (1993) found that, of the 38 studies conducted between 1 975
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and 1990, 39% reported "a strong inverse relationship between an offender's
socioeconomic status and severity of sanction" (p 62). In their own study, an examination
of records from the Florida Department of Corrections, D'Allessio and Stolzenberg used
the terms SES and class interchangeably. They found that the influence of SES on judicial
sentencing, as opposed to the present focus on public judgments, interacted with the type
of offence committed. SES had a significant, inverse relationship to the severity of
sanctions imposed on violent and moral order offenders. However, prior criminal record
was more salient than SES in the punishment of property offences. In a more recent
example of a study that investigated non-judicial punishment decisions, Luscri and Mohr
( 1998) found no effect for offender status8 (measured as occupation type) on penalties for
offences of murder or theft.
The 0. J. Simpson trial prompted many studies on extra-legal influences in
judicial sentencing and biases in evaluations of culpability. An entire issue of the Journal
of Social Issues ("The 0. J. Simpson Trial," 1997) was devoted to reporting twelve of
these studies. It included an article by Skolnick and Shaw ( 1997) that reported a jury
simulation study of the effects of offender and mock-jury members' race, and offenders'
celebrity status on assigned penalties and evaluative judgments. They reported that their
results "confirmed a "Black racism" hypothesis, since Black jurors favored Black over
White defendants by voting not guilty more often, recommending more lenient sentences
and judging them more positively" (p. 503). However, a defendant's celebrity status

8

The main purpose of Luscri and Mohr's (1998) study was an investigation of the effects
of negative stereotypical connotations of offenders' surnames on evaluations of offenders and
assignment of punishment. However, they also manipulated offenders' occupational status.
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(operationalised as the success and popularity of a fiction author) had no effect on
verdicts or sentencing, although it did influence personal evaluations of the defendant.
Skolnick and Shaw's findings led them to conclude that race, rather than celebrity status,
was likely to have influenced the Simpson verdict.
The conceptualisation of status used in the present research was derived from the
functionalist perspective of sociology and the defining characteristics of status that were
identified in the survey reported in Chapter Three (chiefly, economic and prestige factors
and doing socially valuable work). The operationalisations of offender status in the
studies that will now be reviewed were consistent with that conceptualisation.
In following the work of Wiggins et al. (1965), Rosoff (1989) also found that
status became a liability, and that high status deviants from social norms were more
severely penalised when serious offences were committed. He proposed that members of
the highly regarded profession of medicine are especially vulnerable to effects of status
liability and investigated the effects of status differences between medical specialists on
public reactions to deviance. As the basis for his manipulation of status, Rosoff cited his
earlier findings for a prestige hierarchy in medicine based on ascribed esteem, perceived
income and assigned social value. Unfortunately, reference details for the source of these
findings were not included in Rosoff's paper. Rosoff found that, although undergraduate
students (as mock jurors) were more reluctant to punish a high status offender (a surgeon)
than one of lower status (a dermatologist) for a moderately serious offence, the surgeon
was punished more severely than the dermatologist for a very serious offence.
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Skolnick and Shaw ( 1994) were justifiably critical of Rosoff' s (1989) conclusions.
There was a lack of comparability between his measures of punishment. The measures
were evaluations of guilt in one offence condition and sentence length and degree of
professional sanction in another. Furthermore, guilt was assumed in one offence condition
and unproven in the other. Skolnick and Shaw argued that this made it unclear whether
status liability effects depended on uncertain guilt and status shield effects applied only
when the offender was clearly liable for an offence.
A more serious problem with Rosoff's ( 1989) study was that it confounded the
magnitude of an offence and its professional relatedness (Skolnick & Shaw, 1994).
Although the major crime occurred in the doctor-offenders' homes and was unrelated to
their professional activities, the minor crime of insurance fraud was directly related to the
offenders' professional duties. As Skolnick and Shaw asserted, this confounding made it
difficult to conclude whether status effects are moderated by the extent to which
idiosyncrasy credit is eroded or by the professional relatedness of an offence.
A further flaw in Rosoff's (1989) study, and in many like it, was the compromise
to external validity posed by the use of undergraduate students as mock jurors. Skolnick
and Shaw (1997) made the general observation that mock jurors are not as highly
motivated as real jurors because the consequences of their judgments are not as important.
There have been many other criticisms of the generalisability of findings from jury
simulation studies (Bornstein, 1999; and see Diamond, 1997, for a review).
Skolnick and Shaw ( 1994) challenged the assumption that status effects are
· moderated by offence seriousness. Instead, they proposed that, although there had been
independent empirical support for the conclusion that high status provides a shield from
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sanctions when offences are unrelated to an offender's profession, the moderator of status
liability effects is the professional relatedness of offences. Skolnick and Shaw appear to
have overlooked the fact that Hollander (1958) made a similar assertion. The main thrust
of Hollander's argument was that seriously idiosyncratic behaviour nullified the
protection of status from sanctions for moderate deviance from normative role
expectations. However, he also claimed that role-related deviance would have a similar
effect. Hollander stated that, although those who have high status are afforded:
latitude for the manifestation of what would be seen to be nonconforming
behavior for others . . .. [the high status person] could readily lose credits and
find his [sic] influence diminished if he were to show idiosyncratic behavior
in terms of expectancies associated with his role. (p. 125, italics added)

The results of Skolnick and Shaw's (1994) study supported a hypothesis that
status effects are moderated by professional relatedness of offences rather than by offence
seriousness. A significant interaction between professional relatedness and status showed
that participants judged a high status offender (a psychotherapist with a PhD in clinical
psychology) less harshly than a low status offender (a graduate student in psychology
who conducted therapy as part of his training) for a professionally unrelated offence
(status shield). An opposite, albeit weaker, effect was found for a professionally related
offence in that a high status offender was assigned higher professional penalties and more
responsibility for an offence, and he received less favourable personal evaluations than a
lower status offender (status liability).
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The level of seriousness of offences did not interact with professional relatedness
and status at a statistically significant level on any of the multivariate measures of
punishment (Skolnick & Shaw, 1994). This disconfirmed the findings of Wiggins et al.
(1965) and Rosoff (1989) that offence seriousness is the mediator of status effects.
Further analysis showed a significant univariate effect for the three-way interaction of
status, professional relatedness and offence magnitude on one punishment measure,
professional penalties. Subsequent pairwise comparisons revealed no differences between
cells for a major crime (possibly as an artifact of the type of crime, rape, which could be
expected to attract severe professional sanctions regardless of status or professional
relatedness). However, a significant status shield effect was found for a professionally
unrelated, relatively minor crime of fraudulently billing an insurance company. Not
surprisingly, Skolnick and Shaw found a significant simple effect for offence seriousness
on punishment (more extreme sanctions for a major crime compared to a minor crime),
however the seriousness of the offence did not produce different levels of punishment for
high and low status offenders.
A follow-up study by these authors (Shaw & Skolnick, 1996) extended the
evidence for professional relatedness as the moderator of status effects to include the
context of civil lawsuits involving liability judgments and financial sanctions. It also
addressed limitations of their earlier study by portraying unambiguous motives for the
offences, magnifying the difference between (the same) high and low status defendants
and adding an intermediate level of crime severity.
Skolnick and Shaw (1994; Shaw & Skolnick, 1996) concluded that the mechanism
of status effects on sanctions for wrongdoing was the association between that
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wrongdoing and the source of an offender' s status rather than the magnitude of the
offence. The source of status that they manipulated was professional standing9 . By this
choice of status representation, they also manipulated position of trust. The association of
status and trust, but not the confounding, was acknowledged in their description of the
responsibilities of a high status professional:
. . . high status professionals are role models for others in the profession and
their behavior must be exemplary. Professionally related deviance by high
status individuals betrays the trust of their profession and should be
sanctioned more severely than the same professionally related crime
committed by low status individuals. (Skolnick & Shaw, 1994, p. 1829)
Therefore, the status effects found by Skolnick and Shaw (1994; Shaw &
Skolnick, 1996), were also trust effects. It could have been the position of higher trust of
the high status offender that shielded him from strong sanctions for a professionally
unrelated offence. Similarly, the relatedness of an offence to his professional high trust,
rather than his professional high status may have served as a liability. Furthermore, as
well as manipulating the status- and trust-relatedness of an offence, Shaw and Skolnick
(1996) manipulated the trust relationship between an offender and a victim. They
acknowledged this inclusion as a confound in the manipulation of professional
relatedness in their second study. However, they claimed that it had no impact on their
results.
9

In the concluding comments of their second paper, Shaw and Skolnick (1996) pointed to
the need to conduct studies on the effects of status derived from sources such as attractiveness,
ability, wealth or inherited position in order to ensure that their representation of 'professional
relatedness' was not a special and non-generalisable case of 'status relatedness' .
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Interim Summary of Status Effects
Status is an essentially sociological construct. Although sociologists assert that
status roles carry expectations of certain behaviour, sociological theory does not expand
on the kinds of behaviours that are expected or the consequences of non-conformity with
expectations. Intuitively, high status should carry expectations of exemplary behaviour
but it has been argued that high status offers protection from sanctions for deviance from
normative expectations. The mechanisms of this protection may be either latitude for
idiosyncratic conduct or attributions of basic goodness that are associated with high
status. Protection has been shown to be withdrawn, and high status has been shown to be
a liability in the face of serious non-conformity and deviance that is related to an
offender's status. The criminal justice system ignores offender status in the interests of
egalitarian application of justice.
Some effects of status on social judgments can be explained in the context of trust.
If attributions of high moral character shield an offender from punishment, so might the
occupation of a position of high social trust. Additionally, previous empirical findings for
a status shield effect may have owed as much to differences in trust as differences in
status; the professional relatedness of offences that has shown a status liability effect
involved the manipulation of professional trust as well as professional status; and the
relationship between the offender and victim that produced a status liability effect was a
trust relationship.
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Professionally Related Offences and Asymmetrical Trust

Interpretation of the results of the experimental study reported in Chapter Two
included the conclusion that the findings of the initial exploratory study may have
indicated the importance of trust relationships rather than trusted roles as an important
principle in the public's reasoning about justice. It was decided that trust in professional
relationships would be explored because trust in interpersonal relationships had already
been excluded from the scope of this research program. Additionally, professional
relationships had previously been investigated in association with offender social status,
another variable that required further examination.
Professional relationships are asymmetrical trust relationships (Freiberg, 1995)
because they involve differences of power and expertise. The symmetrical trust explored
in Chapter Two was defined as trust-as-confidence (Cherney, 1997) - an expectation that
others will act morally and abide by social and role norms (Freiberg, 1995). The expected
response to violation of symmetrical trust was anger and outrage at the perceived threat to
social order. Asymmetrical trust, trust-as-obligation (Cherney, 1997), is the reliance on
those who hold more power, or have more knowledge or expertise to act diligently,
competently and with integrity and to put the interest of the weaker party above their own
(Freiberg, 1995). Freiberg cited relationships between professionals and their clients;
parents and their children; and the relationship of doctors, lawyers, and counsellors to
those who seek their help, as examples of this kind of trust relationship. The asymmetry
of power and status inherent in professional relationships produces a vulnerability in the
. less powerful party that involves a different kind of trust than that which is present in
everyday social interactions. The gap in competence between the two parties involved in
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a professional-client relationship means that the less powerful party is obliged to trust in
the integrity of the other (Blomqvist, 1997).
In the case of high status professionals such as medical doctors and lawyers,
Govier ( 1997) stated that the public must assume, not only that the more powerful parties
in professional relationships are competent and reliable, but also that they will use their
expertise in the public's interest because they care. The vulnerability inherent in such
relationships means that "both technical competence and caring motivation are essential"
(p. 95). "We need to rely on the understanding and values of this person" (p. 91, original
italics). In a similar vein, Lupton (1996) has criticised attempts to empower patients in
their relationship to doctors by taking a consumerist approach alone. She stated that
comparative evaluation of services and increasing the medical knowledge of patients fails
to address the dimension of emotional vulnerability in doctor-patient relationships.
Lupton's conclusions from her research on the emotional context of doctor-patient
encounters included the statement that "it is clear that most people expect a high level of
compassion, empathy and comfort from their doctors and not just adequate medical
knowledge and expertise" (p. 160). Doctors are trusted to care as well as to perform.
Skolnick and Shaw (1994; Shaw & Skolnick, 1996) operationalised status-related
wrongdoing as a professionally related offence. Their representation of this variable as an
offence by a high status professional against a client meant that the offender-victim
relationship was one of asymmetrical trust. Therefore, the professional relatedness that
produced a status liability effect in the results of their studies was an example of a breach
. of asymmetrical trust. Violation of the integrity expected of the more powerful party in
such relationships represents betrayal of trust as reliance and obligation. The present
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study investigated the role of asymmetrical trust relationships, as well as the influence of
positions of social trust and social status on the public's evaluations of a criminal offence
and its reasoning about punishment.

The Present Study
The original impetus for the present study was the need to examine the effect of a
position of high trust on condemnation for an offence without the confound of high social
status. The correlation of position of trust and status in some real-world exemplars meant
that those variables had to be represented together in examples of offenders. The
representation of an offender as a medical doctor (high trust and high status) and a lawyer
(low trust and high status) was expected to partially address the initial aim. However,
restrictions on the production of credible, ecologically valid portrayals of offenders meant
that a completely factorial test of the effects of trust with status was not possible. The
need to investigate the effect of trust in professional relationships as well as trust in roles
contributed to the problems of operationalisation of positions of trust and status.
The inclusion of an offender who was described as a police officer added a low
status and high trust condition to the experiment design but the values of those variables
did not provide an axis that was perfectly orthogonal to the other levels of the
manipulation. The results of the surveys reported in Chapter Three indicated that,
although the social status of police officers is lower than that of doctors and lawyers,
police were not specifically categorised as a low status group. Additionally, police
officers were highly trusted by many participants (27.4%) but actively distrusted by a
smaller proportion (11.4% ). The equivocal trust and status of the position of police

Public Reasoning About Justice
125
officers in society made it difficult to predict the impact of an officer's offence on public
condemnation or the goals of his deserved punishment. Nevertheless, it was accepted that
police assume a responsibility of public trust when they accept the authority to enforce
the law and this includes being of good personal character (Cohen & Feldberg, 1991;
Delattre, 1989). Additionally, in a discussion of sentences that involve an element of
aggravation for a breach of fiduciary (asymmetrical) trust, Freiberg asserted that
"offences committed in breach of high statutory office, such as Ministers of the Crown,
are regarded as particularly egregious as are those committed by police" (1995, pp. 99100). A police officer's obligation to uphold the law is the ultimate protection for those
with less power. Failure to do so was expected to attract condemnation and punishments
aimed at deterrence and retribution.
In addition to the original aim of testing position of trust, the inclusion of offender
social status as a variable in the present study enabled further investigation of the status
effects found by Skolnick and Shaw (1994; Shaw & Skolnick, 1996). However, because it
was anticipated that the addition of position of trust to offenders' characteristics would
produce more complex results, no predictions were made regarding the differential effects
of combined levels of offenders' trust and status on condemnation and goals of
punishment.
Due to the focus on trust in this program of research, the present study
unambiguously manipulated 'professional trust relationship' rather than the simple
'professional relatedness' of an offence (although, of course, an offence that involves a
. professional trust relationship is also professionally related). The difference between the
two types of manipulation is illustrated by the example of a doctor who inflates an
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account directly billed to a patient with no private medical insurance versus one who
bulk-bills the government Health Insurance Commission for the same inflated service.
The first offence attacks the professional trust between doctor and patient, the second is
related to the doctor's profession (as well as symmetrical trust and the source of his or her
status) but it has no immediate detrimental impact on the patient.
The expected mediation of status effects by professional relatedness of offences,
and asymmetrical trust relationships between offenders in positions of varying levels of
trust and their victims made hypothesising interaction effects a complex exercise. The
introductory section of this chapter described evidence for inconsistent influences of trust
and status on condemnation for wrongdoing and concluded that previous support for the
role of professional relatedness in status effects may well have been due to the mediation
of trust. Investigation of the interaction of offender position of trust and status with
professional trust relationships was regarded as exploratory and no explicit hypotheses
were formulated.
The simple effect of a professional, asymmetrical trust relationship between an
offender and a victim carried clear expectations and was, thus, more amenable to a priori
hypotheses. Offences involving the abuse of relationships of trust or authority are
recognised factors of aggravation in sentencing (Freiberg, 1 995; Hills et al., 1 998). It was
expected that the public would understand this circumstance of aggravation in the same
way. Investigation of the effect of relationships of asymmetrical trust between
professional offenders and their victims revisited, by implication, the issue of victim
vulnerability explored in Chapter Two. The less powerful partner in an asymmetrical trust
relationship, although not necessarily vulnerable, per se, is vulnerable in interaction with
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and dependent on the trustworthiness of the other. Responses to violations of
asymmetrical trust and associated vulnerability were expected to be condemnatory and,
possibly, retributive and deterrent.

Method

Design
The independent variables were the combination of offenders' positions of trust
and status (medical doctor, lawyer, police officer) and professional trust relationship
(present or absent). In accordance with the results of the trust and status surveys described
in Chapter Three, a doctor was a representative of high trust and high status, a lawyer
represented low trust and high status, and a police officer represented qualified high trust
and relatively low status. In the interests of external validity, it was accepted that the
levels of offenders' position of trust and status must be incomplete because no credible
offence scenario could be formulated for a low trust/low status offender in conjunction
with a professional trust relationship.
The levels of the two independent variables were fully crossed to produce six
experimental conditions in a 3 x 2 factorial, between-subjects design. Stimulus materials
were six offence scenarios that represented the six experimental conditions.
The eight dependent measures were: degree of negative emotional response to the
stimulus scenario; the perceived moral wrongfulness of the offence; the perceived
harmfulness of the offence; the severity of the deserved punishment; and the importance
of each of the four widely accepted goals of punishment (individual deterrence;
rehabilitation; general deterrence; and retribution) to the punishment decision.
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Participants
Fourth year psychology students acted as research assistants and administered the
research questionnaire to 122 members of the general public. The sample was selected
using the same snowballing technique as the experimental study reported in Chapter Two,
but participants came from a different pool as the students were from the subsequent
academic year. Research assistants' instructions appear in Appendix K.
Participants were 47 males and 74 females (one participant recorded no
information on gender) and they were aged between 18 and 92 years ( M age = 43.33,
SD = 17.36). They were randomly assigned to one of the six experimental conditions and
were assured of confidentiality and anonymity before voluntarily participating in the
research.

Materials
Stimulus Scenarios
The six experimental conditions were portrayed in six descriptions of an assault
on a middle-aged male victim by a fictional offender named Greg Hill. The offence
scenario was brief and clear and guilt was assumed from the outset, thus avoiding one of
the confounds in the study by Rosoff (1989). Offence seriousness was moderate and was
kept constant. The scenario, essentially the same as the one used in the first experimental
study, described a collision between a bicycle rider and a pedestrian that resulted in an
assault that caused physical harm to the rider. A small number of participants in the
previous experimental study made the comment that ambiguity of the degree to which the
offender was provoked made decisions difficult. This was addressed by making it clear
that the bicycle rider victim's near-collision with the pedestrian offender was accidental.
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The scenarios were presented as brief summaries of evidence and they are
reproduced in Appendix L. The example of scenario one, in which the offender was
described as a medical doctor and a trust relationship with the victim was present,
follows.

Greg Hill is a medical doctor who lives in a middle-class suburb of Perth. He
has pleaded guilty to a charge of assault on a middle-aged man after he
pushed the man off his bicycle. Hill had been walking down a city street on
his way to work when the man, who he knew as a patient of his named John
Marshall, emerged from an alley on his bicycle and almost collided with him.
Mr Marshall stopped, said, "sorry, I didn't see you", and rode on. When Hill
spotted Marshall at a set of traffic lights near his surgery a few minutes later,
he told him off and, at the same time, pushed him. This caused Marshall to
fall from his bicycle, sustaining grazes, bruising and a broken wrist.
When the case came to court, the prosecutor stated that, as well as being
injured, Mr Marshall was upset by the assault. At the time of the assault, he
had been a patient of Dr Hill's for six months. Mr Marshall had been
regularly attending Hill's surgery for treatment of a distressing, minor chronic
illness. He had relied on Hill for his advice and expertise and felt that they
had a close, professional relationship.

The Research Instrument
Each research questionnaire comprised an instruction page, one of the six stimulus
scenarios and six questions (see Appendix M). The instruction page explained that the
purpose of the research was to invite members of the public to give their personal
opinions on justice issues. This page also explained the requirements for completing and
returning the questionnaire.
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To address the possibility that the variability in the data from the experimental
study reported in Chapter Two was due to a wide range of participants' levels of
response, attempts were made to standardise the degree of consideration that participants
gave to their decisions. The questionnaire cover sheet included specific instructions to
participants to give some thought to their opinions, rather than base their answers on
immediate reactions.
The first five questions were essentially the same as those asked in the previous
experimental study. Questions one to four requested a rating of the extent of participants'
negative emotional response to the offence described in the stimulus scenario; an
evaluation of the moral wrongfulness and the harmfulness of the offence; and a rating of
the severity of the punishment deserved by the offender. Each of these four questions
required a cross to be made on a 135mm visual analogue scale.
To facilitate qualitative analysis of responses to a second part of question four,
"What factors influenced your opinion on the severity of punishment deserved by Greg
Hill?", participants were asked to identify the most important factor in their punishment
decision.
Question five was identical to the one used in the previous experimental study. It
comprised four 135mm visual analogue scales to record the importance of individual
deterrence, rehabilitation, general deterrence and retribution to participants' decisions
about an appropriate penalty.
As information about socioeconomic status added nothing explanatory to the
results of the previous experimental study, question six asked for information about age
and sex only.

L
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Procedure
Research assistants were instructed to, as far as possible, select equal numbers of
males and females who were over 18 years of age and who came from a range of ages
(research assistants' instructions appear in Appendix K).
Participants read the instruction sheet in the presence of the research assistant.
They then read the stimulus scenario they had been assigned and answered the six
questions. Finally, research assistants gave the participants a sheet of paper containing
debriefing information about the purpose of the study and availability of results (see
Appendix N). The completed questionnaire was sealed in an envelope and delivered or
mailed to the researcher.

Data Scoring
Each questionnaire delivered eight individual scores out of 135, calculated by
measuring the length of each 135mm visual analogue scale at the point where participants
had marked their rating. The overall internal consistency reliability of the scale was high
(Cronbach's a= .83).
Scores on conceptually related items one to four yielded a Cronbach's alpha value
of .82 and principal components analysis revealed one component with an eigenvalue of
2.552. This component was again named condemnation. It accounted for 63.81% of the
total variance in the items' scores and all four items loaded highly (between .64 and .87)
on it.
Consequently, the same five dependent variables that were used in the previous
experimental study were prepared for analysis: condemnation, and the importance of
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individual deterrence, rehabilitation, general deterrence, and retribution to decisions about
deserved penalties.
Demographic values for age and sex were recorded in their raw state. Qualitative
data produced by the question, "What factors influenced your opinion on the severity of
punishment deserved by Greg Hill?" were recorded verbatim and grouped according to
experimental condition for later thematic analysis. The data were used as a source of
elucidation of quantitative findings.

Results
Data Screening
Missing data were not problematic. As the data were grouped by the research
design, subsequent screening was performed separately for each experimental group.
Some within-cell inter-item correlations were very high. For example, in the doctor/trust
relationship-present group, r = .94 between wrongfulness and individual deterrence.
However, the overall pattern of inter-item correlations did not indicate any redundant
items.
Screening for outlying univariate scores using stem-and-leaf plots in conjunction
with SPSS tables of extreme values revealed 21 outlying scores. Ten of these were
attributable to three participants in the doctor/trust-relationship-present group. Extreme
scores were modified by assignment of a raw score that was one unit smaller (or larger)
than the next most extreme score in that distribution (as suggested by Tabachnick &
Fidell, 1989).
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Mahalanobis distance values were calculated for each participant to check for
multivariate outliers. Using the conservative a = .001 recommended by Tabachnick and
Fidell (1989), comparison with the appropriate chi-square value, x2 crit (5) = 20.52,
showed no multivariate outliers in the data.
Initial screening of the data showed considerably fewer within-cell violations of
normality than were found in the same variables for the experimental study reported in
Chapter Two. After modification of the univariate outliers, there were only five serious
normality violations (probability of Shapiro-Wilk's statistic p < .03) in the 30 cellmeasure groupings. Investigation of skewness and kurtosis values and examination of
histograms showed that, of these five violations, only two were a cause for serious
concern. The dependent variable 'importance of rehabilitation' had excessive negative
kurtosis and a bimodal distribution in the doctor/trust-relationship-present and the
doctor/trust-relationship-absent groupings. In both groups, participant age was an
underlying factor in score bimodality. Younger participants generally attached more
importance than older participants to the role of rehabilitation in punishment decisions.
It was decided to exclude the measure of the importance of rehabilitation to
punishment decisions from further multivariate analysis of the data produced by item five
due to violations of the requirement for approximately normal distributions. It is not clear
whether the robustness of ANOVA to violations of normality also applies to multivariate
analyses of variance (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989). In any case, the smaller cell sizes in
this study did not provide the protection against such violations that was afforded by the
larger samples in the previous experimental study. As there was no suitable method of
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non-parametric statistical analysis of the effect of the two independent variables on
rehabilitation, it was not analysed.
The bimodality of response distributions indicated by those who did and did not
trust police in the trust survey was not reflected in the data for the present study as
responses to scenarios in which the offender was described as a police officer were
normally distributed. Although the questions asked were not specifically about trust,
absence of bimodality is mentioned as it illustrates that the pattern of responses to police
offender scenarios was comparable to those of the other two types of offender.
Tests for linearity of pairs of dependent variables were not performed because of
the number of tests that would have been necessary (with the associated potential for
Type I errors) and the consequent complexity of interpretation.

Descriptive Statistics
In comparison to the data from the experimental study reported in Chapter Two,
there was a considerable reduction in the variability of condemnation and individual
deterrence score distributions. For general deterrence and retribution, standard deviations
remained high. Means and standard deviations for each of the four dependent variables in
each experimental condition are reported in Table 9.

Analysis
Condemnation
The homogeneity of variance assumption for ANOVA on condemnation was
violated (Levene's test p = .021) but sample sizes were adequate and almost equal. A
3 x 2 ( offender position of trust/status x professional trust relationship) ANOVA showed
no significant main effects, but the interaction effect of the two independent variables on

Public Reasoning About Justice
135
condemnation was statistically significant, F(2, 1 16) = 4.80, p = .010, 172 = .076. The
ANOVA results are shown in Table 10.
Table 9
Means and Standard Deviations of Condemnation, Individual Deterrence, General
Deterrence and Retribution Scores (range 0 - 135)

DV

condemnation

Trust
Relationship
eresent
absent
Total

doctor

Note:

M

83.13 24.95

102.74 28.93 43

M
SD
88.32 37.75
107.81 23.50

98.55 32.22

N
21
22
43

M

SD

56.91 41.32

N

19
21

40

M
SD N
58.68 43.76 19
63.45 38.86 20

61.13 40.84

39

N
21
22
43

M

SD

70.84 35.75
81 .75 39.65

76.44 37.71

SD

84.67 23.80

N

18
21

39

M

N

39

M
SD N
102.61 23.80 18
9 1 .67 30.70 21

98.22 30.41 58
100.55 29.05 64
99.44 29.61 122

police

Total

96.72

27.93 39

M
SD
5 1 .61 41.41
79.95 32.62

66.87 39.14

N

18
21

39

M

M

M

SD

56. 17 45.34
83.15 36.3 1

70.37 42.52

SD

SD

ss

757.57
896.87
5330.10
64423.96
70650.93

N

Total
N

18

20

38

M

SD

MS
378.79
896.87
2665.05
555.38
583.89

N

60.60 40.75 58
73.98 40.66 62
67.52 41.09 120

Table 10
ANOVA Summary Table of the Effects of Offenders ' Position of Trust/Status and
Professional Trust Relationship on Condemnation
d[_
2
1
2
116
121

N

54.60 42.30 58
60.97 39.11 63
57.92 40.62 121

ind. deterrence = individual deterrence
gen. deterrence = general deterrence

Source
Offender
Relationship
Offender x Relationship
Within
Total
* p < .05

N

Total

police

19
20

SD

82.95 23.99 58
87.75 24.42 64
85.47 24.24 122

police

law�er

doctor
55.14 41 .07
58.59 42.45

40

M

76.49 27.1 1
91 .68 18.42

law�er

doctor

46.88 40.14

N

19
21

lawrer

M
SD N
103.43 27.07 21
102.09 3 1 .22 22

M
SD
53.48 43.51
40.59 36.53

SD

75.71 24.92
89.85 23.56

doctor

retribution

Trust
Relationship
eresent
absent
Total

N

88.37 24.25 43

gen. deterrence
Trust
Relationship
eresent
absent
Total

SD

M

95.04 14.71 21
82.01 29.71 22

ind. deterrence

Trust
Relationship
eresent
absent
Total

Offender Position of Trust/Status
Total
lawrer
police

F
0.682
1.615
4.799 *
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The direction of the mean group scores indicated that, when there was a
professional trust relationship between the offender and the victim, condemnation was
higher for a doctor than for a lawyer and a police officer. However, when the victim was
a stranger, condemnation was higher for a lawyer and a police officer than for an offender
who was described as a doctor. The diagram that shows this disordinal interaction appears
in Figure 12.

Estimated Marginal Means of Condemnation
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Figure 12
Condemnation as a function of offenders' position of trust/status and professional trust
relationship.
To further investigate the interaction effect, a one-way ANOVA was conducted on
condemnation score distributions from each of the six cells of the experimental design.
The homogeneity of variance assumption for ANOVA was again violated. The ANOVA,
F(S, 1 16) = 2.40, p = .041, could only be regarded as significant if a = .05 was not
adjusted for the possibility of familywise error.
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Post hoc comparisons for groups with unequal variance using the Games-Howell
statistic revealed no significant pairwise differences on condemnation between cells. The
comparison that came closest to significance (p = .063) was between the doctor/trust
relationship-present condition (M = 95.04, SD = 14.71) and the lawyer/trust-relationship
present (M = 75.71, SD = 24.92) condition. Comments that indicated the influence of
offender attributes and offender-victim relationship factors in the punishment reasoning
of participants in these two experimental groups are reported in Table 11.
The comments recorded in Table 11 relate to severity of punishment alone, that is,
they explain reasoning about only one of the four contributors to the measure of
condemnation. Although by no means conclusive, they indicate that the status of both the
doctor- and the lawyer-offender were important to consideration of deserved penalty but
that expected trustworthiness and the relationship with the victim were more important to
deciding the punishment of the doctor.
Qualitative analysis of response content and themes (Glesne & Peshkin, 1992)
indicated that offender characteristics and calculation of just deserts were important
considerations in participants' decisions about appropriate punishment. This finding was
consistent with the one found by the same kind of analysis of the data from the
experimental study reported in Chapter Two. Professional relationships between an
offender and a victim were generally not cited as important factors in reasoning about
punishment. A summary of qualitative data produced by responses to the question, "What
factors influenced your opinion on the severity of punishment deserved by Greg Hill?" is
presented in Table 12.
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Table11

Participants ' Comments on Offence Factors That Influenced Severity of Punishments
Assigned to a Doctor and a Lawyer in a Professional Trust Relationship With a Victim

Offence Factor
offender
characteristics

Ex�eriment Condition
doctor/patient
lawyer/client
Because he was a prominent figure in
society who you would not expect to do
this.
Being a doctor he should have been more
aware of Mr Marshall's condition and
had more patience.
A doctor must have control of his
emotions.
Should have had more self-control.
His over-reaction as a professional man.
A doctor is supposed to help - not injure
people.
Greg Hill is supposed to be a respected,
responsible person in the community and
should set an example. If he gets away
with it, so will others.
No-one should be allowed to get away
with this behaviour, doctor or not.
Should have control in any situation
Lack of emotional control of Hill.

relationship
characteristics

Being a doctor, people expect them to set
an example.
The fact that he knew Mr Marshall on a
doctor/patient level.
Mr Marshall being a patient of Hill's
implies he felt they had a trusting and
considerate relationship. By his actions
Hill has disregarded their relationship.
The fact that he was a doctor and John
Marshall a patient of his.
Should set an example - especially to
people who trust him.
Should have control in any situation but especially when dealing with
patients.
Hill's relationship with other patients.
Over-reaction to Mr Marshall's action
when he knew of his condition.

Hill, as a lawyer, should have been able
to deal with the incident in an
appropriate manner.
A person of his standing should have
been able to show a great deal more
control over his actions.
Greg Hill knew the law and penalty for
assault.
Should have control at all times.
Greg Hill did the wrong thing. Because
he is a lawyer he should know it is
illegal but he still did it.
A person should think before acting. I
have more expectations of a lawyer to
behave himself and follow the law.
Likely that harm would be caused and a
legal professional should know
more/better than most.
He appears to be, apart from this assault,
a stable, reliable and valued member of
the community.
A position of public respect, trust.
Greg Hill should behave better, being a
lawyer, - needs to set an example for
others.

Needs to set an example for others and
respect the needs of his clients
He knew him; had a good professional
relationship.
Destruction of pre-relationship.

r
t
f
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Table 12
Results of Qualitative Analysis of Frequencies of Important Offence Factors That
Influenced Participants' Opinions on Severity of Punishment
Cell

(offender/
relationship)

doctor/yes
doctor/no
lawyer/yes
lawyer/no
police/yes
police/no

Total b

Offence Factors That Influenced Punishment SeveritI a
1

offender
attributes

8
4
8
2
9
12

43

2

intent

4

3

relationship
attributes

4

3
3

2
1
1

14

4

harm

1

3

3

13

6

2
5
1
1

3
7

5

seriousness

1
1
1

6

blame/
deserts

7

wrong

5
9
2
6
4
4

30

1
2
1
2
2
8

Notes:
a

b

1 position or status of offender; expectations of same
2 planned nature of offence; retaliatory
3 violation of trust
4 extent of harm, violence, potential harm
5 serious nature of offence
6 calculation of just deserts: assessment of a penalty that is proportional to the degree of harm and
blameworthiness
7 moral wrongfulness of offence
some participants gave more than one reason

Goals of Punishment
A 3 x 2 (offender position of trust/status x professional trust relationship)
MANOVA was performed on the three dependent variables that measured the importance
of individual deterrence, general deterrence and retribution to decisions about
punishment.
The Box's M test for homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices was
satisfactory. MANOVA (Pillai's criterion) showed a significant multivariate main effect
for offender position of trust/status, F(8,224) = 2.2 18, p = .027, r,2 = .073, and a
significant effect for the interaction of offender trust/status and professional trust
relationship, F(8,224) = 2. 185, p = .030,

1]

2

= .072 . There was no multivariate main
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effect for trust relationship. The full MANOVA source table is shown in Table 13.
Interaction diagrams for the effects of the interaction on individual deterrence, general
deterrence and retribution appear in Figures 13, 14 and 15.
Table 13
Multivariate Analysis of Variance of the Importance of Individual Deterrence, General
Deterrence and Retribution to Decisions About Punishment
Source of variance
Offender
Relationship
Offender x
Relationshi,E

Pillai's trace
0. 112
0.033
0.128

Hypothesis df Error dL Multivariate F
2.229 *
226
6
112
1.273
3
226
6
2.567 *

* p < .05
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Figure 13
Importance of individual deterrence to punishment decisions as a function of offenders'
position of trust/status and professional trust relationship.
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Estimated Marginal Means of General Deterrence
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Figure 14
Importance of general deterrence to punishment decisions as a function of offenders'
position of trust/status and professional trust relationship.
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Figure 15
Importance of retribution to punishment decisions as a function of offenders' position of
trust/status and professional trust relationship.
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Although some authors argue that main effects should be ignored if a significant
interaction is found in a factorial analysis, a more common-sense position is that the
meaningfulness of main effects should be examined before discarding them as
unimportant (Howell, 1997). In this case, univariate tests for the simple effect of
offenders' position of trust/status on individual deterrence, general deterrence and
retribution were not significant. Effects on general deterrence, F(2, 1 14) = 2.609, p = .078,
772 = .044, and retribution, F(2, 1 14) = 2.485, p = .088, 772 = .042, were closest to
significance at an unadjusted a = .05.
Because of these near-significant univariate effects, pairwise post hoc
comparisons using Tukey's HSD were conducted on the effect of offenders' position of
trust/status on the importance of general deterrence and retribution. Neither set of
comparisons was significant. General deterrence ("the need to make an example of him")
tended to be more important to the punishment of a police officer (M = 66.87,
SD = 39. 14) than the punishment of a doctor (M = 46.88, SD = 40. 14, p = .060).

However, the interaction diagram in Figure 12 shows that this effect only held for
offences against a victim with whom the offender had no professional trust relationship.
In the case of this disordinal interaction, it was judged that analysis of the interaction
effect on general deterrence would prove more illuminating than analysis of the main
effect for offender trust/status.
Post hoc comparisons of the main effect of offenders' position of trust/status on
retribution ("the need to ensure he gets what he deserves") were not significant. They
showed that retribution tended to be more important to the punishment of a lawyer
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(M = 76.44, SD = 37.31) than a doctor (M = 56.91, SD = 41.32. p = .076).
Univariate analysis of the interaction effect of offenders' position of trust/status
and professional trust relationship revealed no statistically significant differences between
conditions on individual deterrence, general deterrence or retribution. Interaction effects
on individual deterrence, F(2, 114) = 2.568, p = .081, r,2 = .043, and general deterrence,
F(2,114) = 2.898, p = .059,

r,2 = .048, approached significance if a = .05 was not adjusted

for the possibility of familywise error.
A one-way ANOVA on each of the six cells of the experimental design was used
to further explore the nature of the (non-significant) interaction effects on individual
deterrence and general deterrence. The ANOVA result for individual deterrence was not
close to significance. However, post hoc comparisons resulting from the one-way analysis
of the interaction effect on general deterrence, F(5, 115) = 2.378, p = .043, showed that,
in the absence of a professional trust relationship, general deterrence ("the need to make
an example of him") was much more important to the punishment of a police officer

(M = 79.95, SD = 32.62) than a doctor (M = 40.49, SD = 36.53, p = .018). Comments that
indicated the influence of offender attributes in the punishment reasoning of participants
in these two experimental groups are reported in Table 14. Although the comments relate
to the severity rather than the goals of punishment decisions, they gave a strong indication
of the more negative response toward the police officer than the medical doctor who
broke the law.
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Table 14
Participants ' Comments on Offender Characteristics That Influenced Severity of
Punishments Assigned to a Doctor and a Police Officer Who Assaulted a Stranger
Experiment Condition
doctor/stranger
He should have known better.
That he is a doctor and should be able to control his
behaviour and reactions.
Hill is a medical doctor and is expected to be able to
be rational and not lose his cool and act out
unacceptable behaviour.
He should know better, being a doctor.
Hill, being a doctor, may have had a serious question
on his mind regarding one of his patients - shock
reaction to situation.
As a doctor, a professional person, his anger should
have been tempered!
Status in community. Showing restraint.

'-1(

police officer/stranger
Being a police officer he should have known
better.
As a policeman he should protect, not abuse.
He is an officer of the law and the man didn't do
anything wrong.
Greg Hill is a "public officer" - no less, a
policeman.
He is a police officer and therefore should have a
stronger sense of morals than demonstrated by his
actions.
The position of respect and community standing
as a police officer - should be setting an example.
He is a police officer and should be setting an
example.
Police officers should be more able to control
anger in difficult situations.
Being a public servant.
Mr Marshall said sorry. Greg Hill is a police
officer.
Serving police officer - exposed to daily violence.
Self-restraint and discipline.
Breach of authority/social standing. Over-reaction
to minor accident.
If Greg Hill was in uniform on his way to work
then he gives a reason for passers-by to form
derogatory opinions of the whole police force. As
a policeman this Mr Hill has a duty to the public
and his profession.
He is a police officer.
He was a police officer so surely someone in his
profession should know better.
Greg Hill was a police officer - abuse of power
and status.
Policemen are expected to display exemplary
behaviour.
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Summary
A summary of the most important findings of the present study is presented in
Figure 16. When a professional relationship existed between an offender and a victim, an
offender who was described as a medical doctor was more strongly condemned than an
offender portrayed as a lawyer. Judgment of the deserved punishment of an offender
described as a police officer was significantly more strongly based on considerations of
general deterrence than the punishment of an offender portrayed as a medical doctor
when the victim was a stranger.
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Figure 16
Important findings of the effects of offenders' position of trust/status and professional
trust relationship.

Discussion

The only firm prediction made for the results of the present study, that the
existence of a professional trust relationship between the offender and victim would result
in condemnation and punishments aimed at deterrence and retribution, was not
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substantially supported by the data. There was no main effect for professional trust
relationship on any dependent variable.
Results showed that offender characteristics and professional relationship
interacted to produce a significant effect on condemnation of the offence. Although the
influence of the interaction was not particularly strong, examination of the interaction
diagram prior to statistical comparisons indicated the disordinal effect that, when there
was a professional trust relationship between the offender and the victim, condemnation
was higher for a doctor's offence than for that of a lawyer or a police officer. However,
when the victim was a stranger, condemnation was higher for the lawyer and the police
officer than for an offender who was described as a medical doctor. Hence, there was
evidence for the protection of a doctor from condemnation unless his offence was
professionally related.
Statistical analysis of the interaction did not reveal the status protection and
liability effects that were found in previous experimental work (Skolnick & Shaw, 1994;
Shaw & Skolnick, 1996). A complete effect for status would have resulted in significantly
greater condemnation of the lawyer as well as the doctor than the police officer for the
professionally related offence and greater condemnation of the police officer than the
doctor and the lawyer for the professionally unrelated offence. Instead, the only
difference in condemnation that was close to statistical significance was between the
doctor and the lawyer, both high status offenders, when both had a professional
relationship with their victim.
The difference between the extent of condemnation of the doctor's and the equally
high status lawyer's offences in the presence of a relationship of professional trust
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relationship approached significance (p = .063) and is worth discussing. It indicated that
when a professional trust relationship with the victim was present, the trusted position of
the offender, but not his status, exacerbated public condemnation. As well as the
differences in their positions of trust in a symmetrical, social context, the doctor and the
lawyer could be expected to have differed in the perception of their trustworthiness in
asymmetrical relationships. Therefore, the mechanism of the different levels of
condemnation for the doctor- and lawyer-offender was presumably the breach of
expectations of asymmetrical as well as symmetrical trust.
The present study would have offered even stronger support for the earlier
speculation that status effects may actually be trust effects if there had been
corresponding significant shield effect for doctors over lawyers in the conditions that
involved a victim who was a stranger. The professional relationship of the offender to the
victim may have made trust more salient in participants' reasoning than it was in the
stranger-victim conditions.
As well as the differences in the trust that is attached to the positions of doctor and
I
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lawyer, the characterisation of doctors' high status has been shown to be qualitatively
different from the reasons for the high status of lawyers. In the surveys described in
Chapter Three, both doctors and lawyers were described as possessing high status
because of prestige and economic reasons. However, the perception that doctors care and
help was the chief reason for their categorisation as the highest status group. The
centrality of the work of doctors to human existence appeared to be an important source
of their high status. This aspect of doctors' high status illustrated the conceptualisation of
prestige derived from charisma and deference, as opposed to prestige deriving from class
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and achievements alone (Shils, 1975; Wegener, 1992). The differences in the sources of
the prestige of doctors and lawyers, as well as their different levels of trust, may have
contributed to the different levels of their condemnation. Participants may also have
viewed the differences between doctors and lawyers in the light of the distinction made
by Jones et al. ( 1997) between qualities required for 'getting along' versus 'getting
ahead'.
The present study also revealed a significant multivariate effect for the interaction
of offender characteristics and professional relationship on the importance of generally
accepted goals of punishment to participants' decisions about appropriate penalties.
Univariate effects of the interaction were not strong. However, the effect of the
interaction on the importance of general deterrence to punishment decisions approached a
non-adjusted level of significance.
Further analysis of the interaction effect on general deterrence showed strong
indications (p = .0 18) that, where no professional relationship between offender and
victim was present, there was a greater perceived need to formulate punishment with the
aim of making an example of the police officer than the offender who was described as a
doctor. It appears that it was the magnitude of this single effect (Cohen's d = 1. 13) that
produced the statistical results that indicated a multivariate effect for offender
characteristics and for the interaction of offender characteristics and professional
relationship on all three measures of goals of punishment.
The simplest interpretation of the difference between the need for general
deterrence of the police officer and the medical doctor is one provided by a status shield
effect similar to that found by Skolnick and Shaw ( 1994; Shaw & Skolnick, 1996). That
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is, the doctor's higher social status protected him from the perception that he needed a
punishment aimed at general deterrence. However, although it was not an intentional
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manipulation (it was an artifact of the acknowledged non-ideal operationalisation), the
social position of medical doctor is also more, and more unambi guously, trusted than that
of police officer. The source of the doctor-offender's protection, as hypothesised for the
source of previous status effects, may have been his relative trust as well as status.
The need for general deterrence of the police officer lent support to the strongly
expressed need to make an example of police officers who break the law that was
indicated by participants in the initial exploratory study. The comments recorded by
participants in the police officer/no-professional-relationship condition of this study
illustrated the strong negative responses evoked by police officers who break the law (as
shown in Table 14). Participants in the police officer/professional-relationship condition
generally showed a greater degree of tolerance for the offender (see Appendix 0). The
police officer's relationship with the man he had been assisting was qualitatively different
from either the doctor-patient relationship or the lawyer-client relationship in that it was,
arguably, less reliant. One could argue that, although the relationship of police services to
societies as a whole is obviously one of asymmetrical power, there is less power inherent
in the relationship of individual police officers to members of the public because they
have less professional autonomy than doctors or lawyers. Prior, non-asymmetrical
interpersonal relationships between a victim and an offender have been shown to result in
less serious consequences for the offender than when a victim was a stranger (Della
Torre, 1997; Erez & Tontodonato, 1990; Simon, 1996). Offences involving such
relationships are also less likely to be reported (Ruback, 1994). Perhaps the relationship
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the officer had established with the victim was viewed as interpersonal and his role as a
representative of a social institution in which public confidence is of paramount
importance was more salient in the stranger condition.
There were minor differences in the complexity of the offence scenarios used in
the first experimental study and this present study. Nevertheless, the scenarios in which a
doctor assaulted an able-bodied adult in the first study, and in which the doctor-offender
had no trust relationship with the victim in the present study, were essentially the same.
This similarity invited examination of the difference made by an instruction to
participants in the second study to give more considered responses. Comparison of the
data produced by those two conditions indicated that greater consideration to r�sponses in
the present study was associated with a slightly higher level of condemnation of the
doctor-offender and the perception of a greater need for a punishment aimed at individual
deterrence (see Table 15).
Table 15
Mean Scores for Condemnation and Importance of Individual Deterrence, General
Deterrence and Retribution to Punishment Decisions for an Offence by an Offender
Described as a Medical Doctor Against an Adult Victim in Two Experimental Studies

DV

Rating
M
N
SD
condemnation
71.84 31.54 37
ES1a
29.71
82.01
22
ES2b
M
SD
N
individual deterrence
39.38
39
75.97
ES1
22
102.09 31.22
ES2
M
N
SD
general deterrence
39.47 38
48.61
ES1
36.53 22
40.59
ES2
M
N
SD
retribution
63.03 41.20 39
ES1
58.59
42.45 22
ES2
experimental
study
one
(reported
in Chapter Two)
Notes: a
b
experimental study two (reported in Chapter Four)
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Conclusions
The interaction of the effects of offender status and trust, and professional trust
relationship on condemnation indicated that, when a professional trust relationship with
the victim was present, the high status of the offender became a liability in that it
exacerbated public condemnation, but only when the offender was expected to be highly
trustworthy. Although the interaction effect of the doctor- and lawyer-offenders and their
professional relationships on condemnation was not statistically significant, the directions
of the mean scores spoke more strongly to a trust effect than a status effect.

It

may be

that, when the source of an offender's high status is wealth and education rather than the
qualities of helping, caring and centrality to the needs of society (which are more closely
related to trust), his or her status is not a liability in the consideration of sanctions for
professionally related offences.
The status liability effect found by Skolnick and Shaw (1994; Shaw & Skolnick,
1996) may also have owed as much to trust as status. The degree of public trust in both
the symmetrical and asymmetrical relationships of the offenders described in those
studies could be expected to have covaried with their status. Just as the highly regarded,
eminent psychotherapist had more to lose in the abrogation of the responsibilities of his
high standing than the lower status person who was the graduate student of psychology,
so may he have been more vulnerable to sanctions for violating the higher degree of trust
in which he was held. A complex interaction of symmetrical trust, asymmetrical trust,
status and sources of prestige appears to be an important principle in the public's
reasoning about justice and it is one that bears further investigation.
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A limitation of the present study was that the professional trust relationships that
were manipulated may not have been comparable. A doctor-patient relationship is
arguably one that entails more trust as reliance than a client's relationship with a lawyer
or a victim's relationship with a police officer. Additionally, nearly all members of the
public could be expected to be more familiar with the relationship of doctor and patient
than one with a lawyer or a police officer. Consequently, the higher level of
condemnation for a doctor who assaulted a man who was a patient may not have been a
consequence of his position of higher trust and social status. It may have been an artifact
of a unique professional relationship.
Findings were also influenced by the properties of the data produced by the
present study and the limitations of statistical data analysis. The trends in the data were
interesting and they have been discussed in relation to previous explanations from theory
and empirical studies. However, the fact that those trends were not supported by
unequivocal statistical evidence must not be overlooked.
Statistical analysis demonstrated that the public's condemnation was significantly
\�
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influenced by offender trust and status in combination with a professional relationship
between offender and victim in some way. Further comparison of the distributions of
scores for each experimental condition with each other condition showed that, although
they were different at the conventionally accepted level of probability, the differences
were not strong enough to ensure that they were not produced by the tendency of multiple
statistical tests to provide a false appearance of difference (familywise error). Pairwise
comparison of experimental groups showed that the largest difference in levels of
condemnation was between the offences of a doctor and a lawyer who had a professional
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relationship with the victim. However, this difference (p = .063) was not significant at the
conventional level of statistical probability.
Multivariate analysis showed a statistically significant effect for the manipulated
variables, in interaction, on the best linear combination of three goals of punishment.
However, that effect disappeared when separate analyses were performed on each goal of
punishment. The influence of the interaction of the manipulated variables on a perceived
need for general deterrence, and comparison of the distributions of general deterrence
scores for each experimental condition with each other condition, approached statistical
significance if the risk of familywise error was ignored. Nevertheless, pairwise
comparisons of experiment groups showed a far greater perceived need for a punishment
goal of general deterrence for an offender who was a police officer than for one who was
described as a medical doctor. The statistical probability of obtaining this result by chance
was one point eight in 100. It appears that it was this effect that influenced the
multivariate results.
A strict interpretation of the results of these statistical analyses is that no
statistically significant effects were found by this present study. At best, statistical data
analysis has showed that the public's condemnation of an offence and its perception of
the need for various types of punishment were influenced by the combination of offender
trust, offender status, and a professional relationship between an offender and a victim in
some way. However, the qualitative data give some indication that the practical impact of

to criminal offences bears further investigation.

these variables on the public's response
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The standard deviations in the data collected for this study, although generally
smaller than those for the study reported in Chapter Two, were still indicative of an
enormous amount of variability in the public's reasoning about criminal offences and this
had the potential effect of obscuring important findings. It is obviously more difficult to
detect differences in comparisons of diffuse data sets than in ones that are relatively
compact. That difficulty was compounded by the inconsistent variability between
experimental groups in scores on the measure of condemnation.
A specific task for researchers who further develop the present research may be to
conduct a coordinated program of experimentation on selected homogenous groups of
participants in order to gain a clearer understanding of the effects of offender trust, status,
and professional relationships. A major general task for future research in this area is the
need to be cautious in laying claim to definitive answers to questions about public
responses to crime and to accept that a consensual body of public opinion on crime may
not exist.
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CHAPTER S
Summary, Discussion And Conclusions

This chapter presents an extended summary of the research reported in this
dissertation, an analysis of the implications of the findings in the context of the thesis and
the field of social psychology and law, and discussion of future research directions.

Summary
The rationale for this program of applied research was that it is important to know
about the public's intuitive reasoning about criminal justice, given the role of public
sentiment as a basis for law. The significance of this series of studies was that the use of
methodologically rigorous experimental methods would increase understanding of
enduring, generalisable decision principles that underpin public evaluations of crime
seriousness and appropriate punishment in a way that is not possible for the simple survey
methods that have frequently been used in the past.
The use of simple survey methods has been implicated in the belief that the public
has punitive attitudes towards criminal offenders. Many social science researchers have
described the assumption that the public is punitive and non-rational as erroneous or
simplistic (for example, Cullen et al., 1988; Diamond, 1990; Durham, 1993; Flanagan &
Caulfield, 1984; lndermaur, 1987; Innes, 1993; Roberts, 1992; Roberts & Doob, 1989;
Sprott, 1999; Thomson & Ragona, 1987; Walker & Hough, 1988; Walker et al., 1987).
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Doubt has also been expressed about the assumed existence of a body of
consensual public opinion on criminal justice (Durham, 1993). Nevertheless, public
sentiment about criminal offending is an important and increasingly influential basis of
law (Green, 1996; Lloyd-Bostock, 1991; Pillsbury, 1995; Robinson & Darley, 1995). It
was considered important to know more about the ways in which the public, whether
collectively or typically, decides on the seriousness of offences and the severity and
purpose of deserved punishments.
An assumption of widespread punitiveness was not part of the rationale for the
present research. However, it was expected that the public has stronger responses to some
offences than others. The aim was initially to examine strong emotional and morally
based responses in order to establish principles that underlie such responses as a basis for
subsequent investigations of everyday reasoning.
A small, exploratory study described in Chapter One indicated that offenders'
position of trust and the perceived vulnerability of victims were offence characteristics
that evoked moral indignation and disproportionately punitive responses in members of
the public. A subsequent experimental study manipulated victim vulnerability and
offender position of trust in terms of everyday expectations of social trust in symmetrical
relationships. Survey research described in Chapter Three clarified the bases of
attributions of social status and trust and provided empirically sound examples of social
and occupational groups for use in further experimental investigation of offender trust and
status. The final experimental study that was reported in Chapter Four manipulated
offender positions of varying levels of social trust and status as well as the trust that is
inherent in asymmetrical victim-offender relationships.
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The initial study in this program of research explored the reactions of 34 members
of the public to descriptions of offences that were designed to be emotionally and morally
provocative. Examination of responses to these offence scenarios was expected to
illuminate some of the underlying principles of reactions that were more punitive than the
harm caused by the offence would indicate. The aim of the study was to explore links
between offence characteristics and disproportionately severe judgments of crime
seriousness and deserved punishment in order to inform subsequent experimental studies
of the influence of those characteristics on decisions about more prosaic offences. It was
information about underlying evaluative principles implied by the use of particular
offence characteristics in participants' judgments rather than determination of the offence
characteristics alone that was considered important.
The initial study identified some offences that evoke a high degree of moral
indignation from members of the public. Offences of supplying heroin, fabrication of
evidence, causing pollution, and sexual penetration of a child aged between 13 and 16
years all aroused anger and punitive responses in members of the public. It was also
found that responses to sexual offences that are illegal but that disgust rather than arouse
anger, or that are regarded as trivial, were more tolerant than those prescribed by law.
Particular aspects of offences evoked particularly negative responses from
members of the public. A sexual offence, a drug offence committed by an adult against
young victims, and an offence committed by a police officer were all strongly
condemned. It was concluded that responses to the provocation of emotional and moral
concerns indicated consideration for offenders' violation of trust and for victim
vulnerability as factors in participants' evaluations that warranted further investigation.
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The subsequent experimental study (Chapter Two) measured the effects of
offender position of trust and victim vulnerability on the public's judgments about a less
provocative offence. Although trust has proved hard to define and measure (Barber, 1983;
Blomqvist, 1997; Hosmer, 1995; Kahn, Jr & Turiel, 1988; Kasperson et al., 1992;
Kramer, 1999; Shapiro, 1987), it is generally agreed that social trust is necessary for
cohesive social function (Eisenberg et al., 1989; Freiberg, 1995; Luhmann, 1980; Willig,
1997). Freiberg's (1995) conceptualisation of symmetrical trust was utilised in the
manipulation of three representatives of varying levels of everyday social trust. The
acknowledged vulnerability of people who have a disability (Nettelbeck et al., 2000) and
the indication from the initial study that the vulnerability of youth is a consideration in the
public's reasoning about justice formed the bases of the manipulation of three levels of
victim vulnerability.
Data analysis showed statistically significant effects for victim vulnerability on
condemnation of the offence and for offender position of trust on the importance of
individual deterrence and rehabilitation to punishment decisions. The effects of position
of trust and victim vulnerability did not interact.
The findings of the study confirmed the role of victim vulnerability in the public's
condemnation of criminal offences. An offence against a victim who had an intellectual
disability was more strongly condemned than the same offence against an unimpaired
adult. However, there was no support for the influence of vulnerability as a product of the
victim's youth, despite indications from the initial study. It was concluded that perception
and consideration of the youth of victims in the public's evaluations of criminal offences
might interact with the nature of the offence. Young people may be perceived as
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vulnerable in offences that evoke morally based judgments, for example those that
involve drugs or sex, but not in the context of an assault.
Participants' reasoning about purposes of deserved punishment showed that
rehabilitation was a relatively important consideration in the punishment of a young
offender and that an offender who occupied a position of high trust was relatively
immune from a punishment aimed at individual deterrence. These results were discussed
in the contexts of the perceived rashness and redeemability of youth and the protection
afforded by the high social status of the highly trusted offender.
It was also concluded that the high status of the offender who occupied a highly
trusted position in society might have protected him from stronger condemnation for the
breach of that trust than offenders who represented less trusted (and lower status)
positions. However, a status shield effect such as that found by Wiggins et al. (1965),
Rosoff ( 1989), Skolnick and Shaw ( 1994) and Shaw and Skolnick (1996) did not provide
a complete account of the results. Those previous studies showed that high status
offenders attracted significantly less severe sanctions than lower status offenders. In the
case of the experimental study reported in Chapter Two, the high status offender was only
shown to be not significantly more condemned than those of lesser status and trust. Five
point seven per cent of participants in the status survey nominated non-offending youth as
a low status category. A complete status protection effect would have resulted in a higher
level of condemnation for the offender who was a youth, at least, than for the offender
who was described as a medical doctor.
The unexpected absence of an effect for offender position of trust on
condemnation was also discussed in terms of the possibility that trust relationships rather
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than trusted roles are important in the public' s evaluation of offences. It was noted that
both the police officer-offender and the older man who was portrayed as a sex offender in
the initial exploratory study could have been regarded as having obligations of trust in
relationship to their victims. The trust that resides in relationships of obligation has been
characterised as asymmetrical trust (Freiberg, 1995): the trust inherent in reliance on
those who have more power or knowledge than the trustor. Studies by Skolnick and Shaw
( 1994; Shaw & Skolnick, 1996) have shown a reversal of the status shield effect to a
status liability effect when an offender had a professional trust relationship with a victim.
Subsequent attempts were made to isolate trust and status in examples of
offenders for further investigation. The concepts of trust and status appeared to have
considerable overlap when considering real-world exemplars. In an attempt to further
illuminate the relationships between the status and trust of people who occupy various
social positions and occupations, two surveys were conducted. The aim was to find
concrete examples of the abstract concepts of trust and status in order to provide an
empirical basis for further experimental research on offender characteristics that, as much
as was possible, separated trust and status.
Results of the surveys showed that a high level of trust - whether as a result of
holding a trusted position in society or by occupying a role that others rely on - was
associated with high status, however, high status was not an important source of trust.
The exemplar categories and characteristics of low trust and low status were unrelated.
The categories of medical doctors, lawyers and police officers were deemed
appropriate for experimental manipulation in further investigations of various levels of
offender trust and status and professional trust relationships between an offender and a
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victim. Medical doctors comprised the only group that both was regarded as having high
status and was highly trusted. They were trusted because they kept information
confidential and because of their work for the good of society. The sources of their status
were caring, helping, education level and income. High status was attributed to lawyers
because of high income, wealth, education and power but they were somewhat distrusted
as a result of their perceived dishonesty and greed. Police officers had lower status than
doctors and lawyers. They were trusted by many participants because of the service and
protection they provided and because of their position in society. A smaller proportion of
participants nominated them as a low trust group because they regarded them as corrupt
and as abusive of their power.
The status and trust of other groups that did not meet criteria for further
investigation were reported in appendices. They included family and close friends who
were categorised as highly trusted in interpersonal relationships; politicians whose high
status and low trust did not involve professional relationships; celebrities who had high
status but were not identified in the trust survey; and salespeople who were highly
distrusted but did not figure prominently in the status survey.
The subsequent experimental study (Chapter Four) investigated the combined
effects of social status and position of trust of offenders, and the presence or absence of a
professional relationship involving asymmetrical trust, on public condemnation of
offences and reasoning about punishment. In order to avoid compromising external
validity by artificially manufacturing status and trust categories that were orthogonal but
not credible, an incomplete factorial design was used. The representation of police
officers as a category that had high trust and low status was not ideal. Additionally, the
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intention to manipulate a professional trust relationship between offender and victim
precluded the representation of a low trust, low status category. The surveys produced no
obvious category of persons that could be portrayed as one upon whom a victim would
rely for expert knowledge and assistance.
Results showed that offender characteristics of trust and status and the offendervictim relationship interacted to produce a significant effect on condemnation of the
offence. The only post hoc pairwise comparison that approached an unadjusted level of
significance (p = .063) showed a higher mean level of condemnation of a doctor than of a
lawyer when both had a professional trust relationship with their victim.
The medical doctor and the lawyer both represented high status offenders. The
differences between them were the extent of trust in their positions and the sources of
their status. The high trust expected of the offender who was a doctor and the low trust of
the lawyer indicated that holding a position of trust was a liability for an offender in an
asymmetrical professional relationship. In addition to the common status attributes of
wealth and knowledge, the high status of the medical doctor was strongly derived from
perceptions of caring and helping and the central role of medicine to the needs of society.
That is, the chief source of the status of medical doctors was esteem for their perceived
benevolence, characteristics congruent with trust, rather than economic or prestige
reasons. Thus, an alternative interpretation of the differences between condemnation of
the two high status offenders was that the different sources of their high status, as well as
their relative positions of trust, produced a liability effect in the presence of a professional
relationship between offender and victim.
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Findings of the second experimental study did not provide support for the status
liability effect found by Skolnick and Shaw ( 1994; Shaw & Skolnick, 1996) because there
was no statistically significant difference between levels of condemnation for the high
status offenders who had a professional relationship with their victims and the lower
status offender. Skolnick and Shaw's operationalisation of status relied, in part, on
different levels of expectations of trust in an offender's position and his relationship with
his victim. They described the high status attributes of the offender in terms of
expectations of professional trust, ". . . deviance by high status individuals betrays the
trust of their profession" (Skolnick & Shaw, 1994, p. 1829). Additionally, the difference
between their high and low status offenders was described in the context of asymmetrical
trust relationships, ". . . a high-status therapist relating to a patient may be held to a higher
standard of conduct than a low-status therapist" (Shaw & Skolnick, 1996, p. 441). Given
the results of the surveys reported in Chapter Three, it could be expected that this trust
difference was magnified in the examples of a medical doctor and a lawyer. Just as the
work of Skolnick and Shaw extended and clarified the findings of Wiggins et al. ( 1965)
and Rosoff ( 1989) in that they found evidence that the moderator of status effects was
professional relatedness rather than offence seriousness, the present work indicated that
professional relatedness may interact with two types of trust in the production of status
effects.
The second experimental study also showed a significant multivariate interaction
effect for offenders' status and position of trust, and professional relationship on the
importance of generally accepted goals of punishment to participants' decisions about
appropriate penalties. Univariate effects of the interaction were not strong. Further
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analysis indicated that it was a strong effect on the importance of general deterrence to a
single pairwise comparison of experimental conditions that was the major influence on
the significant multivariate effects. In the absence of a professional trust relationship,
general deterrence (punishment aimed at making an example of the offender) was less
important to reasoning about the punishment of a doctor than a police officer (p = .018).
The main difference between the representations of a medical doctor and a police
officer as offenders was the manipulation of offender status. The participants of the status
survey regarded police officers as having considerably lower status than doctors. Thus,
the consideration that it was less necessary to make an example of an offender who was a
medical doctor than one who was described as a police officer indicated a status shield
effect similar to the one found by previous researchers (Rosoff, 1989; Shaw & Skolnick,
1996; Skolnick & Shaw, 1994; Wiggins et al., 1965).
The different levels of trust in doctors and police (even though they both
represented high trust offenders) supported speculation that trust was a factor in the
higher level of need to assign a punishment reflecting general deterrence to the police
officer. That result also lent support to the strongly expressed need to make an example of
police officers who break the law that was demonstrated by participants of the initial
exploratory study.
A limitation of the second experimental study was that the professional
relationship manipulation may have inadvertently created a confound in the level of
asymmetrical trust perceived in the relationship between the victim and the offender. A
doctor-patient relationship is arguably one that entails more trust-as-reliance than a
client's relationship with a lawyer or a crime victim's relationship with a police officer.
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Consequently, the difference between condemnation of the offences by a doctor and a
lawyer may have been an artifact of the unique professional relationship between doctors
and their patients.
Discussions of the results of both the first and second experimental studies centred
on the extensive variability in the quantitative data and evidence from qualitative data that
reflected objective legal reasoning about punishment severity. The first study (Chapter
Two) showed large standard deviations on every measure in every experimental
condition. Additionally, qualitative data demonstrated that participants had given as much
consideration to assessment of judicial criteria such as culpability and harm in their
calculations of appropriate penalties as they had to personal characteristics of offenders. It
was concluded that there is possibly little real consensus in the public's reasoning about
criminal justice, and that reasoning about punishment is more rational and less emotive
than is popularly believed.
In an effort to control the variability in quantitative responses, participants in the
second experimental study (Chapter Four) were instructed to give their "considered
opinion" in their responses. This attempt to increase standardisation of the type of
response given may have been the cause of smaller standard deviations in the resulting
data. In comparison to the data from the experimental study reported in Chapter Two,
there was a considerable reduction in the variability of condemnation and individual
deterrence score distributions. For general deterrence and retribution, sta.'ldard deviations
remained high and variability in the consideration of rehabilitation in punishment
decisions increased.
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Qualitative analysis of offence aspects that influenced participants' assessment of
penalty severity in the second experimental study showed greater reliance on personal
characteristics of offenders than on calculation of just deserts.

Implications of the Research Findings
This program of research found evidence for factors in the public's evaluation of
offences and its decisions about deserved punishment that indicated the importance of
vulnerability, trust and status as three of the underlying principles in commonsense
reasoning about criminal justice. The first section of the following discussion will address
the implications of the research findings for these three variables separately and in the
context of their combined influence in roles, social positions, and relationships.
Although it was not the purpose of the research to compare public and legal
reasoning, a focus on emotive, morally based or otherwise subjective reasoning naturally
gave indications of extra-evidentiary factors in responses. In particular, qualitative data
from the two experimental studies showed that participants placed an emphasis on
personal characteristics of offenders in their considerations of appropriate punishment.

t
IV

The second section of the discussion that follows considers the use of extra-legal offence
aspects in the public's decisions about punishment.
The use of experimental methods in the current program of research contrasted
with survey or correlational methods that have been implicated in false impressions of
punitiveness and consensus in the public's views on crime and punishment. The third
section of the following discussion concerns the implications for those methods in the
production of highly variable data.
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Some Principles in Public Reasoning About Criminal Justice
Victim Vulnerability
Consideration of the vulnerability of victims was identified as an important
principle in the public's reasoning. Perceived material gain from exploitation of the
vulnerabilities of youth was an important aspect of an offence that described the supply of
heroin to high school students and recruitment of them to sell to heroin to their peers. As
well as use of the legal principle of harm, responses to this offence reflected outrage at
the corruption of vulnerable youth. Anger was also expressed at an older offender who
was perceived to have exploited the inexperience of youth and to have violated sexual age
norms.
Conditions of exceptional vulnerability provided the clearest evidence for the use
of this principle. An experimental study demonstrated condemnation of offences
involving victim vulnerability that was associated with compromised cognitive and social
judgment but not immaturity. The public's attention to vulnerability of youth in its
reasoning about justice may depend on the type of offence. Current evidence was limited
to concern for youth who may have been viewed as more persuadable in sexual offences
due to developmental limitations on their experiences of relationships with the opposite
sex or as exploitable due to an adolescent propensity for hedonism and risk-taking.

Trust
Trust was identified as a principle that has complex application to the public's
reasoning about criminal justice. Initial indications came from reactions to the fact that it
was a police officer who was described as fabricating evidence. Participants expressed
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concerns about corruption and violation of the public' s trust in the form of abrogation of
the duty of police to uphold the law and the moral obligation to serve and protect society.
Trust is an aggravating factor in judicial sentencing. However, while it has an
important implicit function in criminal law, its substantive role is not explicit (Freiberg,
1995). Clearly extra-legal concerns about breach of trust were elicited by a sexual offence
by a 60 year old man against a 15 year old female that was described in the first study of
this thesis. The absence of condemnation or punitiveness toward an 18 year old offender
involved in an identical offence indicated a lack of regard for the actual legality of a
sexual encounter with a person under the age of legal consent to such a relationship. The
source of participants' concern was a perceived breach of the normative trust that men of
advancing years will not engage in sexual activity with adolescent females.
The strongest indication that trust was a factor in the public's reasoning about
criminal justice was found in responses to a police officer's offence of fabrication of
evidence. No concern was expressed for the victim of the offence and there were some
indications of empathy for the officer' s motives. However, the fact that the officer had
challenged the trust in the role of police officers to contribute to the stability and order of
society by upholding the law elicited strong condemnation.
A position of high symmetrical trust, in that a person in such a position is more
expected than others to act in the interests of the society in everyday social contracts and
exchanges, did not, on its own, exacerbate condemnation and punitive judgments. The
impact of trusted positions on the public' s reasoning about criminal justice was shown to
interact with trust relationships and offender status. In hindsight, the abuse of power that
was perceived as inherent in the breach of trust of the corrupt police officer and the 60
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year old sex offender also indicated the violation of an asymmetrical trust relationship.
This type of trust and associated vulnerability were inherent in the assumed comparative
naivety of the much younger victim of the sex offender indicating that, rather than
separately reacting to the offender's position of trust and the vulnerability of his young
victim, the public saw this offence as a violation of an asymmetrical trust relationship in
which victims are, by definition, vulnerable in some way. Similarly, the police officer's
power in relation to the man against whom he fabricated criminal evidence and, more
particularly, the relationship between the police service and members of the public, was
an example of asymmetrical trust.
The subsequent identification of negative reactions towards a doctor who offended
against a patient again demonstrated the public's condemnation of the violation of the
trust and vulnerability inherent in asymmetrical relationships. Nevertheless, the fact that
an identical offence by lawyer against a client was less condemned indicated that the
position of trust of an offender has an interactive effect with the impact of trust
relationships on condemnation. There were also qualitative differences in the offender
victim relationships.

Status
Offender social status had previously been identified as a factor in reasoning about
criminal sanctions (Wiggins et al., 1965; Rosoff, 1989; Skolnick & Shaw, 1994; Shaw &
Skolnick, 1996; and others). Its place in the present program of research resulted from an
indication that it offered a degree of protection from condemnation to an offender in a
position of high trust. Subsequent investigations showed that high status, possibly in
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combination with a relatively high position of trust, protected an offender from a
punishment aimed at general deterrence.
Contrary to the findings of previous studies (Skolnick & Shaw, 1994; Shaw &
Skolnick, 1996), no status liability effects were found by this research. High status
offenders who had a professional relationship with a victim were not significantly more
condemned than a lower status offender. However, the source of offenders' status may
have been a liability when a professional relationship with a victim existed. High status
that was derived from perceptions of caring and helping, as opposed to that conveyed by
prestige and economic reasons alone was associated with different levels of
condemnation.
The various high status groups identified in the survey results reported in Chapter
Three showed that social status is a multidimensional construct. Status was defined as
derived from and indicated by wealth, normative social ranking, occupation, education
level, income and power. Doctors, politicians, lawyers and celebrities were the highest
status groups. The most important high status attributes for individually identified groups,
as opposed to the generic definitional characteristics of status, were wealth, income, fame,
power, education, importance, and caring, helping work.
Trust and Status

The research that formed the basis of this dissertation looked at the inter
relationship of trust and status in a way that has not previously been attempted. Status is a
prominent concept in sociological literature and there have been volumes written on trust
in the humanities and the social sciences. However, the literatures do not speak to each
other or refer to each other and neither illuminates a psychological focus of understanding
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and explaining human behaviour. Sociological discussions of status emphasise its role in
social stratification. The predominant foci of the literature on trust are conceptual
clarification, social cohesion and organisational culture. Additionally, the concept of
social, as opposed to interpersonal, trust has received little attention from psychology and
there have been no investigations of the inter-related effects of status and trust on social
judgments.
This research was unique in that it established an empirical basis for the
manipulation of trust and status. Although Rosoff (1989) sought evidence for a status
hierarchy amongst medical specialists, the usual method of previous studies has been to
base operationalisation of status on theoretical and intuitive assumptions (Skolnick &
Shaw, 1994; Shaw & Skolnick, 1996; Wiggins et al., 1965).
Status and trust are complexly interwoven. Although they are semantically
separable and they differ in theory, there are many social roles that exemplify both their
relatedness and their differences. In the surveys on trust and status that were conducted as
part of this research there was no evidence for a status-trust relationship in the exemplars
of low status and low trust. Low trust groups often had high status, and low status was
derived from lack of wealth, education, power and social contribution rather than any
relationship to trust. High trust was relevant to high status in specific instances, and vice
versa, but it was not an important general prerequisite. Medical doctors were the single,
possibly unique, example of a group that was viewed as possessing very high trust and
social status.
Rather than a simple status protection effect, the significant difference between
the perceived need to make an example of the doctor and the police officer that was found

.....__
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in this research may have indicated an effect for combinations of trust and status on the
public's reasoning about punishment. The offenders varied in the level of unequivocal
trust in their positions as well as in status. It is possible that, as well as the protection
offered by his higher status, the doctor was shielded by the higher level of trust in, and
deference to, his position. Similarly, and in direct contrast to the hypothesised effect, the
high level of trust in the doctor portrayed in the first experimental study, as well as his
status, may have offered him a degree of protection from condemnation. A clear shield
effect, whether from status or trust, would have resulted in doctor-offender being less
condemned than the lower status youth10 rather than being condemned to the same extent.
Perhaps high trust or status afforded him sufficient protection, not to the extent that he
was less condemned than the youth or the adult businessman, but to the extent that
condemnation of him was no higher.
Some non-empirically based operationalisations of status have incorporated trust
into assumptions about status. Skolnick and Shaw (1994; Shaw & Skolnick, 1996)
formulated a description of a high status offender in terms of expectations of professional
trust, thereby introducing a confound into their intended manipulation of status alone. The
degree of trust inherent in the positions of their choice of offenders (eminent
psychotherapist versus graduate psychology student) could be expected to have covaried
with the offenders' status. The implication is that previous status protection effects found
for high status offenders who were also highly trusted may have been as much due to a
protective effect of trust as to the shield of high status.
10

Youth were nominated as a low status group by 5.7% of the participants in the status
survey. The offender who represented an intermediate level of trust in symmetrical relationships
was described as a businessman. Business executives were later shown to be a group that has
relatively high status by 24.5% of participants of the status survey. A clear status shield effect
would also have resulted in differences in condemnation of a youth and a businessman.
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The corollary implication is that previous 'status liability' effects found for highly
trusted, high status offenders (Skolnick & Shaw, 1994; Shaw & Skolnick, 1996) may also
have owed as much to trust as status. The greater vulnerability to sanctions for violating
the trust in which the offender was held may have been as much a liability as high status
when a professional relationship existed between an offender and victim. Similarities can
be drawn between Skolnick and Shaw's representation of a high status, high position and
the medical doctor represented in that context by the studies reported in this dissertation.
Additionally, Skolnick and Shaw acknowledged that the status of their offenders covaried
with expectations of their standard of behaviour in professional relationships. The
presence of such a relationship in the manipulations of professional relatedness of an
offence that produced the status liability effect made asymmetrical trust salient. This kind
of trust may also have been a factor in the liability effect produced by offender attributes.
In summary, results of the present program of research have indicated that
previous conclusions about the effects of status on decisions about justice may have been
due to effects of trust alone or, more probably, to inextricably linked effects of status and
symmetrical and/or asymmetrical trust. A final piece of evidence for the inter-related role
of status and trust in reasoning about justice was provided by the results of the second
experimental study. It was concluded that the sources of a medical doctor's status, as well
as his position of trust, may have been a liability in condemnation for his offence against
a patient relative to condemnation of a lawyer with a similar offender-victim relationship.
The sources of lawyers' high status reflected wealth and prestige alone. The major
sources of doctors' high status more closely resembled characteristics of trust. The
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differences in the status-producing characteristics of doctors and lawyers can be
summarised as honour, an element of status that was identified by Weber in his analyses
of the differences between status and class (Wegener, 1992).

Roles, Positions and Relationships
A more concrete, albeit partial, interpretation of the results of this program of
research is that the public does not like it when police officers act corruptly or assault
members of the public, that it allows doctors considerable latitude but that it does not like
it when doctors harm their patients, and that it is not surprised when lawyers behave badly
because it does not trust them anyway. In a similar vein, the public may simply and
universally condemn corrupting offences against corruptible victims and harmful offences
against easily harmed individuals or against those towards whom an offender's role and
relationship specifically dictates that he or she must do no harm.
Police officers are trusted as members of society who are relied upon to protect
and serve. Their role is to uphold the law above all else - including ignoring the law in
pursuit of justice. Police officers are distrusted when they are seen to be corrupt or as
abusing their power. It was notable that a substantial proportion ( 11.4%) of those
surveyed about trust habitually regard police as untrustworthy. As Freiberg (1995) has
stated, "corruption can generally be regarded as the violation of the public trust . . .. The
antiquity and frequency of corrupt actions cannot inure us to the emotional indignation
we feel when corruption is exposed" (p. 96).
Police officers have a mandate from society to use a reasonable amount of force in
the course of upholding the law and they are trusted not to abuse the authority that has
been bestowed on them (Ashworth, 1983). Ashworth has stated that "a deterrent rationale
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could be advanced for treating force unlawfully used by police officers as aggravated in
the sense that sentences of increased severity are likely to deter them from exceeding their
powers in this way" (1983, p. 159). When police officers abuse the power with which
they are entrusted, the law the public reacts with fear and anger. Punishments are likely to
include a basis of a need to make an example of individual officers who offend and to
warn others.
There was a degree of support from qualitative data for a belief that an offence
committed by a medical doctor must have been an isolated or otherwise provoked event.
The public may need to trust in the ultimate benevolence of doctors and to be
consequently unwilling to seek or attend to evidence that disconfirms that trust. It has
already been noted that the necessity of trust is fundamental to the cohesive functioning
of society (Blomqvist, 1997; Hosmer, 1995; Kahn, Jr & Turiel, 1988 ; Kasperson et al.,
1992; Kramer, 1999; Luhmann, 1980; and many others). Social cognition research also
provides ample evidence that people ignore evidence that disconfirms important beliefs
(see Fiske & Taylor, 1991 for a comprehensive review and analysis of sources).
Additionally, stereotype-based expectancies have been shown to play an important role in
selective information processing and consequent social behaviour (pivotal sources in a
large body of research are Bodenhausen, 1988; Darley & Gross, 1983; Hamilton,
Sherman & Ruvolo, 1990), especially when salient cues to group membership are present.
The source of such biases in attention is said to be cognitive miserliness (Taylor, 198 1 ),
the need to establish processing limits that reduce and simplify interpretation of the
wealth of stimuli with which people are continuously confronted. Good ( 1988) called the
source of hypothesis-confirming biases cognitive inertia and proposed that such biases
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derive from a self-serving need to preserve trust in cherished concepts. He stated that
people are usually willing to ignore lapses in good behaviour and concluded that "despite
its apparent fragility and our many attempts to do without it, it is clear that, in many
societies where it is well established, trust is remarkably robust" (p. 46).
Whether due to their high status or their high trust (and they may be unique in
possessing both), doctors appear to be virtually unassailable as offenders unless their
offence attacks one of the sources of that status and trust: the reliance on them to act
diligently, competently and with integrity towards their patients. Doctors are not
necessarily expected to be better people by virtue of their position alone. Their status
(and, perhaps, the belief that they are ultimately trustworthy) protects them from that
requirement. However, they are expected - possibly because of society's intense reliance
on them, and the risks that that entails - to behave with the utmost correctness towards
those in their care. In the sense that the high status of the position of medical doctor is
chiefly derived from the perception that they care and help, that status can be regarded as
a liability in what should be caring and helping relationships.
In retrospect, the type of offence presented in the second experimental study
introduced a confound into the manipulation of a professional relationship between an
offender and victim. The major tenet of medical practice is that doctors should do no
harm. An assault committed by a medical doctor is a direct violation of that principle.
This specific requirement of medical doctors may have contributed to the difference in
the levels of public condemnation of a doctor's assault on a patient and a lawyer's assault
on a client. The confound was compounded by the fact that the victim of the doctor's
assault was his own patient and the fact that he was aware that the victim had a
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'distressing minor chronic illness'. This fact not only made the trust and obligation
inherent in the specific relationship salient, it might have contributed to a perception that
the victim was particularly vulnerable.
Lawyers hold a privileged position by virtue of their perceived wealth and
education but stereotypical views of lawyers depict them as self-interestedly dishonest
and grasping. This might mean that, not only are lawyers not trusted in a symmetrical,
everyday sense, but that they might also not be viewed as trustworthy in asymmetrical
professional relationships. Just as dishonesty, greed and self-interest are not conducive to
confidence in social cohesion or social order, a self-interested practitioner also fails to put
the interests of others above his or her own. It was the implicit assumption of Skolnick
and Shaw ( 1994) that all high status professionals attract special trust. It is possible that
the lack of trust in the high status professions of law and politics shown in the results of
the surveys reported in Chapter Three of this dissertation is a cultural artifact of
Australian society that bears further investigation.
It may be that, rather than a special principle of the public's reasoning about crime
and punishment, protection of the vulnerable is a ubiquitous, almost self-evident principle
of human behaviour. In his comprehensive examination of the topic of vulnerability,
Goodin ( 1985) asserted that to be vulnerable is to be susceptible to material or emotional
harm of one's welfare or interests. He stated that it is a fundamental moral responsibility
of all members of a society to protect the vulnerable from harm and that responsibilities
towards those who are exceptionally vulnerable carry exceptional obligation. In his
explanation of the demands of vulnerability in a social rather than an individual context,
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Goodin asserted that:
Where people are particularly vulnerable . . . . the group as a whole is
responsible for protecting their interests; and you as an individual within the
group have a derivative responsibility to help organize and participate in a
cooperative scheme among members of that group to produce that result.
(Goodin, 1985, p. 206)

Use of Extra-Evidentiary Offence Aspects in Decisions About Deserved Punishment
The law does not provide for individualised punishment according to offender
status (Garland, 1990). Similarly, the influence of an offender's position of social trust is
not explicit in criminal law statutes, although there are laws that govern trust relationships
such as those involving a duty of care, and the holding of a trusted position is an
aggravating factor in sentencing (Freiberg, 1995; Hills et al., 1998). Walker ( 1991) has
stated that, although the great majority of legal theorists hold that an offender's character
does not mitigate or exacerbate punishment, a few philosophers see moral character as
relevant to blame and punishment. He asserted that "on this view the offender is blamed
for being a person of the sort which is normally capable of doing whatever he [sic] did"
(p. 7 1). The converse, that an offender may be judged not to be the kind of person who is
capable of, for instance, assaulting an innocent bicycle rider, may also hold.
The experimental findings of this research showed heavy reliance on offender
characteristics in participants' decisions about appropriate levels of punishment. Twenty
nine per cent of the 381 offence aspects cited by members of the public in the first
experimental study relied on offender attributes in assessments of penalty severity,
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matching the 31 % of aspects that indicated calculation of just deserts. At that stage it was
concluded that the degree of attention given to objective, legalistic assessment of
appropriate penalties indicated that the public may be more rational in its assessment of
deserved punishment than is popularly believed.
Participants were uniformly required to give greater consideration to their
responses in the second experimental study. Qualitative analysis of only the most
important aspects of offences in participants' decisions about punishment severity in the
that study showed that offender attributes (35.54%) were regarded as more important than
calculations of just deserts (24. 79%). That is, the individual nature of the offender was
more important to punishment decisions than the facts of the offence that indicated the
extent of his culpability. Attaching more significance to offender attributes than
assessment of penalties that are proportional to the degree of harm and blameworthiness
indicated an extra-evidentiary bias in the public's reasoning.
It

is possible that participants paid attention to offender characteristics in order to

inform their calculations of just deserts. Feather and Atchison (1998) found that people
use information about offender characteristics to form judgments about an offender's
moral character and that this information, in tum, influences judgments of culpability for
an offence and decisions about punishment. Either way, participants' attention to offender
characteristics was inconsistent with majority legal theory (Walker, 1991) and avowed
legal practice (Garland, 1990).
Variability in the Public's Opinions on Criminal Justice
Durham (1993) expressed concern that problems of survey methodology impact
on the validity of responses to surveys of public opinions on criminal justice. Her analysis
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included evidence for the propensity of methodological limitations to produce both a false
appearance of consensus and substantial disagreement in data on the public's views.
Durham was optimistic about the likelihood that methodological improvements would
improve the validity of criminal justice research findings. By implication, the adoption of
such improvements could be expected to reduce any appearance of false consensus or
false variability.
The present program of research utilised methods that specifically addressed
Durham's ( 1993) concerns about the validity of public opinion data. The responses
produced by these methods, although arguably more valid than those produced by simple
survey methods, were highly variable. With the exceptions of responses to the offence of
supplying heroin, which was regarded as extremely harmful, and the illegal but relatively
harmless sexual encounter between the 18 year old male and the 15 year old female,
evaluations of the seriousness of the provocative offences described in the initial
exploratory study were highly variable. Additionally, standard deviations in the data
produced by the first experimental study demonstrated a wide range of responses to the
stimulus scenarios for every dependent variable, indicating considerable variability in
participants' views. Efforts to account for that variability included grouping participants
by age group, sex, age group and sex, and by socioeconomic status. As none of these
attempts made an appreciable difference to standard deviations, it was accepted that a
lack of consensus may be an inherent characteristic of public opinions on criminal justice.
Nevertheless, an attempt was made to reduce variability in the data in a
subsequent experimental study in order to facilitate systematic experimental comparisons.
Materials used in that study eliminated a potential source of ambiguity about offender
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provocation and included an instruction to participants that was designed to enhance
consistency of the type of consideration given to responses. It was accepted that attention
to that instruction would only produce indications of principles in public reasoning at one
level of deliberation.
In comparison to the data from the first experimental study, the second experiment
showed considerable reduction in the variability of condemnation of offenders and in
need for individual deterrence as an aim of deserved punishment. Standard deviations in
the data on the importance of general deterrence and retribution remained high.
Additionally, the distributions of data concerning the need to assign punishment aimed at
rehabilitating an offender showed such extensive variability and bimodality that the
variable was excluded from analysis. These differential impacts of a more deliberate type
of response to offence scenarios are a further indication of the complexity of the public's
reasoning about criminal justice.
Durham (1993) admitted that the various methods she recommended to enhance
validity of information have other limitations. The use of visual analogue scales in this
research may be an example of such a limitation. In accordance with Durham's
suggestions and with specific attention to a recommendation by Harlow ct al. ( 1995),
participants were allowed a wide range of response without predetermined scale marks.
Although the resultant use of visual analogue scales avoided artificially constraining
expressions of judgment, it may also have contributed to the production of
methodologically undesirable variance.
This program of research was not based on an assumption of widespread, general
consensus in the public's reasoning about criminal justice issues. Hart ( 1968) warned of
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the dangers of assuming the prevalence of "a single homogenous social morality" (p.
171). However, the sociological-social psychological perspective of this research
demanded investigation of group level explanations rather than individual meanings. The
variability in the data does not alter that approach. However, the implication of that
variability is that researchers must continue to be aware that the public's views on
criminal justice are complex. Variation in the level of consideration given to responses is
a potential source of instability in publicly expressed opinions. A lack of consensus in the
public's evaluation of offences and it judgments of appropriate punishment means that its
sentiments challenge, although they do not defy, neat aggregation and comparison.

Future Directions
The findings and implications of this program of research have indicated some
potentially profitable directions for future investigations of the public' s reasoning about
criminal justice. These directions will be discussed in the context of methodological
improvements and developments that will address limitations of the present research as
well as potential avenues of research that will extend knowledge and understanding of
this area. The contexts for the following discussion are trust, status and vulnerability;
future directions for measures of condemnation and the importance of particular goals of
punishment; strategies for investigating and controlling variability in criminal justice
research data; and limitations of sampling and stimulus material in the present research.
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Trust and Status
The survey research reported in Chapter Three went some way to disentangling
the nebulous concepts of social status and trust. Further efforts in this direction are a
potentially valuable task for sociology and psychology.
Future investigations of the role of trust in the public's reasoning about criminal
justice would benefit from more explicit knowledge of what the public understands as the
nature of trust. A definition of trust did not suit the data collection context used for the
trust survey reported in this dissertation. The reasons for trust in exemplars of a high level
of trust (see Figure 17 in Appendix H) go some way towards illuminating the nature of
trust in societal groups. However, responses to a question such as "What is Trust?" have
the potential to provide a wealth of conceptual information in a similar manner to the
increased understanding gained from responses to the question "What is Social Status?"
That information would also give a more valid basis for operationalisations of trust than,
for example, "trust is what the actors in our study think it is" (Braithwaite & Makkai,
1994, p. 3) and it would advance and clarify the largely academic, esoteric discussions of
trust in the current literature.
Further research into the influence of trust on evaluations of criminal offences
needs to be simplified by conducting initial examinations of the effects of breaches of
symmetrical trust while controlling for confounding influences of status. That is, the
research needs to start from the point reached by this thesis at the conclusion of the first
experimental study. Investigation of the impact of trust relationships should be left until
the role of trust in everyday social interactions has been clarified. This will be facilitated
by experimental comparison of responses to offences by offenders who occupy positions
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of high or low social trust in conjunction with attributions of high or low social status and
who have a symmetrical social relationship with their victims. For example, it would be
interesting to ascertain whether a lawyer or a representative of the elusive category of
high trust and low status would have been more strongly condemned than the high trust,
high status medical doctor described in Chapter Two.
It has been acknowledged that the position of police officer was not an ideal
example of high trust and low status. A clearer example may be drawn from categories
that were less frequently identified as high trust groups, for example unpaid counsellors.
The other obvious example of groups that were categorised as having very high trust but
that did not appear in nominations of status groups is that of family and close friends.
Investigation of the role of trust between family members and between close friends in
reasoning about criminal justice would examine the interpersonal trust that was purposely
excluded from the present program of research. Understanding of the impact of the kind
of trust that resides in close relationships will be necessary for further understanding of
the impact of trust in symmetrical relationships.
One of the goals of the present program of research was to manipulate trust
without confounding by status. Future research in this area will need to focus on
manipulations of status that are not associated with trust. In particular, attempts should be
made to represent social status in ways that avoid confounding high social status that is
derived from what has been called prestige-as-charisma with trust. It should be possible to
represent high status that is derived from purely economic or achievement sources, or
from fame and popularity without confounding status with trust. A further suggestion is
that the history and degree of past trustworthiness is made explicit in an offender
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described as possessing characteristics of either high or low status. That is, rather than
relying completely on the stereotypical categories identified in the trust and status
surveys, it may be useful to make explicit individual attributions of status and trust. One
example is to represent a highly acclaimed, well-known actor and a struggling, unknown
unpopular actor as either honest, morally upright and a contributor to social wellbeing
with the interests of others at heart, or the opposite. A second example is a highly
qualified, wealthy financial advisor (high status) or an uncredentialled small bank
manager of moderate socioeconomic status who have demonstrated varying degrees of
past trustworthiness. Of course, the nature of the trust in this second example relies on the
trust inherent in an asymmetrical as well as a symmetrical relationship.
If asymmetrical trust relationships are further examined, it will be useful to
investigate the influence of variations such as the amount of reliance and vulnerability
inherent in the relationship, the duration and closeness of the relationship, and any
contamination by personal involvement. Care should be taken to avoid confounding the
type of harm that is inherent in an offence with the specific obligations of an offender in a
particular relationship, for example, doctors who do physical harm or psychotherapists
who inflict psychological harm. This reasoning points to an inherent problem of
representing lawyers or police officers as offenders. Both positions have an intrinsic
obligation to obey the law.
Future attempts to generate empirically sound categories of offenders who
exemplify various levels of status and trust will benefit from taking the methodology used
in this present program of research a step further. The surveys reported in Chapter Three
identified readily accessible, stereotypical categorisations of status and trust. Presenting a
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list of these categories to a new sample of participants for rating of perceived status and
trust levels may identify examples of high and low trust and status exemplars that were
not produced by spontaneous nominations. For instance, this method may provide support
for priests as an example of high trust and low status and salesmen as the missing low
trust, low status group. It also has the potential to identify more than one group at each of
the levels of the trust-status permutation, a result that would help to avert confounding by
unique, idiosyncratic characteristics of exemplars and their professional relationships.
Vulnerability

Like trust, victim vulnerability has a strong, but implicit role in Australian
criminal law. It is only made explicit in offences that involve special responsibilities of
offenders due to relationships of reliance or dependence. In sentencing, judicial
punishment of offences against those who are less able to defend themselves generally
reflects the public's view that such offences are heinous and reprehensible (Ashworth,
1983). In some parts of the United States, victim vulnerability is an explicit factor in
sentencing guidelines (Dyckman, 1998; von Hirsch, 1994). In 2000, the major political
party in opposition (Australian Labor Party) that has recently been elected to power in
Western Australia introduced a Bill to increase sentences for offences against elderly and
disabled victims. The Bill was defeated. Future indications are that vulnerability of
victims will be enshrined in Western Australian sentencing guidelines.
Goodin stated that, "like the notions of power and freedom, that of vulnerability is
inherently object and agent specific" ( 1985, p. 112). The effects of victim vulnerability on
the public's reasoning about criminal justice may be further explored in the context of the
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characteristics of victims that render them vulnerable and the characteristics of offenders
to whom they are most vulnerable.
Knowledge of the nature of the perceived vulnerability of victims will be
enhanced by investigation of the role of degrees of victim age (particularly old age, which
was not examined here) and disability as well as other sources of vulnerability. Goodin
( 1985) identified "children, . . . the mentally and physically handicapped, . . . the poor, . . .
the infirm aged" (p. 34) as particularly vulnerable categories of people. Vulnerability
should also be conceptualised as relational and the impact of various types of dependency
should also be examined. This will necessarily encompass investigation of the role of
asymmetrical trust in relationships of unequal power.
In the course of this dissertation, it was concluded that the perception of youth as
vulnerable victims might interact with the type of offence committed. Portrayal of
offences that intentionally take advantage of, for example, lack of financial experience as
a source of vulnerability in youth (represented as fraud by deception) in future research
will provide a test of the influence of victim youth on evaluations of non-sexual, non-drug
related offences.
Condemnation
Four questionnaire items that measured evaluative responses to offences were
clearly correlated as a single measure of public condemnation in both experimental
studies reported in this dissertation. Those evaluations encompassed participants'
emotional and moral responses to an offence, as well as their judgments of offence harm
and the degree of deserved punishment. The present program of research did not attempt
to separate emotional, moral and objective evaluations in what was, instead, taken to be a
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global measure of response. Future research will benefit from measurement of the degree
to which arguably moral principles, such as trust, are demonstrated by morally based
responses, such as ratings of offence wrongfulness. For example, in the second
experimental study, the offences of both the doctor and lawyer against a professional
client were seen as more wrongful than harmful. However, the moral wrongfulness of the
doctor's offence (M = 108.90, SD = 14.83) was seen to be substantially and more
consensually greater than that of the lawyer (M = 89.63, SD = 26.69).
Goals of Punishment
This thesis placed little emphasis on the relative importance of goals of
punishment to penalties for various offence scenarios, although it clearly emerged that
general deterrence was seen as an appropriate aim of punishment for police officers who
break the law. The results of both experimental studies showed that individual deterrence
was an important, general goal of punishment. Differences in the intended purposes of
punishments that are deemed appropriate and that are influenced by offender trust and
victim vulnerability bear further investigation.
Understanding of the public's reasoning about justice will also be furthered by
examination of the relationship of condemnation of offences to goals of deserved
punishment. For example, Roberts and Gebotys (1989) found that, although the severity
of assigned penalties was correlated with perceptions of the seriousness of offences,
sentence severity was unrelated to the importance of general deterrence, incapacitation, or
rehabilitation in punishment decisions.
Due to the moderate seriousness of the offence scenario presented in the
experimental studies reported in this dissertation, incapacitation was not investigated as a
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goal of punishment. A perceived need for incapacitative sentences has been associated
with offences such as murder, rape, child sex offences, and armed robbery and with
general 'dangerousness' (Morris, 1982/1994; Walker, 1991). Indermaur ( 1987) found that
2 1.6% of his sample of 554 members of the Western Australian public nominated
incapacitation as the most important goal of punishment for criminal offences. However,
he also found that 69.9% of those participants indicated that they had a violent crime in
mind when they responded to the questionnaire. Nevertheless, it would be prudent to
present a range of punishment purposes to participants of future studies, particularly in
the presence of more serious offences.
Similarly, restitution was not presented as a goal of punishment option in the
present research. Hamilton and Sanders ( 1983) proposed that emphasis on an offender's
social role obligations in decisions about punishment should be associated with a need for
restitution, rather than retribution, in order to restore social bonds. In view of the focus in
the present research on social roles of trust and high status and the conceptualisation of
violation of standards of conduct expected of those roles as a social harm, restitution (the
need for offenders to 'make up for' offences against society) should be investigated as a
goal of punishment in future similar research.
Variability in Reasoning About Justice
The value of applying normative findings as if they represented a consensual body
of public opinion will not be debated here (see Durham, 1993, for a discussion). The
sociological-social psychological perspective of this dissertation demanded investigation
of normative explanations of the public's reasoning about criminal offences and
punishment. It was not assumed that there would be a high degree of consensus in the
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public's views and steps were taken to benefit from previous recommendations for
methodology that guarded against false impressions of high consensus.
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However, the potential impact of variability in the public's responses on the
findings of this program of research is relevant to the thesis and its future directions.
There was a possibility that comparisons of highly and inconsistently variable score
distributions obscured or weakened experimental effects. There is a need for further
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exploration of research methods that are not so general that they artificially obscure
variability in the views of the public but that are able to elicit valid, accurate responses
that are general enough to facilitate statistical interpretation and theoretical development.
Future researchers in this area should also be more open to statistical transformation of
data for the purpose of normalising score distributions. It was reported in Chapter Two
that, in the interests of generalisability, a decision was made not to transform the many
non-normal distributions of data from the first experimental study. However, scores can
always be back-transformed after analysis to validly indicate their real-world impact.
Further methodological efforts to elicit less variable and more validly comparative
data may benefit from a focus on more controlled measurement of the public's responses,
and comparison across studies of more homogenous samples using consistent response
contexts. These strategies are discussed in the following sections of this dissertation.

Response Measurement Control
The experimental studies conducted as part of this program of research utilised
visual analogue scales in order to avoid artificial constraint of responses. The problems of
variability in the data that may have been contributed to by the use of those scales need to
be addressed by measures that are non-constraining but that also do not allow so much
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response freedom that normative trends and possibilities for statistical comparison are
obfuscated by a confusion of subjective interpretation.
Homogenous Samples

Analysis of data produced by the first experimental study in this program of
research showed that grouping participants according to various combinations of age, sex,
and socioeconomic status did not substantially reduce response variance. Future provision
for explanation of responses that indicate influences by alternative individual difference
factors and individual methods of processing information are potentially useful
homogenising contexts for either cross-study comparison or as a basis for filter questions
within a single study. Differences in individual characteristics and methods of
information processing were not of interest to the sociological-social psychological
perspective of this dissertation. Nevertheless, knowledge of these differences has the
potential to enhance understanding of the public's responses to offence scenarios by
accounting for variability in responses. Information on individual decision making
influences may also reduce complexity and explain the lack of consensus in the public's
views.
It could be expected that specific ideological orientations of sections of the public
produce consistent bases for responses to wrongdoing. For example, Curry (1996) found
that people with conservative Protestant religious beliefs almost invariably base their
perceptions of wrongfulness on moral concerns. He concluded that conservative
Protestants regarded all criminal behaviour, including minor offences such as trespassing,
as morally wrong and that there was a high, positive correlation between Protestant
religiosity and perceptions of wrongfulness.
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In Australia, Feather has conducted a comprehensive, often cross-cultural,
program of research on the roles of authoritarianism (Feather, 1993, 1996a; Feather &
Oberdan, 2000), conservatism (Feather, 1 984), self-esteem (Feather, 1991, 1996b;
Feather & McKee, 1993), and national identification and ingroup favouritism (Feather,
1994, 1995) in social decisions that has added to the knowledge of influences of
personality and value characteristics. Comparison of a series of studies that gather
information on the views on crimes and punishment of selected homogenous groups of
members of the public who have similar value orientations will further add to an overall
picture of the public's reasoning about criminal justice. Filter questions that address
ideological orientations of participants can be used as a basis for investigating variability
in overall responses.
Future research on public reasoning about criminal justice may also be illuminated
by explanations of the way in which members of the public make decisions about justice
reasoning factors such as responsibility and blame. An initial examination of existing
frameworks of justice decision making will prove worthwhile. Extant models explain the
processing of information about offences and consequent decisions about just outcomes
with reference to social cognitive processes (Feather, 1998), attribution theory (for
example, Fincham & Jaspars, 1980) and retributive moral judgments (Shultz & Darley,
1991). An example of their usefulness to future investigations of the present research
topic is the application of attribution theory to judgments of moral and criminal
responsibility that incorporates the concepts of role-related normative forces or oughts
(Fincham & Jaspars, 1980). In an analysis of Heider's seminal works on attribution
theory, Benesh and Weiner (1982) proposed that violated 'oughts' or moral imperatives
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evoke anger and a morally-based desire to retaliate and punish. Anderson's (1978)
algebraic model is an older example of a more cognitive model of attribution processes in
criminal responsibility. Its proposition that blame = intent + consequence - extenuation -

personal goodness has the potential to further clarify the role of offender trust in
condemnation and punishment. The potential value of the Shultz and Darley (1991)
model and the one proposed by Feather ( 1998) is attention to moral responsibility and the
incorporation of affective reactions into the assignment of penalties, respectively.
Qualitative data produced by the present research (Tables 6 and 12) showed an
emphasis on the use of offender characteristics in participants' decisions about
appropriate penalties. Using existing explanatory frameworks of the public's 'legal
reasoning' (Darley & Shultz, 1990) in future studies may facilitate greater understanding
of the ways in which offender variables are associated with evaluations of blame and
responsibility and shed light on major extra-legal influences, as well as illuminating
sources of variability in judgments.

Consistent Response Contexts
Efforts to control the extent of pa..1:icipants' deliberation over responses in the
second experimental study produced some reduction of variability in the data. The partial
success in controlling statistical variance in participants' responses has methodological
implications for future, similar research. Instruction in the type of response that is
required may lead to less variation for the quantitative comparison of the extent to which
the public condemns offences and its opinions on the degree to which an individual
offender needs to be prevented from re-offending. However, this method does not appear
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to be useful for reducing variability in considerations of general deterrence or retribution
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and it may have been implicated in more variable opinions on rehabilitation. A more
accurate, comprehensive picture of the public's reasoning about criminal justice might be
obtained by future comparisons of studies across multiple, homogenous response contexts
or by including filter questions that demonstrate participants' level of consideration in a
single study.
The measurement of condemnation in this research included evaluations of
offence seriousness in terms of wrongfulness and harmfulness (as proposed by Warr,
1989). Determination of offence seriousness involves attribution of an offender's
responsibility for the offence (Douglas & Ogloff, 1996) and Myers (1980) has warned
that contextual variations "shape attributions in complex and unanticipated ways" (p.
4 15). An example of the impact of response and decision variations was provided by
Hamilton and Rytina ( 1980). They found that the more participants deliberated over
calculations of just deserts, the more their responses deviated from a group average
response.
The role of response context variations, for example, careful consideration versus
off-the-cuff reactions, in the production of diversified data could be tested by
manipulating and comparing participants' decision making contexts in realistic ways. An
overall picture of the public's views would be gained from testing variables under
multiple decision contexts and comparing results. Examples of contexts might include the
public's 'gut-level' responses to news media reports of criminal offences versus
simulation of jury decision making situations under conditions of maximal ecological
validity. Consideration should also be given to whether participants use social or personal
contexts for responding to questions about criminal offences and their punishment. For

Public Reasoning About Justice
195
example, responses made when group membership is salient are likely to differ from
those rooted in individual preferences (Fincham & Jaspars, 1980). Finally, researchers
may want to determine whether responses reflect a basis for action or whether they
indicate opinions that predict no attitude-behaviour link.
In terms of considered response contexts, it is important to continue to ask
participants why they made a particular response. The scope of the present research
demanded that analysis of qualitative data produced by responses to such questions was
selective rather than extensive. The aim of understanding the public's reasoning about
criminal justice will be furthered by more detailed analysis of the qualitative data on
explanations for decisions. This analysis should include more structured methods of
analysis than those used in the present research. It should also use more than one analyst
in order to ensure the accuracy of findings by incorporating measures of inter-rater
reliability.
Sampling Limitations

The present research used participant samples that were not randomly selected
from the population. The findings of the preliminary exploratory study were based on the
views of a small number (N = 34) of members of the public. Although steps were taken to
maximise representativeness, the weight placed on the findings of that study in
subsequent investigations would have benefited from the initial use of a larger, randomly
selected sample. The experimental studies used a snowballing technique (Eland
Goossensen et al., 1997) and other methods of participant selection that were designed to
maximise representativeness. Random selection of participants in future studies will
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produce data that are more methodologically rigorous in their indications of the public's
reasoning and the degree of its consensus.
Additionally, the sample size (N = 122) of the second experimental study resulted
in cell sizes of approximately 20 participants. Although cell sizes were almost equal (an
important statistical assumption) and of adequate size for the performance of analysis of
variance tests, the power of those tests to detect significant differences when they exist in
the data would be improved by using larger samples in future studies. For example, in the
comparison of offenders described as a medical doctor and a lawyer who had a
professional relationship with a victim, the probability of a statistical difference in levels
of public condemnation was .063. A good level of statistical power to detect the effect
(Cohen's d = .68) in the presence of a violation of the assumption of homogeneity of
variance would have required samples of 40, rather than 20. As it was, the actual power
of this comparison (1 - � = .6) was lower than desirable. It is interesting to note that if
variances in the condemnation scores of these two groups had been homogenous, the
magnitude of the effect would have been very high (d = .96) and the samples of 20 would
have given excellent power (1 - � = .8).
The surveys reported in Chapter Three used convenience samples of
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undergraduate students. The nature of these samples was sufficient for the purpose of the
surveys - to obtain a broad contemporary picture of conceptual understanding of social
status and trust and the identification of groups that exemplified those qualities. It has
already been noted that participant characteristics more closely approximated those of the
wider population than is found in most university student samples. Nevertheless, the
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accuracy of the findings of future similar investigations will benefit from random
sampling of the general population.
Limited Offence Contexts
The two experimental studies in this program of research used a single offence
context - that of assault occasioning bodily harm. Douglas and Ogloff ( 1996)
recommended the use of multiple offence scenarios in investigations of public opinions
on justice. A more complete understanding of the public's views will be provided by
identification of consistent relationships between offences and reasoning principles across
various offence contexts. The use of multiple offence scenarios will not only expand on
the results of the current research it will further address Durham's ( 1993) concern that
public assignment of sentences to descriptions of individual offences often produces
highly specific judgments for highly specific events. Similarly, a larger sample of
offences that represents a more exhaustive range of moral and emotional elements will
enhance the findings of exploratory research that attempts to identify factors in reasoning
about justice in the same way as the initial study in this research program.

Conclusions

This program of research has provided some preliminary but valuable indications
of principles in the public's evaluations of offences and its judgments on punishment. The
major contribution has been original identification and analysis of the nexus of trust and
status in criminal justice reasoning.
The role of public opinion in law is hotly debated elsewhere (see discussions of
the Hart-Devlin debate on morality and law, for example, those by George, 1990, and
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Bittinger, 1990). The starting point for this research was that legislation is currently being
based on perceptions of public opinion (for example, Crime [Serious and Repeat
Offenders] Sentencing Act 1992, 1992; Criminal Code Amendment [Home Invasion] Act,
2000; see discussion in Chapter 1). Therefore, those perceptions must be clear and valid
and legislative responses must be empirically based rather than under-informed or
misinformed knee-jerk reactions. In his seminal work on commonsense justice, Finkel
(1995) concluded that, "in calling for the law to follow the path of the community, we are
not urging it to heed majoritarian, transitory, ignorant, or unprincipled sentiment. We are
asking it to acknowledge what it may have forgotten or lost sight of: the deeper roots of
justice" (p. 337). Although it was not the aim of the present research to make a claim for
the inclusion of community sentiment in official justice, its rationale echoed Finkel's
concern for the validity of such inclusions.
The analysis of the public's responses that were collected as part of this research
has included theoretical interpretations and explanations for the absence of evidence of
principles that would support popular assumptions of punitiveness and emotionally and
morally based reasoning. It has involved discussion of statistical effects and the nuisance
value of variability in the data. Real-world analysis of those responses demonstrates that
the public shows remarkably egalitarian and objective reasoning about criminal offences.
Even though participants took offender characteristics into account in the assignment of
appropriate penalties, the trusted position and, later, social status of offenders made little
difference to the public's emotional reactions to an offence, its evaluations of offence
wrongfulness and harm, the severity of assigned penalties or the aims of deserved
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punishment. In real-world terms, what was not found by this program of research is more
important than what was found.
The principles that emerged from the initial study of responses to provocative
offences did not prove to be generically important to reasoning about a more prosaic
offence. The ubiquity of a principle of exceptional vulnerability was demonstrated by
strong reactions to predation, exploitation or perceived disregard for the implications of a
relative lack of competence, even in the absence of clear intent to cause harm. However,
although there was clear evidence for the impact of exceptional victim vulnerability on
condemnation of offences, consideration of some sources of vulnerability appeared to be
specific to certain types of offence.
The initial hypothesis regarding the impact of breach of trust assumed its fragility.
However, subsequent investigations showed evidence that supported an assertion by
Good (1988) that trust, when it is well established, is remarkably robust. Trust is
important to public evaluations of criminal offences and its decisions about punishment
but it is not a principle that is applied wholesale in a way that is indicated by moral
theories. Similarly, it appears that the public's response to breach of trust is not always to
seek revenge.
Responses to breaches of trust that demonstrated disproportionately punitive
responses and indications of extra-legal reasoning were specific to the interactions of
certain types of offence (corruption, violation of sexual norms), characteristics of the
offender (complexly, trust and honour inherent in an offender's social position or an
offender's relatively low social status), and the professional relationship of an offender to
the victim. Although there was qualitative evidence for the consideration of social
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characteristics of offenders in assessments of deserved punishment, this research found
little statistical evidence for condemnation of offenders and selection of goals of
punishment based on who they are. One instance of the role relationship of an offender to
a victim was important but offender role expectations were generally not a factor in the
public's reasoning about criminal justice. The public's consideration of offender trust was
complex but it clearly was not entirely based on emotional or moral concerns about what
a person ought to do as opposed to what the law says is wrong.
There are sources of complexity in what is often uncritically assumed to be
'public opinion on criminal justice'. However, this does not mean that research into the
underlying principles of those opinions is worthless or doomed, only that it demands
awareness and caution. Carefully interpreted normative data have heuristic utility in the
application of public opinion research to criminal justice administration. The key is to
ensure that the collection and interpretation of such data is empirically rigorous and that
findings demonstrate representative opinion rather than the most vociferous or politically
useful judgments.
This research has identified some specific areas of public concern about criminal
justice. Recommendations that include the selective amalgamation of normative and
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individual perspectives on the public's evaluations of criminal offences and its reasoning
about appropriate punishment will further develop academic and everyday understanding
of those concerns.
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Appendix A
Offence Scenarios Used in the Exploratory Study Reported in Chapter One
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Offence Scenarios
1

Supplying Heroin

Mr "X" has been charged with possession of heroin with intent to sell or supply.
He has admitted supplying heroin to students of a local high school in return for
recruiting and selling the drug to new users among their fellow-students.
2

Fabricating Evidence

Imagine that Mr "X" has not been charged, but that police know about his
activities and have been unable to charge him. The police visit Mr X's house with a
search warrant but do not find any heroin. A police officer "plants" a small amount of the
drug in Mr X's house in order to be able to lay a charge. The officer has been charged
with fabricating evidence.
3

Carnal Knowledge of Animal

Mr "B" has been charged with carnal knowledge of an animal. Police officers
called at Mr B's farm to make general enquiries about an unrelated matter and they
observed him sexually penetrating a cow. There was no-one else around at the time.
4

Unlawful Use of a Motor Vehicle

Mr "P" has been charged with unlawful use of a motor vehicle. He took the car
from the owner's driveway and used it to drive to a relative's house. The car was
returned, unharmed two hours later. However, the owner knew it had been taken because
a neighbour saw Mr "P'\ a 15 year old Aboriginal youth, driving it.
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5

Causing Pollution
Corporation "M" has been charged over a pollution offence. It allowed chemicals

that cause a temporary overgrowth of algae to be discharged into a stream in an industrial
area. There are no residential buildings within a 30km radius of the corporation' s
discharge outlet.

6

Sexual Penetration Of A Child 13 Or Older And Younger Than 16 Offender 18
Miss "L" has recently turned 16 years old. She is an average person of that age,

interested in clothes and music. She lives with her parents and two brothers and attends
TAPE part-time where she is studying book keeping. Miss "L" also has a part-time job in
an office.
Mr "S" also works in an office. He lives in an average suburb and is not married,
although he has had two serious relationships. He and Miss "L" met at a social function to
do with their places of employment. They have known each other for about a year.
Six months ago, Miss "L" and Mr "S" had sexual intercourse. Miss "L" consented but,
because she was under 16 at the time, Mr "S" was charged with a sexual offence after
Miss "L'" s parents complained to the police.
Miss "L" states that she and Mr "S" only had sexual intercourse on that one
occasion. He did not want them to have sex, because of her age, and she was the one who
initiated the sexual contact. Miss "L" says that she has suffered no ill effects from having
sex with Mr "S", and that they are still fond of each other. At the time of the offence, Mr
"S" was 18 years old.
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.l

Sexual Penetration Of A Child 13 Or Older And Younger Than 16 Offender 60
Miss "T" has recently turned 16 years old. She is an average person of that age,

interested in clothes and music. She lives with her parents and two brothers and attends
TAPE part-time where she is studying book-keeping. Miss "T" also has a part-time job in
an office.
Mr "G" also works in an office. He lives in an average suburb and is not married,
although he has had two serious relationships. He and Miss "T" met at a social function to
do with their places of employment. They have known each other for about a year.
Six months ago, Miss "T" and Mr "G" had sexual intercourse. Miss "T" consented but,
because she was under 16 at the time, Mr "G" was charged with a sexual offence after
Miss "T"'s parents complained to the police.

r

Miss "T" states that she and Mr "G" only had sexual intercourse on that one
occasion. He did not want to, because of her age, and she was the one who initiated the
sexual contact. Miss "T" says that she has suffered no ill-effects from having sex with Mr
"G", and that they are still fond of each other. At the time of the offence, Mr "G" was 60
years old.

I
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AppendixB
Questionnaire Used in the Exploratory Study Reported in Chapter One
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ECU Letterhead

Dear Participant
The attached survey is being conducted as part of a program of Forensic Psychology
research at Edith Cowan University. It concerns public opinions on different justice issues
and we are inviting members of the public to give their views.
Any suggestions you would like to make about the survey itself will help us to improve it.
For example, if any of the material does not seem realistic to you, or if you feel that you
need more information before you can give an opinion, please let us know.
Please note that some of the material in the survey describes sexual offences.
Please do not participate in the survey if you feel it will upset or offend you.

Participation in this survey is voluntary. Your responses will be anonymous and any
information you provide will be strictly confidential.
If you have any questions about this research, please do not hesitate to contact us at the
numbers listed below. Thank you for your assistance.

Dianne McKillop
PhD Student
School of Psychology
Edith Cowan University
Tel: (08) 9400 5736

Dr Adele Hills
Supervisor
School of Psychology
Edith Cowan University
Tel: (08) 9400 5536

1
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PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY
There are no "right answers" to the questions asked in Part 1 of this survey,
your personal opinions and feelings are all that are required.

*********************************************************************
PART1 : YOUR OPINIONS
Please read each of the following 5 brief descriptions and the 2 longer scenarios and then
answer the questions. Please complete them in order, one by one.

Description 1:
Mr "X" has been charged with possession of heroin with intent to sell or supply. He has
admitted supplying heroin to students of a local high school in return for recruiting and
selling the drug to new users among their fellow-students.
1. How does this situation make you feel? ---------------2. How serious is this offence?
(place a cross anywhere on the line)

I

I________________________________

not at all serious

extremely serious

3. What caused you to decide on this seriousness rating?

4. What should happen to Mr "X"?

5. What caused you to decide on this punishment?

l .

please continue on the back of the page . . ...
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Description 2:
Imagine that Mr "X" has not been charged, but that police know about his activities and
have been unable to charge him. The police visit Mr X's house with a search warrant but
do not find any heroin. A police officer "plants" a small amount of the drug in Mr X's
house in order to be able to lay a charge. The officer has been charged with fabricating
evidence.

1. How does this situation make you feel? --------------2. How serious is this offence?
(place a cross anywhere on the line)
I
not at all serious

extremely serious

3. What caused you to decide on this seriousness rating?

4. What should happen to the officer?

S. What caused you to decide on this punishment?

Description 3:
Mr "B" has been charged with carnal knowledge of an animal. Police officers called at
Mr B's farm to make general enquiries about an unrelated matter and they observed him
sexually penetrating a cow. There was no-one else around at the time.

1. How does this situation make you feel? ---------------2. How serious is this offence?
(place a cross anywhere on the line)
I
not at all serious

3. What caused you to decide on this seriousness rating?

extremely serious

'1
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4. What should happen to Mr "B"?

5. What caused you to decide on this punishment?

Description 4:

Mr "P" has been charged with unlawful use of a motor vehicle. He took the car from the
owner's driveway and used it to drive to a relative's house. The car was returned,
unharmed two hours later. However, the owner knew it had been taken because a
neighbour saw Mr "P", a 15 year old Aboriginal youth, driving it.
1. How does this situation make you feel? ----------·-----2. How serious is this offence?
(place a cross anywhere on the line)
I,______________________________

not at all serious

extremely serious

3. What caused you to decide on this seriousness rating?

l

4. What should happen to Mr "P"?

5. What caused you to decide on this punishment?

Description 5:

Corporation "M" has been charged over a pollution offence. They allowed chemicals
which cause a temporary overgrowth of algae to be discharged into a stream in an
industrial area. There are no residential buildings within a 30km radius of the
corporation's discharge outlet.

'I

1. How does this situation make you feel? ----------------

I

I
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2. How serious is this offence?
(place a cross anywhere on the line)
I
not at all serious

extremely serious

3. What caused you to decide on this seriousness rating?

4. What should happen to Corporation "M"?

5. What caused you to decide on this punishment?

Longer Scenario 1:
Miss "L" has recently turned 16 years old. She is an average person of that age, interested
in clothes and music. She lives with her parents and two brothers and attends TAFE part
time where she is studying book-keeping. Miss "L" also has a part-time job in an office.

l

Mr "S" also works in an office. He lives in an average suburb and is not married,
although he has had two serious relationships. He and Miss "L" met at a social function to
do with their places of employment. They have known each other for about a year.
Six months ago, Miss "L" and Mr "S" had sexual intercourse. Miss "L" consented but,
because she was under 16 at the time, Mr "S" was charged with a sexual offence after
Miss "L"'s parents complained to the police.
Miss "L" states that she and Mr "S" only had sexual intercourse on that one occasion. He
did not want them to have sex, because of her age, and she was the one who initiated the
sexual contact. Miss "L" says that she has suffered no ill-effects from having sex with Mr
"S", and that they are still fond of each other. At the time of the offence, Mr "S" was 18
years old.
1. How does this situation make you feel?

I !
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2. How serious is this offence?
(place a cross anywhere on the line)
I
not at all serious

extremely serious

3. What caused you to decide on this seriousness rating?

4. What should happen to Mr "S"?

5. What caused you to decide on this punishment?

Longer Scenario 2:
Miss "T" has recently turned 16 years old. She is an average person of that age, interested
in clothes and music. She lives with her parents and two brothers and attends TAFE part
time where she is studying book-keeping. Miss "T" also has a part-time job in an office.

l

Mr "G" also works in an office. He lives in an average suburb and is not married,
although he has had two serious relationships. He and Miss "T" met at a social function to
do with their places of employment. They have known each other for about a year.
Six months ago, Miss "T" and Mr "G" had sexual intercourse. Miss "T" consented but,
because she was under 16 at the time, Mr "G" was charged with a sexual offence after
Miss "T'" s parents complained to the police.
Miss "T" states that she and Mr "G" only had sexual intercourse on that one occasion. He
did not want to, because of her age, and she was the one who initiated the sexual contact.
Miss "T" says that she has suffered no ill-effects from having sex with Mr "G", and that
they are still fond of each other. At the time of the offence, Mr "G" was 60 years old.
1. How does this situation make you feel? ----------------

I
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2. How serious is this offence?
(place a cross anywhere on the line)

I________________________________

extremely serious

not at all serious

3. What caused you to decide on this seriousness rating?

4. What should happen to Mr "G"?

5. What caused you to decide on this punishment?

l

'

!

please turn the page for the final questions . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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6. A strong emotional response combined with the belief that something has violated
one's personal moral code is often called "moral indignation", or "moral outrage".
D yes
Are these expressions meaningful to you?
D no
(please tick the box that applies)
7. After looking back over the survey, can you relate a feeling of moral outrage or
moral indignation to anything you have read?
D yes
D no
8. If your last answer was "yes", please give details.

*********************************************************************
PART2 : GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT PARTICIPANTS
(please tick the box that applies)

1. What sex are you?

male
female

D
D

2. What is your age group?
D 1s - 21
D 22 - 25
D 26 - 35
D 36 - 45
D 46 - 55
D 56 - 65
D 66 or more
3. What is your main cultural background?
D Australian-born (non-Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander)
D Australian-born (Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander)
D born overseas (lived in Australia more than 10 years)
D born overseas (lived in Australia less than 10 years)
D other -------------------(please specify)

I
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4. Have you had any involvement with the criminal justice system?
D no
D yes
5. If your answer to the previous question was "yes", please describe how you were
involved (e.g. as a victim, a justice employee, an offender, on a jury, etc.)
(answering this question is optional)

THANK YOUfor completing this survey.
Your assistance is very much appreciated.

l

PLEASE READ:
The scenarios and offence descriptions you have read were hypothetical. All the
characters were fictitious. If you feel that you need to talk to someone about any of
the scenarios or about any issues which have arisen from them, please feel free to
contact the researcher, Dianne McKillop, on 9400 5736. If you need to speak to
someone about a sexual offence, the crisis line number for the Sexual Assault
Referral Centre is 9340 1828.

!8J NOW PLEASE SEAL THE COMPLETED SURVEY IN THE
ENVELOPE PROVIDED

l2J
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Appendix C
Instructions to Research Assistants Used in the Experimental Study Reported in
Chapter Two
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RESEARCH ASSISTANT BRIEFING PACKAGE
PROJECT: PhD Research Study, The Role of Offender Breach of Trust and Victim
Vulnerability in Public Views of Crime Seriousness and Punishment
RESEARCHER: Dianne McKillop, 9400 5736
Thank you
Thank you for volunteering to collect data for this study. I'm sure that your enthusiasm
and initiative will lead to a very successful career in psychology.
Contact details
I can be contacted at the above number at any time (just leave a message on my voicemail
if I'm not in).
A sheet for recording your contact details will be passed around after our coffee break.
Please let me know during the break if you would rather not have your details recorded
where others can see them.
The contact list also asks what you would like to gain from helping with the research (e.g.
experience, a reference), so don't forget to fill that part in.
Research design
The study for which you will be collecting data has a simple 3 x 3 between-subjects
factorial design. As the title suggests, the two independent variables are offender breach
of trust and victim vulnerability. The three levels of these variables are:
offender - medical doctor, adult, youth
victim - youth, adult, adult with a mild intellectual disability
Each participant will be assigned to one of the resulting nine experimental conditions and
asked to read a description of an assault involving the offender/victim combination that
corresponds to that condition.
There are several dependent variables designed to measure participants' emotional
response to a crime scenario, evaluation of crime seriousness, judgment of severity of
deserved punishment, and purpose of punishment. So, of course the appropriate analysis
is a MANOVA (you knew that).
The design and the questionnaire for the study have now (in their various evolving forms)
been pretested four times. The manipulation works, and problems with question wording,
scales that are too hard for people to complete, etc. have been ironed out.

Package
Your research assistant package contains:
• this briefing sheet
• 20 "Public Opinion Survey" questionnaires
• 22 "Confidential" envelopes (10 plain, 7 labelled, 5 labelled and stamped)

I
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The questionnaire
The cover page of the questionnaire has a number on it that corresponds to the
experimental condition it represents. Participants are required to read a description (Brief
Summary of Evidence) of a crime, to answer some questions about their views on that
crime, and to give some general information about themselves.
Selection ofparticipants
In an ideal world, this research would randomly sample the population. The best we can
do is to make the sample we select as representative of the population as possible and
randomly assign them to one of the experimental conditions. You should follow these
rules when selecting your 20 participants:
• do not select psychology students
• do not select members of your immediate family
• select (as far as is possible) an equal number of males and females
• select (as far as is possible) from a range of age groups (all participants should be over
1 8)
• select (as far as is possible) from a range of socioeconomic groups
• keep a record of the number of people who decline to participate

1

Administration of the questionnaire
You should go through the cover page of the questionnaire with participants and stress the
ethical considerations of voluntary participation, anonymity and confidentiality. The
manipulation should not be explained at this stage and you should use the top
questionnaire in your (randomly ordered) set on each occasion. Completing the
questionnaire takes about five minutes.
Participant debriefing and questionnaire return
Participants have been told to contact myself or Susan Gee if they have questions about
the research. However, you should answer any general questions once they have
completed the questionnaire. If participants have any concerns about any part of the
study, or their role in it, that is not your responsibility and you should refer them to me.
The preferred method for return of the questionnaires is for you to wait while they
complete it and seal it in the envelope, and to bring it (unopened) to Joondalup. There are
some stamped envelopes in your package for anyone who insists on returning it by post.

A few final points.....
Speedy return of these questionnaires is vital. If you are having trouble collecting the data
(it is sometimes harder than you think), or if you become ill or find something better to
do, please don't hesitate to contact me and I'll make other arrangements.

THANKS AGAIN ! ! !

·
.:._

.
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AppendixD
Stimulus Scenarios (Brief Summaries of Evidence) Used in the Experimental Study
Reported in Chapter Two
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Stimulus Scenarios (Brief Summaries of Evidence)

Scenario 1 - offender a medical doctor, victim a youth.
Greg Hill is a medical doctor who lives and practices in a middle-class suburb of
Perth. He has been charged with the assault of a 14-year-old youth after he pushed the
youth off his bicycle. Hill had been walking down a city street when the youth emerged
from an alley on his bicycle and almost collided with him. When Hill spotted the youth at
the traffic lights a few minutes later, he told him off and pushed him. This caused the
youth to fall from his bicycle, sustaining grazes, bruising and a broken wrist. The youth
was not one of Dr Hill's patients.
Scenario 2 - offender a medical doctor, victim a middle-aged adult.
Greg Hill is a medical doctor who lives and practices in a middle-class suburb of
Perth. He has been charged with the assault of a middle-aged man after he pushed the
man off his bicycle. Hill had been walking down a city street when the man emerged
from an alley on his bicycle and almost collided with him. When Hill spotted the man at
the traffic lights a few minutes later, he told him off and pushed him. This caused the
man to fall from his bicycle, sustaining grazes, bruising and a broken wrist. The man was
not one of Dr Hill's patients.
Scenario 3 - offender a medical doctor, victim a middle-aged man with a mild
intellectual disability.
Greg Hill is a medical doctor who lives and practices in a middle-class suburb of
Perth. He has been charged with the assault of a middle-aged, mildly intellectually
disabled man after being seen pushing the man off his bicycle. Hill had been walking
down a city street when the man emerged from an alley on his bicycle and almost
collided with him. When Hill spotted the man at the traffic lights a few minutes later, he
told him off and pushed him. This caused the man to fall from his bicycle, sustaining
grazes, bruising and a broken wrist. The man was not one of Dr Hill's patients.

,
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Scenario 4 - offender an adult businessman, victim a youth.

Greg Hill is a 41-year-old businessman who lives and works in a middle-class
suburb of Perth. He has been charged with the assault of a 14-year-old youth after he
pushed the youth off his bicycle. Hill had been walking down a city street when the
youth emerged from an alley on his bicycle and almost collided with him. When Hill
spotted the youth at the traffic lights a few minutes later, he told him off and pushed him.
This caused the youth to fall from his bicycle, sustaining grazes, bruising and a broken
wrist.
Scenario 5 - offender an adult businessman, victim a middle-aged man.

Greg Hill is a 41-year-old businessman who lives and works in a middle-class
suburb of Perth. He has been charged with the assault of a middle-aged man after he
pushed the man off his bicycle. Hill had been walking down a city street when the man
emerged from an alley on his bicycle and almost collided with him. When Hill spotted
the man at the traffic lights a few minutes later, he told him off and pushed him. This
caused the man to fall from his bicycle, sustaining grazes, bruising and a broken wrist.
Scenario 6 - offender an adult businessman, victim a middle-aged man with a mild
intellectual disability.

Greg Hill is a 41-year-old businessman who lives and works in a middle-class
suburb of Perth. He has been charged with the assault of a middle-aged, mildly
intellectually disabled man after he pushed the man off his bicycle. Hill had been
walking down a city street when the man emerged from an alley on his bicycle and almost
collided with him. When Hill spotted the man at the traffic lights a few minutes later, he
told him off and pushed him. This caused the man to fall from his bicycle, sustaining
grazes, bruising and a broken wrist.

'
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Scenario 7 - offender a youth, victim a youth.
Greg Hill is 14 years old and lives in a middle-class suburb of Perth. He has been
charged with the assault of another 14-year-old youth after he pushed the youth off his
bicycle. Hill had been walking down a city street when the youth emerged from an alley
on his bicycle and almost collided with him. When Hill spotted the youth at the traffic
lights a few minutes later, he told him off and pushed him. This caused the youth to fall
from his bicycle, sustaining grazes, bruising and a broken wrist.
Scenario 8 - offender a youth, victim a middle-aged man.
Greg Hill is 14 years old and lives in a middle-class suburb of Perth. He has been
charged with the assault of a middle-aged man after he pushed the man off his bicycle.
Hill had been walking down a city street when the man emerged from an alley on his
bicycle and almost collided with him. When Hill spotted the man at the traffic lights a
few minutes later, he told him off and pushed him. This caused the man to fall from his
bicycle, sustaining grazes, bruising and a broken wrist.
Scenario9 - offender a youth, victim a middle-aged man with a mild intellectual
disability.
Greg Hill is 14 years old and lives in a middle-class suburb of Perth. He has been
charged with the assault of a middle-aged, mildly intellectually disabled man after he
pushed the man off his bicycle. Hill had been walking down a city street when the man
emerged from an alley on his bicycle and almost collided with him. When Hill spotted
the man at the traffic lights a few minutes later, he told him off and pushed him. This
caused the man to fall from his bicycle, sustaining grazes, bruising and a broken wrist.
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AppendixE
Research Questionnaire Used in the Experimental Study Reported in Chapter Two
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� PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY �
���������������� 1

This questionnaire is part of a program of research being conducted by Dianne
McKillop, a PhD student at Edith Cowan University.
We are interested in public opinions on different justice issues and we are inviting
members of the public to give their views. You will be asked to read a short
paragraph about a crime and to answer some questions about that crime. There are
!!Q right answers to the questions, your personal opinion is all that is needed.
Participation in the research is voluntary, you do not have to take part. Your
responses will be completely anonymous, you should not write your name anywhere
on the questionnaire. The information you provide in response to the questionnaire
will be held in strict confidence by the researcher. The person who asked you to
participate in the research will not see the completed questionnaire.
If you have decided that you would like to take part in the research, it involves three
steps:

i

Read the instructions and the brief summary of evidence.
Answer the 6 questions.
Record any additional comments you wish to make before
folding the questionnaire and sealing it in the envelope provided to
you. The research assistant will return the envelope, unopened, to
the researcher.

If you have any' questions about this research, please do not hesitate to contact us at
either of the numbers listed below.
Thank you very much for your assistance.
Dianne McKillop
PhD Student
School of Psychology
Edith Cowan University
Tel: (08) 9400 5736

Dr Susan Gee
PhD Supervisor
School of Psychology
Edith Cowan University
Tel: (08) 9400 5526
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Brief Summary of Evidence

(see Appendix D)

Questions:

00

Please place a cross anywhere on the scale below to indicate the extent of
your negative EMOTIONAL reaction to this crime.

no negative
emotional reaction

�

Please place a cross anywhere on the scale below to indicate how MORALLY
WRONG you think this crime was.

not at all morally
wrong

�

extremely morally
wrong

Please place a cross anywhere on the scale below to indicate how HARMFUL
you think this crime was.

not at all harmful

Hj

extremely negative
emotional reaction

extremely harmful

Please indicate your opinion on the severity of any punishment deserved by
Greg Hill.

no
punishment

the maximum
punishmentfor this offence

What aspects of the crime influenced your opinion on the severity of
punishment deserved by Greg Hill?

questions continue on the back of the page.....
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�

Please rate the following factors according to their role in your decision about
Greg Hill's penalty. Place a cross anywhere on each of the four scales to show
how important that factor was in your decision.
the need to deter him from doing it again
extremely important

not at all important

the need to rehabilitate him
extremely important

not at all important

the need to make an example of him
not at all important

extremely important

the need to ensure he gets what he deserves
not at all important

extremely important

So that I can be sure that this research represents a range of people, I would
be grateful if you could supply the following general information:
• your age __
• whether you are male or female _____
• whether you D live with someone as a couple
D do not live with someone as a couple
• whether your annual family income is:
D less than $25, 000
D more than $25,000 but less than $50,000
D more than $50,000 but less than $75,000
D more than $75, 000 but less than $100, 000
D more than $100,000

�

Please feel free to record any comments you wish to make in this space.

�12l RETURNING THE QUESTIONNAIRE �12l

Please now place the completed questionnaire in the envelope provided and either
return it to the research assistant or post it as soon as possible. Thank you again for
your time and efl'ort.
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AppendixF
Materials Used in the Surveys Reported in Chapter Three :
The Trust Survey
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PSY1101 INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY
Week Thirteen - Social Psychology
Tutors' Instructions
Exercise 1: Separating Social and Individual Psychology
Start by having students complete the questionnaire, "Who Can We Trust?"
Allow them 10 minutes. Collect the questionnaires when they have finished.
Introduce the topic by showing students the overhead transparency "Levels of Meaning in
Social Explanation"* from McKnight and Sutton (1994). The usual definition of social
psychology is that it studies the individual in social settings. It is in the mid-range of
levels of explanation that incorporates both individual and social meanings of behaviour.
In studying social behaviour, a social psychologist may use an individual approach such
as social cognition or a person's learning history, an interpersonal approach such as social
exchange, or a more sociological perspective such as cross-cultural comparison.
Facilitate students' discussion of their responses (to the extent they wish to disclose them)
to the "Who Can We Trust?" questionnaire and relate it to levels of psychological
explanation. For example:

individual psychological approach - developmental influences may have affected
students' abilities to easily trust or distrust
individual social psychological approach - the people students trust or distrust may
reflect schemas and stereotypes they have learned during the course of their lives
interpersonal social psychological approach - students may have identified people that
most of us would expect to be able to trust, given their relationship to us ( e.g. our doctor,
our teacher)
sociological social psychological approach - they may have used group level
explanations (e.g. a student may trust men but not women, or they may distrust all
members of a particular culture)
Please place completed questionnaires in an envelope addressed to Di McKillop in the
PhD pigeonhole. Please clearly indicate whose tutorial(s) they are from and do not
amalgamate responses from students of different tutors.
Reference
McKnight, J., & Sutton, J. (1994). Social psychology. Sydney, Australia: Prentice Hall.
* McKnight and Sutton (1994) used the example of an account of an anti-Vietnam War
demonstration.
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Transparency used in the tutorial exercise:
Separating Individual and Social Psychology.

Sociology
What societal
factors caused the
girl's alienation?
Social psychology
(group level explanations)
Are women more aggressive than men?
Is her culture aggressive?
Social psychology
(middle level explanations)
What attributions did she make?
How does she view the police?
Social psychology
(individual level explanations)
What situational influences, heat, crowd
density etc. prompted her response?
Psychology
What learning or developmental influences
underlie the girl's violence?
Physiology
How physiologically aroused was she?
Biochemistry
What hormones/neurotransmitters fueled her anger?
Particle physics/chemistry
What zillions of reactions underlie
her grabbing the policeman's hair?

From "Levels of Meaning in Social Explanation," by J. McKnight and J. Sutton, 1994,
Social Psychology, p. 13. Copyright 1994 by Prentice Hall Australia. Reprinted with
permission of the authors.
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WHO CAN WE TRUST ?

Of all the different groups-diat make up a societf tliere are some that stand out as the
types of people we are able to trust.
There has been very little research done in this area. Your responses to this exercise will
help to give a clearer picture of the groups that people in Australian society think they are
able to trust. Your views on the types of people that you think you are not able to trust
will also be helpful.
To complete this exercise, please use the spaces below to list
1. the types of people you think you can trust, and the reason(s) you can trust them,
2. the types of people you think you cannot trust, and the reason(s) you cannot trust
them.

You should not write your name or any other identifying information on this sheet.
However, to enable further analysis of responses, please record:
your sex (M or F)

D

your age

D
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Appendix G
Materials Used in the Surveys Reported in Chapter Three:
The Status Survey
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PSY1101 INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY
Week Five - Applied Language Exercise
Tutors' Instructions

Language links people. It facilitates the sharing of ideas and values that help to form a
common culture. But how far does this shared understanding go? Do the words and
concepts we use have exactly the same meaning for others?
It is important for researchers in psychology, when investigating people's beliefs and
feelings, to use words which, as far as is possible, have the same meaning for most
people. For example, if a researcher wanted to investigate the influence of attractiveness
on people's perceptions of intelligence (or vice versa), they would need to first find out
what both these terms mean to most people.
One way in which this could be done would be to ask a large number of people what they
define as intelligence (or attractiveness), including what they think makes an intelligent or
unintelligent person. Using the common elements of this information in the researcher's
description of an intelligent person would make the findings of the research more
generalisable (meaningful) in the real world.
The following exercise is an attempt to establish a common meaning for a concept that is
often mentioned, but poorly defined in the psychological and sociological literature.
Results of the exercise will be made available later in the semester.
Have students discuss their responses. How much consensus was there?
Tutors:
Please stress that this activity is voluntary, anonymous and confidential.
If students have a problem thinking up categories for question 2, you may tell them that
most people use occupation as a social status grouping category. If students don't want to
record their exact age, they may record an age range.
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WHAT IS SOCIAL STATUS ?
Most people have an opinion on what constitutes "social status". However, the concept is
not well defined in the social psychology literature. This exercise will enable us to gain a
clearer picture of what defines social status as well as what groups are usually regarded as
of high or low status.
You do not have to agree with the idea of social status in order to take part in this
voluntary activity. You do not need to be "status conscious". All that is required is for
you to express an opinion of what goes on in the social world.
You should not write your name or any other identifying information on this sheet.
However, to enable categorical analysis of results, please record:
D
your sex (M or F)
D
your age
Question 1: What is your definition of social status? (i.e. what are the
characteristics of a person who has high status ? low status ?)

Question 2: Make a list of types of people who are usually regarded as high or low
social status. Use whatever categories of people you like.
Also, please make a note of what it is about each type of person
that makes them hi2h or low status.

Use the back of this page ifyou need more room.
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Appendix H
Supplementary Analyses of the Trust Survey
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Participants of the trust survey (N = 237) recorded 870 reasons for their trust in
highly trusted groups of people. The reasons were grouped into the 19 categories shown
in Figure 17. The frequency of 'you know them' represented the association between
intimate knowledge of another as a characteristic of trust and it was produced by the
importance of family and close friends as highly trusted groups. 'Their good work' was a
characteristic of trust that was mainly attributable to the high level of trust in medical
doctors and the associated underlying assumption of their social contribution.
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Figure 1 7
Characteristics of high trust groups.
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Immediate family (Figure 18) and close friends (Figure 19) were the groups most
frequently nominated as people who are able to be trusted. The reasons for that trust are
reported here rather than in the body of the dissertation because they were not relevant to
the research thesis. Trust that resides in interpersonal relationships was specifically
excluded in favour of an emphasis on trust in social interactions and expectations.
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Figure 18
Frequencies of reasons for high trust in immediate family.

Misztal (1996) stated that trust in friends is based on the belief in another's inner
attributes. Relationships with friends are based un mutual knowledge and intimacy,
commitment, and faith in the other's goodwill. Some of these qualities are identified in
Figure 19.
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Figure 19
Frequencies of reasons for high trust in close friends.

With the exception of reasons for distrusting police officers, results regarding
groups who were distrusted were not reported in Chapter Four. A broad picture of those
results is shown here in Figures 20 and 2 1.
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Figure 20
Nominations of low trust groups.
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Figure 21
Total reasons for low trust nominations.
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Although the sample was non-random and probably not completely representative
of the population, the lack of trust shown in government and politicians is an important
and somewhat troubling finding. The reasons for that distrust are shown in Figure 22.
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Figure 22
Frequencies of reasons for low trust in government and politicians.

Salespeople, and car salesmen in particular, were a group that was widely
distrusted due to their perceived self-interest, dishonesty and greed (see Figure 23).
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Figure 23
Frequencies of reasons for a high level of distrust in salespeople, particularly car
salesmen.
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Appendix I
Supplementary Analyses of the Status Survey
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Although they were viewed as highly untrustworthy, politicians were seen to be a
high status group (see Figure 3). The reasons for this high status are shown below in
Figure 24. As mentioned in the conclusions to Chapter Three, the high status and low
trust of politicians would have made this group ideal for the formulation
exemplar in the second experimental study had it not been

deemed impossible to depict

them in a realistic offender-victim relationship ofprofessional trust.
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Figure 24
Frequencies of reasons for the high status of politicians.
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Thirty-one point eight per cent of the 192 participants in the status survey
identified celebrities as a high status group (see Figure 3) confirming a very recent social
trend (for example, Skolnick & Shaw, 1997). Actors and models were the celebrities who
were most often identified as members of this high status group. The reasons for their
high status are shown in Fi gure 25.
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Figure 25
Frequencies of reasons for the high status of celebrities.
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If sport-stars (9.4%) had been included in the category of celebrities, they would
have been the third highest status group (41.2%), ranking between politicians and
lawyers. In his millennium new year service, Britain's Archbishop of Canterbury attacked
the high status given to fame, wealth and power and urged people to adopt more Christian
values ("Christian Pointers," 2000). The relatively recent conceptualisation of fame as a
source of status is illustrated by Daniel's (1983) survey of the prestige of occupations in
Australia. Daniel commented that:
the prestige of artists and entertainers is markedly less than that of
professionals or scientists - depending on occupation it ranges from the
middle level to the least esteemed in the community. . . . Prestige is not a
matter of popularity, otherwise sportsmen and other entertainers would be
prestigious. (p. 148)

Although they were not relevant to the thesis, findings regarding low status groups
(Figure 26) are of social psychological interest. A lack of material wealth, income and
education or skill were the major defining characteristics of having low status. Belonging
to a group with a negative social image, one that lacks prestige, also characterised low
social status as did behaving in ways that differ from culturally expected norms.
A long period of high unemployment in Australia and the increased personal
contact with this phenomenon that presumably has resulted does not appear to have
moderated the traditional Australian stereotype of the unemployed person as a 'dole
bludger'. The negative stereotype appeared to be active in many participants'
characterisations of this low status group and many respondents used the specific
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derogatory label. The reasons for the low status of unemployed people are shown in
Figure 27.
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Figure 26
Nominations of low status groups.
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Figure 27
Frequencies of reasons for the low status of unemployed people.
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AppendixJ
Thematic Analysis of Defmitions of Status Provided by Participants of the Status
Survey Reported in Chapter Three
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Every defining characteristic of social status that was mentioned by participants
was recorded and each time the characteristic was mentioned was tallied. Individual
definers were recorded only once for each participant no matter how many times they
were identified. The number of times each defining theme and the constituent
characteristic was mentioned is recorded in the following data.
ECONOMIC (N=216)
wealth (101)
income (34)
where someone lives (21 )
possessions (car, clothes, house)
(28)
social circle ( 15)
standard of living (5)
leisure activities (3)
economic security (4)
opportunity (4)
SES (1)
CLASS (N=l4)
class (6)
background (4)
family name/inherited status (4)
POWER (N=39)
power /control (30)
influence (4)
mobility (1)
authority (4)

PRESTIGE (N=l16)
rank in society (66)
being looked up to/admired (6)
importance ( 14)
respect from others (21 )
recognition/reputation (7)
leadership (2)
FAME (N=22)
being well known ( 16)
popularity (6)
EMPLOYMENT (N=69)
professional (5)
kind of job (58)
having a job (6)
SUCCESS (N=l6)
achievements (6)
success (10)
KNOWLEDGE (N=64)
education level (4 1)
special skills (3)
intelligence (8)
ability/competence (7)
knowledge/information (5)
PRESENTATION (N=35)
attractiveness (3)
presentation/appearance ( 16)
communication skills/style (4)
respectability (5)
social competence (7)
PERSONAL/SOCIAL (N=l4)
gender (2)
ethnicity (5)
health ( 1 )
religion (3)
marital status (2)
age (1)

GOOD WORK (N=9)
help others (2)
social contribution (6)
community orientation ( 1 )
TRUST (N=lO)
honour (2)
trust (2)
honesty/integrity (3)
contribution to social
order/stability (2)
fairness ( 1 )
WORTH (N=l3)
social value (7)
acceptance by society ( 1 )
meaningful interaction with
society ( 1 )
productivity (4)
MORAL CHARACTER (N=20)
good character (3)
morals/values (3)
hard work (3)
moral conduct (10)
respect for others ( 1 )
PERSONAL (N=24)
self-esteem (4)
self-respect (2)
independence ( 1 )
thoughtfulness ( 1)
firmness (1)
warmth ( 1 )
understanding ( 1 )
friendliness ( 1 )
sociability (4)
ambition (3)
balance ( 1 )
rationality ( 1 )
strength o f will ( 1 )
happiness (2)
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Appendix K
Instructions to Research Assistants Used in the Experimental Study Reported in
Chapter Four

'•
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RESEARCH ASSISTANT BRIEFING PACKAGE
PROJECT: PhD Research, Study 5, The Effects of Offender Social Position and

Offender-Victim Trust Relationship on Condemnation and Punishment Decisions by the
General Public
RESEARCHER: Di McKillop, 9400 5736 (+ voicemail)

Thank you
Thank you for volunteering to collect data for this study. I'm sure that your enthusiasm
and initiative will lead to a very successful career in psychology. I will be happy to write
a reference for your CV based on your role as research assistant in this project.
Research design
The study for which you will be collecting data has a simple 3 x 2 between-subjects
factorial design. As the title suggests, the two independent variables are offender position
and offender-victim trust relationship. The levels of these variables are:
1. social position - high status/high trust (doctor); high status/low trust (lawyer); low
status/high trust (police officer)
2. trust relationship - present; absent
Participants will be randomly assigned to one of the resulting six experimental conditions
and asked to read a description of an assault that corresponds to that position/relationship
combination. All that this will involve on your part is to give each participant the top
questionnaire from your (randomly ordered) set. Do not try to "match" participants to
particular versions of the questionnaire.

Package
Your research assistant package contains:
• this briefing sheet
• "Public Opinion Survey" questionnaires
• "Confidential" envelopes (a few with stamps - ring me if you need more)
• Information Sheets for participants
The questionnaire
The cover page of the questionnaire has a number on it that corresponds to the
experimental condition it represents. Participants are required to read an Assault
Description, to answer some questions about their views on that crime, and to give some
general, personal information.
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Selection ofparticipants
In an ideal world, this research would randomly sample the population. The best we can
do is to make the sample we select as representative of the population as possible and
randomly assign them to one of the experimental conditions. You should follow these
rules when selecting your participants:
• do not select psychology students,
• do not select members of your immediate family,
• do not select more than one person from any one family or other close group
• select ( as far as is possible) an equal number of males and females
• select (as far as is possible) from a range of age groups (all participants should be over
18)
• select (as far as is possible) from a range of socioeconomic groups
• do not exclude people on the basis that the scenario may have personal relevance
• keep a record of the number of people who decline to participate
Administration of the questionnaire
The manipulation should not be explained at this stage and you should use the top
questionnaire in your (randomly ordered) set on each occasion. Completing the
questionnaire will take five to ten minutes but participants may wish to think about it and
return it to you later.
You should go through the cover page of the questionnaire with participants and point out
that participation is voluntary, anonymous and confidential. It is also very important to
make it clear that it is the considered opinion of the participant that is required,
rather than their first, gut-level response. This is not to say that people need to
deliberate endlessly over their responses, but the project requires more thought than an
off-the-cuff response.
Participant debriefing and questionnaire return
Participants should be given a copy of the Information Sheet after you have collected
their questionnaire. This will explain the purpose of the research and how to follow up the
results of the research. Participants should contact me if they have any questions or
comments about the research.
The preferred method for return of the questionnaires is for you to wait while they are
completed, seal them in the envelopes provided, and to bring them (unopened) to me at
Joondalup. However, I am happy to collect completed questionnaires from you.
A few final points.....
Speedy return of these questionnaires is vital. If you are having trouble collecting the data
(it is sometimes harder than you think), or if you become ill or something with a higher
priority comes up, please don't hesitate to contact me and I'll make other arrangements.
All questionnaires should be returned to me by the end of November.
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Appendix L
Stimulus Scenarios (Brief Summaries of Evidence) Used in the Experimental Study
Reported in Chapter Four
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Offence Scenarios (Brief Summaries of Evidence)
Scenario 1 - offender a medical doctor, trust relationship present.
Greg Hill is a medical doctor who lives in a middle-class suburb of Perth. He has
pleaded guilty to a charge of assault on a middle-aged man after he pushed the man off
his bicycle. Hill had been walking down a city street on his way to work when the man,
who he knew as a patient of his named John Marshall, emerged from an alley on his
bicycle and almost collided with him. Mr Marshall stopped, said, "sorry, I didn't see
you", and rode on. When Hill spotted Marshall at a set of traffic lights near his surgery a
few minutes later, he told him off and, at the same time, pushed him. This caused
Marshall to fall from his bicycle, sustaining grazes, bruising and a broken wrist.
When the case came to court, the prosecutor stated that, as well as being injured,
Mr Marshall was upset by the assault. At the time of the assault, he had been a patient of
Dr Hill's for six months. Mr Marshall had been regularly attending Hill's surgery for
treatment of a distressing, minor chronic illness. He had relied on Hill for his advice and
expertise and felt that they had a close, professional relationship.

Scenario2 - offender a medical doctor, trust relationship absent.
Greg Hill is a medical doctor who lives in a middle-class suburb of Perth. He has
pleaded guilty to a charge of assault on a middle-aged man after he pushed the man off
his bicycle. Hill had been walking down a city street on his way to work when the man,
John Marshall, emerged from an alley on his bicycle and almost collided with him. Mr
Marshall stopped, said, "sorry, I didn't see you", and rode on. When Hill spotted
Marshall at a set of traffic lights near his surgery a few minutes later, he told him off and,
at the same time, pushed him. This caused Marshall to fall from his bicycle, sustaining
grazes, bruising and a broken wrist.
When the case came to court, the prosecutor stated that, as well as being injured,
Mr Marshall was upset by the assault. He had never met Dr Hill before this incident, they
were strangers to each other.
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Scenario 3 - offender a lawyer, trust relationship present.

Greg Hill is a lawyer who lives in a middle-class suburb of Perth. He has pleaded
guilty to a charge of assault on a middle-aged man after he pushed the man off his
bicycle. Hill had been walking down a city street on his way to work when the man, who
he knew as a client of his named John Marshall, emerged from an alley on his bicycle and
almost collided with him. Mr Marshall stopped, said, "sorry, I didn't see you", and rode
on. When Hill spotted Marshall at a set of traffic lights near his office a few minutes
later, he told him off and, at the same time, pushed him. This caused Marshall to fall
from his bicycle, sustaining grazes, bruising and a broken wrist.
When the case came to court, the prosecutor stated that, as well as being injured,
Mr Marshall was upset by the assault. At the time of the assault, Hill had been handling a
distressing property dispute Marshall had been involved in. They had had regular
meetings over the previous six months and he had relied on Hill for his advice and
expertise and felt that they had a close, professional relationship.
Scenario 4 - offender a lawyer, trust relationship absent.

Greg Hill is a lawyer who lives in a middle-class suburb of Perth. He has pleaded
guilty to a charge of assault on a middle-aged man after he pushed the man off his
bicycle. Hill had been walking down a city street on his way to work off when
the man, John Marshall, emerged from an alley on his bicycle and almost collided with
him. Mr Marshall stopped, said, "sorry, I didn't see you", and rode on. When Hill
spotted Marshall at a set of traffic lights near his office a few minutes later, he told him
off and, at the same time, pushed him. This caused Marshall to fall from his bicycle,
sustaining grazes, bruising and a broken wrist.
When the case came to court, the prosecutor stated that, as well as being injured,
Mr Marshall was upset by the assault. He had never met Hill before this incident, they
were strangers to each other.
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Scenario 5 - offender a police officer, trust relationship present.

Greg Hill is a police officer who lives in a middle-class suburb of Perth. He has
pleaded guilty to a charge of assault on a middle-aged man after he pushed the man off
his bicycle. Hill had been walking down a city street on his way to work when the man,
who he knew as John Marshall - a crime victim with whom he had been working closely,
emerged from an alley on his bicycle and almost collided with him. Mr Marshall
stopped, said, "sorry, I didn't see you", and rode on. When Hill spotted Marshall at a set
of traffic lights near his police station a few minutes later, he told him off and, at the same
time, pushed him. This caused Marshall to fall from his bicycle, sustaining grazes,
bruising and a broken wrist.
When the case came to court, the prosecutor stated that, as well as being injured,
Mr Marshall was upset by the assault. At the time of the assault, Officer Hill had been
handling the investigation of a series of thefts from Marshall's home and business. The
thefts had started six months previously and had caused Mr Marshall some distress. They
had had regular meetings and he had relied on Hill for his advice and expertise and felt
that they had a close, professional relationship.
Scenario 6 - offender a police officer, trust relationship absent.

Greg Hill is a police officer who lives in a middle-class suburb of Perth. He has
pleaded guilty to a charge of assault on a middle-aged man after he pushed the man off
his bicycle. Hill had been walking down a city street on his way to work off when the
man, John Marshall, emerged from an alley on his bicycle and almost collided with him.
Mr Marshall stopped, said, "sorry, I didn't see you", and rode on. When Hill spotted
Marshall at a set of traffic lights near his police station a few minutes later, he told him
off and, at the same time, pushed him. This caused Marshall to fall from his bicycle,
sustaining grazes, bruising and a broken wrist.
When the case came to court, the prosecutor stated that, as well as being injured,
Mr Marshall was upset by the assault. He had never met Officer Hill before this incident,
they were strangers to each other.
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AppendixM
Research Questionnaire Used in the Experimental Study Reported in Chapter Four
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� PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY �

This questionnaire is part of a program of research being conducted by Dianne
McKillop, a PhD student at Edith Cowan University.
You will be asked to read a brief description of an assault and to answer some
questions about it. There are no right answers to the questions, your personal
opinion is all that is needed. However, I would ask that you give some thought to
your opinion, rather than base your answers on your immediate reaction to the
assault description.
Participation in the research is voluntary, you do not have to take part. Your
responses will be completely anonymous, you should not write your name anywhere
on the questionnaire. The information you provide in response to the questionnaire
will be held in strict confidence by the researcher. The person who asked you to
participate in the research will not see the completed questionnaire.
If you have decided that you would like to take part in the research, it involves three
steps:
Read and carefully consider the assault description.
1
Answer the 6 questions.
2
Record any additional comments you wish to make before
3
folding the questionnaire and sealing it in the envelope provided.
The envelope will be returned to us unopened.
If you have any questions about this research, please do not hesitate to contact
Dianne or her research supervisor at either of the numbers listed below.
Thank you very much for your assistance.
Dianne McKillop
PhD Student
School of Psychology
Edith Cowan University
Tel: (08) 9400 5736

Associate Professor Edward Helmes
PhD Supervisor
School of Psychology
Edith Cowan University
Tel: (08) 9400 5543
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2
Assault Description

(see Appendix L)

Questions:

00

Please place a cross anywhere on the scale below to indicate the extent of
your negative EMOTIONAL reaction to this crime.
no negative
emotional reaction

�

Please place a cross anywhere on the scale below to indicate how MORALLY
WRONG you think this offence was.
not at all morally
wrong

�

extremely morally
wrong

Please place a cross anywhere on the scale below to indicate how HARMFUL
you think this offence was.
not at all harmful

�

extremely negative
emotional reaction

extremely harmful

Please indicate your opinion on the severity of the punishment deserved by
Greg Hill.
no
punishment

the maximum
punishmentfor this offence

f
!
I

Questions continue over the page .....

/,
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3
�

What factors influenced your opinion on the severity of punishment deserved
by Greg Hill?
MOST importantfactor: ----------------------

other importantfactors: ------------------------

�

Please rate the following factors according to their role in your decision about
Greg Hill's penalty. Place a cross anywhere on each of the four scales to show
how important that factor was in your decision.
the need to deter him from doing it again
not at all important

extremely important

the need to rehabilitate him
not at all important

I

extremely important

the need to make an example of him
not at all important

extremely important

the need to ensure he gets what he deserves
not at all important

extremely important

So that I can be sure that this research represents a range of people, I would
be grateful if you could supply the following general information:
• your age __
• whether you are male or female _____

�

WIBJ RETURNING THE QUESTIONNAIRE W IBJ
Please now place the completed questionnaire in the envelope provided, SEAL IT
and return it to the research assistant.
Thank you again for your time and effort.

.
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Appendix N
Participant Debriefing Information Sheet Used in the
Experimental Study Reported in
Chapter Four
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fMMi} PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY fMMi}

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET

The purpose of the research you have participated in was to test the effect of an offenders'
social position and an offender-victim relationship on condemnation of offences and
punishment decisions by the general public.
There were six different versions of the assault description used in this study. They
described an assault committed by a doctor, a lawyer, or a police officer on someone with
whom they either did, or did not, have a professional trust relationship.
The results of the study will be available in mid-January, 2000. You are welcome to
contact me for a copy of the results at that time.
Thank you for your participation.

Dianne McKillop
PhD Candidate in Forensic Psychology
Edith Cowan University
Tel: (08) 9400 5736
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Appendix 0
Comments Made by Participants in the Police Officer/Professional-Relationship
Condition of the Experimental Study Reported in Chapter Four
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The comments recorded by participants in the police officer/no-professional
relationship condition of the second experimental study illustrated the strong negative
responses evoked by police officers who break the law (see Table 14). Comments made
by participants in the police officer/professional-relationship condition recorded below
generally showed a greater degree of tolerance.

Offender characteristics
that were considered in
assigning punishment.

Experimental Condition
police/client
Hill, as a .e.olice officer, should have known better.
Police officer should have training that includes anger
control, etc.
He is a policeman and should know better. However, we all
have bad days. Only he knows how much stress he has been
under. He may need to make a decision about his career.
Police officer could have been under stress. Presume it was
a first offence. Puzzled as to why he did it.
He was an officer of the law and shouldn't do things like
that.
He is a police officer and is supposed to protect people in
the community - not harm them.
He was a policeman and his attack was unprovoked and
unnecessary.
He is a police officer - probably over-reacted due to stress
at work.
As a police officer, his behaviour should be exemplary.

